The DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety
Administration (PHMSA) published a meeting notice in today’s Federal Register (80 FR
48620-48621) for a PHMSA Pipeline Risk Modeling Methodologies Public
Workshop on September 9th and 10th, 2015 in Arlington,
VA.
PHMSA notes that the “workshop
will focus on advancing risk modeling approaches by looking at risk modelling
methodologies for pipeline and non-pipeline systems, and practical ways that
operators can adopt and/or adapt them to the analyses of their systems”.
The draft agenda can be found on the meeting web site and
will be updated as the meeting date approaches. That agenda currently includes:
∙ Current Regulatory Requirements for Evaluations of Risk
∙ State Regulatory Perspective
∙ Industry risk improvement approaches post-San Bruno and Marshall
events
∙ International Regulatory Perspective - Risk Evaluation Approaches
∙ Other Industry Regulatory Risk Requirements and Approaches
∙ Practical Risk Modelling Challenges
∙ Path Forward (PHMSA)
∙ Panel
Discussion / Q&A Opportunity
This is the same meeting that I
posted about last month. Where the earlier PHMSA notice was more of a
request for abstracts for possible presenters at the meeting, this is a notice about
the actual meeting itself. Copies of the submitted abstract can be found
here.
This is a public meeting and it will be web cast.
Registration for either live attendance or via the web cast can be done on the meeting web
site. Public comments on the topic may be submitted before or after the
workshop via the Federal eRulemaking Portal (www.Regulations.gov; Docket # PHMSA-2015-0139).
Commentary
While most people consider pipeline risks to be associated
with the physical integrity of the pipeline and perhaps preventing damage to
the pipeline from a physical attack, it is becoming more and more obvious that
gas and hazardous material pipelines are also subject to attacks and accidental
damage due to control system hazards.
The introduction to this notice states that:
“To support integrity management
requirements, a risk analysis modeling approach must be able to adequately characterize
all pipeline integrity threats [emphasis added] and consequences
concurrently, and the impact of measures to reduce risk must be evaluated.”
It is disappointing to see that this cyber threats (both
deliberate and incidental) do not seem to have been addressed by any of the
abstracts submitted for this workshop and it is not mentioned in the draft
agenda for this workshop. Perhaps a discussion about the need to include the
cyber perspective in any comprehensive risk model for pipelines should be added
by PHMSA.
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