HR 1502 Introduced – Counterterrorism Intelligence

Last week Rep. Wolf (R, VA) introduced HR 1502, the Team B Act. The legislation attempts to address the issue of the intelligence community missing valuable indicators of terrorist intentions or planning because they have become so enamored with their previous predictions that they are unable to recognize the importance of indicators of other actions.

The bill would establish the Counterterrorism Competitive Analysis Council reporting to the Director of National Intelligence. The members of the Council would come from outside of the government intelligence community; it even limits the number of previous members of that community that could be on the Council at any one time.

This ‘B team’ of the bill title would have access to all of the intelligence available to the government intelligence analysts. They would then be required to “prepare a competitive analysis of each national intelligence estimate concerning al-Qaeda and other foreign terrorist organizations” {§3(b)(2)} as well as advising the Director on “threats of international terrorism and domestic radicalization based on all-source information” {§3(b)(1)}.

A non-institutional look at intelligence information is always a good idea as long as appropriate information controls are in place. The $5 Million price tag {§3(g)} authorized for this program (coming out of the current DNI budget – thus no new net spending) is a small price to pay.

I have one minor concern about the composition of this body. Section 3(c)(1) would have all eight members “appointed by the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation [emphasis added] with the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate”. I would prefer to see the DNI appoint 4 members and the Chairman and Ranking Members of each of the referenced Select Committees appoint a member. I think that this would provide for a selection of personnel with a wider divergence of backgrounds.

While this Council is directed to look at ‘domestic radicalization’ it would seem logical to assume that a group appointed by the DNI would have more of an external focus on Al Qaeda and its wannabes than an internal focus on non-Islamic oriented radical groups in the United States; the real ‘domestic terrorist’ organizations. It might be a good idea to set up a similar shop within DHS to take a second look at domestic counter-terrorism intelligence.