Congressional Hearings – Week of 3-15-10

There will be three hearings this coming week that might be of interest to the chemical security community; nothing dealing directly with chemical facility security directly, but of interest none the less. Coast Guard There will be two hearings concerning the Coast Guard. The first will be a budget hearing before the Homeland Security Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. This will be held on Wednesday, March 17th, at 10:00. One area of interest that will almost certainly come up is the issue of the implementation of TWIC Readers at MTSA facilities. This final step of the TWIC implementation is behind schedule and the delays are being questioned. The second hearing will be before the Senate Energy and Commerce Committee on Thursday the 18th, at 10:00 am. They will be conducting hearings on several nominations, including that of Vice Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., to be Commandant of the United States Coast Guard. Adm. Pap has come under criticism for his justification for several proposed reductions of Coast Guard programs in support of port security operations. Counter-Terrorism The Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the House Homeland Security Community will be holding a hearing on March 17th, at 10:00 am that should be of interest of anyone with concerns about preventing terrorist attacks. Entitled: “Working with Communities to Disrupt Terror Plots”, this hearing will look at how communities can counter violent extremism. This is of particular import with the continued revelations of more Americans being involved in terror plots and actions here and abroad.

CFATS is Dying?

I got an interesting email from Bill Crews, Security Manager at the Port of Houston. He told me about a conversation he recently had with someone who mentioned that ‘CFATS was dying on the vine’. I’ve heard this in a couple of different places now and I think that that is a completely inappropriate conclusion to draw. Unfortunately, I may have had a hand in the starting of the rumors of the premature death of CFATS. Source of the Rumor Earlier this week SecurityDirecorNews.com published an article by Leischen Stelter based upon an interview she did with me. Entitled: CFATS: “It’s dead”; Leischen did a very good job describing my views on the state of legislation to extend and expand the authority for CFATS. Now anyone that has had anything to do with the news business knows that headlines are not necessarily communicators of fact, but are crafted as attention grabbers to get the reader to read the article. In this case, the “It’s Dead” quote is taken from my description of the apparent status of HR 2868, not CFATS. That is absolutely clear from reading Leischen’s article. CFATS Health Report First off, I have not heard a single politician say anything about canceling CFATS. While many people in the activist community believe that CFATS does not go far enough in protecting the people of the United States from the potential consequences of a terrorist attack on high risk facilities, they want to expand it not kill it. The opposition to the expansion of CFATS coverage has been generous in their praise of the current program and have offered lengthy extensions of the current CFATS authority as an alternative to the expansion of that authority. DHS has been slower on the implementation of CFATS than many of us would have liked to have seen, but they have been operating at a considerable handicap because they have had to make this stuff up as they go along. DHS has developed an innovative series of on-line tools for collecting very detailed information on a wide range of facilities that use potentially dangerous chemicals. Additionally they have had to establish a completely new regulatory scheme with little political guidance from Congress and some very serious constraints upon their authority. The CFATS inspection staff continues to grow. The latest series of new hires is preparing to attend the Chemical Security Academy (oh yes, this also had to be developed) so that they will have both the technical and regulatory skills necessary to help facilities adequately protect themselves against terrorist attacks. Another job posting is expected in the near future for the next class of inspectors. Finally, the leadership of the Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (the home of CFATS) has been running around talking to industry (and a very widely eclectic group of industries it is) to explain the new rules even while they are cajoling individual facilities into plugging the holes in their site security plans. And, oh yes, we’ve just learned that, even with all of that on their plate, they have completed a draft of comprehensive chemical security legislation so that maybe this time they’ll have a law that can actually be enforced. No, CFATS is not dead or dying. It is one of the more vibrant and active programs in DHS and it is just now reaching its maturity. Premature reports of its demise are not only incorrect but inappropriate.

Tips for Completing SSP

ADT Security has been a frequent source of information about CFATS implementation. Their latest offering, a white paper offering Ten Tips for Completing a Site Security Plan, can be downloaded from ChemicalProcessing.com. Unlike many white papers from chemical industry vendors, this document has almost no self-promotion. In fact, the only advertising in this document is the ADT logo on each page and a brief explanation of the services they provide on the last page.

The well written text provides details on their following ten tips:

1. Develop Your Plan Before You Begin the SSP 2. Know What Your Tier Level Means 3. Understand the Ramifications of “Release” Security Issues and “Theft & Diversion” Security Issues 4. Include All of Your Critical Assets in Your Plan 5. Apply the Concepts of Control, Deter, Detect & Delay 6. Record Your Answers & Rationale 7. Consider Using Industry Standards & Best Practices 8. Generate a List of Security Procedures 9. Generate a List of Responsible Personnel 10. Seek Help with Your Plan

There is good information on each tip, but I particularly like their 5th Tip. ADT takes the Deter, Detect and Delay information provided by DHS in the Risk Based Performance Guidance Document and adds an important new concept, Control. They describe ‘control’ this way:

“This is the ability of a facility to manage its activities and assets. Control requires that a facility have policies, procedures and technologies in place that establish rights, authorities and responsibilities and to provide monitoring and feedback. Control applies to nearly every aspect of security, from designating who has access and what they have access to, to determining how access is granted and monitoring how that access is used. Control applies to information as well as access to physical space and assets. Control also requires that a facility maintain a reporting and management structure that supports the allocation of authority and responsibility.”

I have no idea how good a job ADT does with actually helping chemical facilities with the development and implementation of site security plans, but I have been very impressed with the information provided in their webinars and now this white paper. I certainly recommend that any facility working on their Site Security Plan should download and read this free whitepaper.

Lieberman on DHS Budget

Earlier this week Sen. Lieberman (I, CT), the Chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Operations Committee sent his annual letter to the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee presenting his views on the President’s budget request. There were only two areas in the letter that addressed issues of specific interest to the chemical security community. Sen. Lieberman supported the President’s requested increase for the TSA surface transportation security program. While most of this was directed at passenger rail protection it continued funding for last year’s planned increases for surface transportation security inspectors. Part of their job will be the enforcement of the TSA’s freight rail security program. The other area of interest to our community is the funding for the chemical security program. Lieberman supports the budget request for $105 million for the chemical security program (both CFATS and the pending ammonium nitrate regulations). Specifically the letter states:

“I strongly urge the Committee to provide at least that amount for the program. The Department is currently entering the most intensive phase of the program – reviewing the proposed security plans of the riskiest chemical facilities and conducting site inspections. It is critical the Department continue to receive adequate funds to conduct this work and acquire additional expertise with which to evaluate and advise on security at the varied enterprises that use and store dangerous chemicals.”

Interestingly, there is no mention in Lieberman’s letter of the President’s request for another one-year extension of the current CFATS authorization. Of course, last year there was little or no discussion of a similar extension request that was ultimately included in the FY 2010 DHS budget. While the Chairman’s views of the DHS budget do not control how the Appropriations Committee will write the actual legislation, the fact that he is actively supporting the Administration on these areas almost ensures that these provisions will make it into the bill drafted by the Appropriations Committee.

Chemical Sector CIKR Page Update 03-10-10

Yesterday DHS updated their Chemical Sector Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource web page. This page provides an brief overview of how the Chemical Sector fits in with other sectors in the National Infrastructure Protection Program (NIPP). DHS added a brief video to the page explaining the importance of the public-private partnership currently being used to protect facilities within the Chemical Sector and their local neighbors.

Reader Comments 03-10-10 Ad-Posts

Long time readers of this blog are aware of the fact that I have chosen to ‘moderate’ comments. This means that I reserve the right to decide which comments get posted to this blog. Generally speaking I am pretty loose in what I allow and promise never to use my power to moderate to squash legitimate opposing opinions. I have also said on a couple of different occasions that I will allow companies to post comments that are blatantly advertising for security related products and services. Be forewarned, however, that I reserve the right to comment upon those products and services as well as their manner of advertising. Yesterday there were two such advertising posts made to separate blog entries. The first was made to a reader comment posting from February and the advertisement was for gate lighting systems. The second was made to posting on chlorine railcars from last December and that advertisement was for a secondary chlorine containment system for railcars. Since both of these advertisements were appended to older blog postings, I really doubt that they would garner much attention (were it not for this commentary, of course). Those pages are, of course, periodically found in internet searches, so the ‘adposts’ are not a complete waste of time. I am disappointed in both of the posters, however, because they chose to remain ‘Anonymous’ in their posting. It is readily apparent that these are advertisement type comments so I would have thought that it would have been beneficial for the authors to have identified themselves in the addresses of their posts. To be fair, the second posting does appear to have identified the poster in the body of the advertisement, but it is still listed as coming from ‘Anonymous’. Skip the Hyperbole One of the first rules of advertising is to understand your intended audience. Too often I see these advertising posts completely underestimating the intelligence and sophistication of the readers of this blog. For instance, the lighting system poster makes the preposterous statement that: “Turning a soft target into a hard target can be easily and inexpensively accomplished by a highly visible lighting system at the front gate.” While I would certainly agree that adequate lighting at that portion of the facility perimeter is important, it is hardly the be-all and end-all of security measures. Insulting your intended audience with such nonsense does little to forward your cause. Eliminate C-Kit This is the second comment about the “C-Kit Petition” that has been posted to my blog about the chlorine railcars stored in Washington State for the duration of the Olympics. Apparently TGO Technologies of Santa Rosa, CA has developed a secondary containment device to capture chlorine releases from railcar pressure relief devices and railcar domes; they are trying to get FRA to require their installation on all chlorine railcars. If their device works it should help to eliminate a number of the smaller releases experienced by these railcars; a laudable idea. Both of the posts to this blog contain vague references to a ‘first responder’s petition’ but I can find no actual petition to either PHMSA or the FRA asking that this device be required on TIH railcars. There is a copy of comment by BNSF railroad on a two year old docket about the increased safety of TIH railcars, but that is hardly a petition for this device. The latest posting does provide a link for a petition web site which provides testimonials from a large number of first responders. I wish them the best of luck, but I don’t think that attempting to get a Federal Agency to require the use of the device is an effective use of time or energy. The Agency is unlikely to specify their device; the best they can hope for is a requirement for a secondary containment device. I think they would be better off trying to sell their device to owners of chlorine railcars.

Sales Support Information

From time to time I receive emails from a variety of security related companies that have discovered my blog while doing some internet searching about chemical facility security information. Typically these emails come from a market development type person who is looking for information to either justify moving into the chemical security market place or to help them identify potential customers in this expanding market. Sales Support Generally I try to be courteous to these folks. They are doing a tough job, breaking into a new market. Besides, if the technology or services they provide are worthwhile, high-risk chemical facilities can use all of the help they can get putting cost effective and efficient security systems into place. Unfortunately, I seldom have any way of evaluating how cost effective or efficient their products/services are. I received one today that is fairly typical of this type of email. I’ll leave the company name out of this discussion because it could have been anyone of a number that finally drove me to write this posting. This one had a list of questions that they wanted my help answering; questions designed to help them determine the size of the market segment and potential sales volumes that might be directed at the type of service they were selling. This email writer is going to receive less help than normal because I won’t be able to provide much in the way of answers. Some questions I can’t (and wouldn’t) answer. For example they wanted to know where to get a list of Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities. DHS is obviously closely holding that list for good and legitimate reasons. Anyone in the security business should understand that. Most of the other questions presuppose a level of knowledge about the current state of security system installations at CFATS facilities that I just don’t have. Most of my long time readers understand that I haven’t worked in a chemical facility in a couple of years now and I certainly don’t have the type of wide spread contacts necessary to know the level of spending being allocated to various types of security systems. I wish that I did; it would provide me a better understanding of the problems being experienced industry wide with the CFATS implementation. As I said, I try to be courteous and helpful to these types of people. I spent a short time in sales and know how hard it is to develop the type of information that is necessary for starting entry into a new market. Unfortunately, I won’t be of hardly any help to this company’s representative. I just don’t have the necessary information. Information Exchange One thing that generally surprises me about these information solicitations is that they are almost always one way; they want me to provide information to them, but offer nothing in exchange. Long time readers realize that I am a true believer and I am not making any money from this blog (well, I did recently receive a small check from Google for allowing them to post ads on my site, but that doesn’t really count). I’m not asking for monetary compensation for the information they request. Actually I’m asking for something more valuable from my point of view; information. Information about their company and products would be helpful. Information about how they can help hard-pressed facility security managers do their job would be better. Information about the threat environment would be best. You see, to do my job as a blogger, I have to have great stores of information to draw upon to write my daily screeds. I have to be a valuable source of information to attract readers; readers who will ask interesting questions, and provide interesting information. That is what I need, information. If they can teach me something new, tell me a new story, or provide me new contacts, then I’ll be more than happy to share my information with them. Not by Information Alone My wife wants me to add a crass commercial note. I do have to pay bills. I currently support this blog by writing some articles for the Journal of Hazmat Transportation and doing some contract industrial development training. I am a free lance writer and always willing to talk about doing writing work. I obviously have some background in chemical facility security issues, but I am a quick learner and willing to write just about anything. Feel free to contact me at anytime about doing some writing work.