Before leaving Washington for the summer recess, the House
Homeland Security Committee filed their report on HR
1073, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act (CIPA). There are no
changes to the bill beyond what I
already reported, but there is some discussion about the one controversy
surrounding the bill.
EMP vs Geomagnetic
Storm
Section 2(a) of the revised bill
amends 6
USC 101 by adding the definition of ‘EMP’. That definition includes both intentional
man made electromagnetic pulse events and geomagnetic disturbances caused by
solar storms.
On page 7 of the Committee
Report there is a discussion about the difference between the two types of
events. It clearly states that:
“The committee is aware of the
concerns of industry in the possible confusion between pulses caused by
intentional means, such as a high altitude nuclear weapon detonation, and those
caused by natural phenomena such as solar storms. The magnitude and the temporal
duration of the energy released are very different.”
Ranking Member Thompson (D,MS), in his ‘additional view’
response to the report on page 19, further explains the distinction between the
two types of events this way:
“An EMP event is manmade and
expected to impact all microprocessors. A GMD is naturally-occurring and
expected to impact primarily bulk power and communication systems.”
This, of course means that the mitigation measures
undertaken to lessen the effects of the two types of events will be different.
They will both need to provide similar protections of the electric grid, but an
EMP event would also have to protect a much wider variety (and much larger
number) of electronic devices throughout the country to be effective.
Moving Forward
Because the bill allows no regulatory action or the spending
of any new money this bill passed in Committee by a voice vote, even considering
Thompson’s concerns. I would expect this bill to see the same bipartisan
support on the floor of the House where it will almost certainly be considered
under the ‘suspension of the rules’ process with limited debate and no
amendments. There is a very good chance that this bill will reach the floor
before the end of the fiscal year even with everything else that will be going
on the House.
Commentary
While the Committee noted that the intent of their EMP
definition was to “keep these electromagnetic pulse initiating events distinct
and separate, as well as the resulting impact on critical infrastructure such
as the electric power grid” (pg 7) it would seem to me that defining the two
terms separately and requiring planning and research activities to address both
types of events would have made that distinction clearer.
This is not just a semantic distinction. It may be possible
to protect the electric grid from a geomagnetic storm (GMS) event, or at least
provide adequate spare parts to get substantial parts of the grid back into
operation in a reasonable time after such an event. All it would take is large
sums of money. The problem with a large scale EMP event is that while many of
those same grid protection measures may be useable to mitigate an EMP event’s
effect on the grid, the larger problem of the destruction of nearly all
electronic devices within line of site of the nuclear device initiating the EMP
event cannot practically be mitigated.
Smaller scale, non-nuclear EMP attacks (like that shown in
the movie Oceans
Eleven), are of course a different matter. Their small scale and relatively
limited impact would still be much more difficult to mitigate than a similar
scale GMS event, again because of the simultaneous destruction of
microprocessor based devices. But, depending on the size of the device used, it
may be possible to throw enough money at the problem after the attack to allow
for a reasonable recovery.
This bill will move to the Senate in its current form. There
is a remote chance that it will be revised by the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee before it comes to a floor vote, but I suspect
that it will move straight to consideration on the floor of the Senate by
unanimous consent.
This means that we will have to rely on DHS to make a reasonable
distinction between these two types of events. Hopefully they would use their
limited resources (again no new resources are being authorized in this bill) to
concentrate on the GMS threat and pretty much ignore the EMP event. Spending
any time or money on the EMP threat will achieve nothing but detracting from
other work on more likely threats.
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