Yesterday the DHS ICS-CERT published two new advisories; one
for the Siemens WinCC application and another for the MatrikonOPC for DNP
application.
Siemens Advisory
This advisory is for two vulnerabilities in SIMATIC WinCC,
both as a stand alone application and as implemented in SIMATIC PCS7 and TIA
Portal. These are apparently self-identified vulnerabilities for which Siemens
has updates for some of the affected products and is working on updates for the
others.
ICS-CERT identifies the vulnerabilities as:
• Remote code execution - CVE-2014-8551;
and
• Transfer/extract files - CVE-2014-8552.
Interestingly this tells us what the exploit of the
vulnerability is not what the vulnerability is. The Siemens ProductCERT
advisory is not any more forthcoming on this topic than is the ICS-CERT
Advisory. I suspect that any more detailed description of the actual vulnerability
would make it easy for the average hacker to figure out how to exploit these
vulnerabilities.
ICS-CERT reports that a relatively unskilled attacker could
remotely exploit these vulnerabilities. ICS-CERT reports that a exploits for
these vulnerabilities may already be available and these vulnerabilities “may
have been exploited during a recent campaign”. Siemens acknowledges assistance
from Symantec Deepsight Intelligence which may substantiate that claim.
Siemens published their advisory on Friday. I noted in a TWEET® on Friday
morning the unusual lack of description of the type of vulnerability. With
the apparent level of risk involved and the wide spread use of these
applications I am very surprised (and disconcerted) that ICS-CERT took this
long to publish this advisory.
MatrikonOPC Advisory
This advisory
reports an unhandled C++ exception vulnerability in the MatrikonOPC DNP3
application. The vulnerability was reported by Crain-Sistrunk and was
discovered under their Project Robus
using their Aegis Fuzzer (I ought
to charge these guys advertising fees, but I like their chutzpah too much). It
looks like this is now 26 reported of 31 disclosed for the DNP3 protocol and this
is a different vulnerability than most of those previously reported by this
team.
ICS-CERT reports that MatrikonOPC has produced a new version
that mitigates this vulnerability but does not say that Crain-Sistrunk have
verified the efficacy of that mitigation.
ICS-CERT reports that a moderately skilled attacker could
remotely exploit this vulnerability to effect a denial of service attack that
would require a manual reboot of the system. The MatrikonOPC
Security Notification that a successful exploit would “require expert
knowledge of both the DNP3 protocol and an in-depth understanding of the
vulnerability that exists in the affected versions of the MatrikonOPC Server
for DNP3”.
MatrikonOPC published their notice on October 22nd,
over a month ago. There is no indication in the ICS-CERT advisory that this had
been released on the US-CERT Secure Portal, so I wonder why it took so long for
this advisory to be published? Could they have been trying to convince
MatrikonOPC to allow Crain-Sistrunk to verify that their update worked?
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