CFATS Lapse Impacts

CISA has recently change the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrroism Standards (CFATS) program landing page, providing additional information about the impact of the termination of the program. Below the box added on July 28^th, CISA has inserted a new box titled ‘CFATS Lapse Impacts’ that outline the problems that CISA faces trying to help protect high-risk chemical facilities since the program ended because of inaction on the part of the Senate.

The addition notes that:

• CISA cannot inspect high-risk sites—on average, that's 160 inspections per month going unscheduled.
• CISA cannot conduct terrorist vetting on personnel who have access to dangerous chemicals—that's 9,000 names each month going unvetted.
• CISA cannot require the implementation of cyber and physical security measures or assess the risk to these facilities and the communities that surround them—on average, facilities improve their security posture by nearly 60% to comply with CFATS.
• CISA cannot identify new facilities that possess high-risk chemicals—meaning the locations of dangerous chemicals are unknown to CISA and local first responders.
• More than one third of inspections turn up security gaps—CISA can no longer address these gaps with facilities.
• More than 90% of CFATS visits result in confirmed outreach with law enforcement and the local fire department—CISA can no longer confirm these important relationships and ensure critical information sharing and preparedness.

Readers who attended (live or online) the Chemical Security Summit in August heard all of this on Day 1 of the Summit in the opening presentations by Director Jen Easterly and Associate Director Kelly Murray. Further details were provided in the State of Chemical Security presentation by Murray. Still, since Congress has still not acted, it bears repeating often and loudly.