Earlier this month Rep. Kilmer (D,WA) introduced HR 3712,
the Major General Tim Lowenberg National Guard Cyber Defenders Act. The
bill would provide specific authorization for military reserve component cyber
civil support teams. NOTE: For more on Gen. Lowenberg see here and here.
Emergency Preparedness Programs
Section 2 of the bill amends 10 USC
12310(c) which provides for military reservists to be used in an active
duty role to support of emergency preparedness programs. It would add a new
subparagraph (1)(E) to add “An attack or natural disaster impacting a computer,
electronic, or cyber network” to the list of covered emergencies for which the
emergency preparedness programs would be appropriate.
The bill then goes on to add a new subparagraph (3)(B) that
would specifically allow an individual reservist or a “a reserve component
cyber civil support team” to provide emergency preparedness support for the
newly added cyber-attacks or disasters.
Cyber Civil Support Team Authorization
Section 3 of the bill requires that each state will have
(within 5 years) “an operational reserve component cyber civil support team
composed of reserve component members of the Armed Forces” {§3(a)}. To be considered
operational each Cyber Civil Support Team would be required to be able to {§3(c)}:
• Perform duties relating to
analysis and protection in support of responding to emergencies involving an
attack or natural disaster impacting a computer, electronic, or cyber network;
• Advise and coordinate on any
incident deemed critical for the protection of life, property, and maintenance
of good order for the Governor;
• Cooperate with and assist private
sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure and key resources;
• Collaborate and participate in
information sharing with Federal, State, and local Fusion Centers, emergency
management authorities, and emergency management divisions; and
• Coordinate with elements of the Department of
Homeland Security.
Section 4 of the bill ensures that these Cyber Civil Support
Teams are specifically covered by the provisions of the Freedom of Information
Act under 5
USC 552.
Section 5 of the bill provides for a spending authorization
of $50 million for support of the requirements of this bill.
Moving Forward
Neither Kilmer nor his two cosponsors {Rep. Palazzo (R,MS)
and Rep. Heck (D,WA)} are members of the House Armed Services Committee to
which this bill was assigned for consideration. This means that the bill is
very unlikely to be considered in that Committee; pretty much ensuring that the
bill will not get to the floor of the House for a vote.
There is nothing in this bill which would engender any
serious opposition to its passage. The one major drawback to the bill is the
spending authorization, but that is one area where Kilmer and Palazzo have some
influence, since they are both on the House Appropriations Committee. If the
bill were to be considered it is quite likely that it would receive substantial
bipartisan support.
Commentary
While there is a great deal of talk in Congress about
protecting critical infrastructure from cyber-attacks, there does not seem to
be too much that the military can do to protect the vast majority of critical
infrastructure cyber-systems that are owned by the private sector. In fact,
there is a very real argument that the private sector is responsible for that
and should pay for that protection via activities either in-house or through a
wide variety of organizations in the ever-expanding cybersecurity market place.
However, where cyber breaches have a physical impact on the
community beyond the boundaries of critical infrastructure, there is certainly
a need for the kind of support outlined in this bill. What concerns me about
the approach taken in the bill is the focus on post-incident response instead
of emergency preparedness planning.
Planning for the potential consequences of broadly effective
cybersecurity incidents is a pre-requisite for effective responses to such wide
scale incidents. In fact, the §12310(c)
program was founded on the idea that providing one or two professional planners
(military folks are, after all, as much planners as they are fighters) to local
government emergency-response planning agencies was a cost-effective way of
helping to mitigate the consequences of terrorist attacks and natural
disasters.
All but the largest local government agencies are ill
prepared to plan for or respond to cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure.
Most have problems enough providing for their own cybersecurity prevention
efforts, much less have time or resources to plan for attacks on privately
owned critical infrastructure effecting their area. Cyber Civil Support Teams
under State control could provide another (though still limited) resource for
local governments involved in the planning process.
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