Monday, January 11, 2010

Reader Comment – 01-10-10 – Threat Training

Ed Clark, a consultant with Executive Interface, left a response yesterday to an earlier blog about a terror threat training class being offered in Winston-Salem, NC. He wrote:
“Having made THREAT my pet peeve several years in a row, this is a lot to bite off in just 4 hours. Needless to say I am skeptical at the true value of a four hour class that promises this much.”
Ed is certainly correct that a four hour class trying to cover terror planning methodology will be no more than a brief survey of the field. Those personnel who have any significant counter-terror training will likely find any class of this length to be of very little use. Having said that, there are a huge number of people in the chemical security community with absolutely no counter-terrorism backgrounds. Most facility security managers will be chemists or chemical engineers. They need the access to the very basic level of information that a course like this would cover. Hopefully, they would then go on to other courses that provide the type of knowledge that Ed and I would like to see them exposed to. Unfortunately, I have seen very little counter-terror training directed at this audience. When I do see something, even where it is really only applicable in a fairly small area, I will pass it on. I do wish that I could provide more information on the background of the instructors and the probable quality of the course, but I just don’t have the resources to do that. Again, if any of my readers have any knowledge of counter-terrorism training directed at those with little tactical background or training, please let me know.

Sunday, January 10, 2010

DHS CFATS FAQ Page Update 01-08-10

Last week DHS updated/posted answers to eight questions on the CFATS Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) web page. The first four answers are updates to previously answered questions and the remaining four are answers to new questions. The eight questions are: 1143: My company is a spin-off of two separate corporations. As a result several of the new company's facilities are co-located. That is, the facilities either share a fenceline or are completely imbedded within a common facility. What will be required of us in regards to CFATS? Do both companies need to develop a Top Screen, SVA, and Site Security Plan? Is it possible for our imbedded plants to share the Top Screen, SVA, and Site Security Plan with the host company? If this is possible, what would be required by both companies to accomplish this and be compliant under 6 CFR Part 27? 1567: How does a facility count the amount of release flammable COI in a mixture with a National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) rating of 1, 2 or 3 that is not a fuel? 1568: How does a facility count the amount of release-flammable mixture with a National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) rating of 4 if it is stored in either below or above ground tank(s)? 1633: What is a proposed measure and why would a facility include one in the SSP? 1619: I recently received a new CSAT tiering letter for my facility and the facility has an elapsed Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) due date. What do I do? 1657: Does DHS have a list of specific security measures that are required at CFATS-covered high-risk facilities? 1658: What is required of an Alternate Security Program to be acceptable in lieu of an SSP? 1659: What are “planned” measures and why would a facility include them in the SSP? Flammable Mixtures Two of the questions that have updated answers deal with the subject of how to count chemicals of interest in flammable mixtures. There are significant differences between these new answers and the previous time they were answered back on September 3rd, 2008 and the new answers will almost certainly add to the confusion surrounding this topic; changes can be confusing even if they are correct. Question 1567 substantially changes the instructions from the old answer for counting flammable COI in a mixture where the mixture has a NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) rating of 1, 2, or 3. The old answer included the requirement that: “Mixtures with an NFPA flammability hazard rating of 1, 2 or 3 are calculated by multiplying the perentage of the COI times the total weight of the mixture to see if the amount of the COI is at or above the STQ.” There is no such requirement in 6 CFR 27.204(a)(2). The new answer removes that language and affirms that such mixtures are not counted in the Top Screen as long as the mixture is not a fuel. Question 1568 simplifies the previous answer to this question by just stating that: “A facility must count the entire weight of any release-flammable mixtures with an NFPA rating of 4 toward the STQ, regardless of whether the mixture is stored in below ground or above ground tanks.” To make it more ‘technically’ correct the wording should probably be: “…the entire weight of a mixture containing a release-flammable chemical of interest at a concentration equal to or greater than 1% with an NFPA….” Other Changed Answers In the answer to question 1143 DHS emphasizes that while it would typically be the party responsible for the security of the COI that would have to make the appropriate submissions, DHS acknowledges that special cases will certainly exist. They suggest that if there is any question about this specific issue that the parties should consult with the Help Desk (866-323-2957) for individual determinations. The other previously answered question provides DHS to address, in a small way, the issue of inherently safer technologies. The answer provides a new response that was not previously included in the list of items that a facility might want to include in the ‘proposed security measures’ sections of the SSP submission. The new response is: “Changes in processes, operations, or chemical uses a facility is considering or proposing.” This would allow DHS to advise facilities if their proposed IST measure would change their security situation. New Questions As is usual with these reviews, I suggest that everyone in the chemical security community that might be dealing with CFATS issues should read the answers that DHS provides for new questions. These four questions are no different. I don’t see any really new information in any of these answers. The answer to the ASP question does provide an interesting reference to an explanation of Alternative Security Plan in the preamble to the Interim Final Rule for 6 CFR Part 27. Since most people will not have seen the interim final rule this is a valuable reference.

Friday, January 8, 2010

Terror Threat Training

Yesterday the Department of Homeland Security sent out their weekly Homeland Security Newsletter (subscribe). As part of their normal announcements they included the listing for a class conducted in Winston-Salem, NC. The course, Criminal Elements and Terrorist Threat Analysis and Threat Assessments, was listed as being restricted to members of a public-safety agency. Knowing that this type of course would be valuable for security managers at high-risk facilities (who wouldn’t be members of a public-safety agency) I emailed the point of contact listed on the course description document, August Vernon. He did confirm that the course had been opened to ‘CIP partners’ (Critical Infrastructure Protection), but that the listed course was already full and had a waiting list. He did tell me that he had another course coming up soon (March 8th (Monday) 0830-1230) dealing with the terrorist operational planning cycle. According to the flyer that August sent me:
“This 4-hour course identifies how terrorists use a structured methodology to plan their operations. Pre-operational surveillance of the targets location and behavior patterns are critical to the success of the adversary missions. In this module, students learn how terrorist groups plan their operations and methods to conduct surveillance, the indicators they project, and the countermeasures that public safety agencies can use to disrupt terrorist planning.”
Again this sounds like a valuable course for anyone wanting to understand how terrorist organizations work, a pre-requisite to planning a proper counter-terrorism strategy for a city or a high-risk chemical facility. This course is nearly full, so if you wish to attend contact August as soon as possible. Since this is only a four hour course it will probably only be of interest to someone within driving distance of Winston-Salem, NC. Anyone knowing of similar regional courses, please let me know. I certainly would be willing to publicize these to the chemical security community.

Plant Security and the Shooter

Nancy Bartels at ControlGlobal.com has an interesting post on their SoundOff blog about the security issues involved with incidents like yesterday’s ‘disgruntled employee’ shooting at the ABB manufacturing facility in St. Louis. While she addressed the security-safety issue I would like to point out that the site security plans being developed and implemented at 6,000+ high-risk chemical facilities across the country should help to reduce the occurrence of these type incidents. The security measures required to protect plants against terrorist attacks also have some utility in preventing these types of attacks. Risk-Based Performance Standard #3, Screen and Control Access, addresses efforts to limit the introduction of hazardous devices (which certainly should include firearms) into the facility. The Summary Metric for all four tier levels includes language requiring the screening process to deter “the unauthorized introduction of dangerous substances and devices to the facility” (pg 46). The idea of a homicidally enraged employee stalking a facility with loaded weapons strikes fear into the heart of any facility manager. At a high-risk chemical facility, with containers of dangerous chemicals sitting around, the risk becomes even higher. Even if the employee does not specifically target those containers, high-speed projectiles from firearms are likely to puncture those containers anyway. The releases from the small bullet holes will probably be less than catastrophic. That will be little comfort to employees that are exposed to those chemicals while they are trying to hide from the direct attack by weapon wielding employee. The prevention of these types of attacks is not specifically the target of the CFATS regulations. High-risk facility management can, however, take some comfort that the actions they take to meet the DHS requirements for anti-terror measures will also help protect their employees from random acts of employee rage.

IST Compliance

I am going to close out this series of blog ‘re-postings’ about IST with an original post looking at IST compliance issues. The earlier postings in the current series were:
Writing IST Legislation
IST Reader Comment - Scheduling
What Standard to Apply for IST - Limits
What Standard to Apply for IST – Cost Estimates
IST Reader Comments – Sources and Standards
IST Reader Comments – IST Incentives

 Last week I had an interesting telephone conversation with Jon Kalmuss-Katz, a reader from NYU. It was a lengthy discussion of the IST provisions of HR 2868. Jon asked an interesting question during that discussion; he asked my opinion about the probable effectiveness of the IST provisions in HR 2868. As with everything else associated with the entire IST debate, there is no simple answer to that question, but a discussion of the subject seems like an excellent way to close out this series of blogs.

IST Assessment 

I think that the requirement to for every high-risk facility to perform an IST assessment has the potential to be the most effective part of this legislation in getting high-risk chemical facilities to change chemicals and processes. The reason for this is that for many, probably most, of the 6,000+ covered facilities, this will be the first time that they have taken a systematic look at the chemical processes that they use with the view to possibly changing to a safer process.

Now many facilities will have already looked at alternative processes as part of their EPA and OSHA mandated process safety reviews. The facilities with chemical engineering or chemical R&D support are more likely to have looked at safer processes. The reason is actually fairly simple; handling dangerous chemicals is expensive. The government reporting requirements, the added safety equipment, and the liability issues all increase the costs of these processes. As part of the standard business cost-cutting program, most facilities with the technical capabilities to do so will look at alternative processes to reduce their manufacturing costs.

Unfortunately, a large number of chemical facilities will not have adequate technical resources in-house to conduct such a review. In the normal course of business they would just continue to use the same chemicals and processes that they have for years. The EPA and OSHA process safety reviews do not specifically require looking at alternative processes and are rarely checked in any case. So, there is no clear incentive to conduct such studies. If the IST provisions of HR 2868 are passed into law (very likely in some form) these facilities will be required to complete and document an IST assessment. They still won’t have the in-house resources to do this, but, because of the legal requirement, they will turn to outside engineering consultants to conduct and document the assessments.

Now, if these assessments turn up effective alternative processes that will save the companies money, most companies will implement the appropriate process changes. There is every economic incentive to do so and economic incentives drive most of the decision making in corporate America. The key here will be putting effective review procedures in place to ensure that the assessments are actually done.

The big problem with the OSHA and EPA process safety review requirements is that there is no effective governmental check of the adequacy of those reviews unless there is a significant accident at the site. To be fair to those two agencies, Congress has never provided funding or authority for such agency reviews and approvals of the safety studies.

Presumably, DHS would develop an IST Tool to be used as part of the current Chemical Security Assessment Tool (CSAT). Such a tool would have to provide for the submission of enough information that DHS would be able to evaluate the adequacy of the assessment as well as its substance.

Mandated Implementation

The current language of HR 2868 {§2111(b)(1)(A)} as passed in the House only allows the Director of the Office of Chemical Security to consider the information provided in the assessment in making the determination of whether to require the implementation of the inherently safer technology. Included in the Director’s determination is the requirement to ensure that the hazard to be avoided at the facility is not simply transferred to another location.

There is, however, an inherent problem with this that Jon identified in our conversation; how does DHS ensure that the hazard is not transferred to another location? HR 2868 requires that the conversion does not create a new Tier 1 or 2 covered facility {§2111(b)(1)(a)(i)(II)} or conversion of a Tier 3 or 4 facility to Tier 1 or 2 {§2111(b)(1)(a)(i)(III)}.

Take, for example, the case of a facility converting from the use of chlorine to hypochlorite. If the supplier were a Tier 3 or 4 facility, there would be no way of knowing if the new business provided by the converting facility would enough to change the producer to a Tier 1 or 2 facility until that facility reported the change in their chlorine inventory in a new Top Screen after the new business was in place. The new business could be simply off-setting lost business or it could be an increase in business that did not require an increase in on-site chlorine inventory at the hypochlorite manufacturer; in either case there would be no change in the manufacturer’s tier ranking.

Further complicating this determination is the issue of transportation hazard. Section 2111(b)(1)(a)(i)(IV) prohibits requiring implementation of an IST that transfers the risk to ‘transportation infrastructure’. If the hypochlorite producer needed an increase in the number of chlorine shipments to handle the new business, this could be considered such a risk transfer. Again, DHS would not be able to determine this until the producer reported the change in the number of shipments; something not currently required to be reported in Top Screens.

To make matters worse, it may not be possible to identify the potential manufacturing facility where the hypochlorite will be produced. If the implementing facility were sourcing their hypochlorite through a distributor, they would have no way of knowing, nor would DHS, which facility would be manufacturing the hypochlorite. Since hypochlorite is not a COI, the distributor might not even be a reporting facility; much less a CFATS covered facility. And the distributor might use multiple manufacturers or manufacturing locations to source their chemicals.

Assessment Evaluation 

The final issue that Jon and I discussed was the evaluation of the IST assessment conducted by the facility. Since the Director must rely on the facility’s assessment to make the implementation decision, it becomes a relatively simple matter for facilities to avoid implementation; write an assessment that finds it not feasible.

Ignoring for the moment the earlier discussion of why facilities would want to implement technically and financially feasible IST, this is one of the major concerns for advocates of mandating IST implementation. One could certainly describe a situation where an IST implementation was technically and financially feasible, but would be such a headache that the facility would want to avoid being required to implement the technique. This could be further aggravated by the implementation timeline required in the legislation.

The question then becomes, could the facility avoid mandated implementation by the way they wrote their assessment? An assessment could be completely fabricated that would show that the IST implementation was both technically and financially not feasible. Depending on how well the assessment was written, the fabrication might be completely undetectable. Fortunately, there would be few if any (in my opinion, others will certainly disagree) high-risk facilities that would take this clearly illegal route to avoiding a requirement to implement an IST technique. Short of such clearly illegal manipulation of the assessment, there are a number of ways that a facility can manipulate the assessment to avoid mandated implementation.

Cost estimates for implementation are based as much on technical opinion as fact. Every engineer takes available information and adds fudge factors to try to account for the inevitable unforeseen events that come into play in any process change. The earlier in the engineering process that the estimates are made the larger those fudge factors will be. Small changes in that factor can make significant difference in feasibility determination of the assessment.

Other factors that can be massaged during the assessment process include the source for price estimates. Facility engineering staffs know multiple suppliers for almost every service and equipment required for the implementation project. Choosing a higher cost supplier for the assessment quote can significantly increase the cost estimate for implementation. Since these supplier decisions are frequently location based, it would be very difficult for DHS to question such manipulations.

Another factor that could be subject to manipulation is the margin requirement for the products involved in the covered process. Every product in the market place has a required price margin over manufacturing costs. This margin is used in calculating the profitability of the product and thus figures into the calculation of financial feasibility of the IST implementation. Every business uses a different methodology for determining the margin requirements for their products and will frequently require different margins for different products. I have seen required margins as low as a penny a pound and as high as $1000.00 per pound at the same chemical facility.

The factors that affect that calculation vary widely but can include sales price, volume of production, age of the production facility, customer and market share. A small change in the required margin can have a major impact on the financial feasibility of the IST project. With all of these variables (and there are many more variable that can be taken into account when evaluating technical and financial feasibility) it strikes me that there should be no facility that could be forced to implement an IST that they did not fully endorse. Anyone should be able to document an assessment that finds a marginal project to be financially not feasible.

Thursday, January 7, 2010

Smart Tanks

There is an interesting article over at EnvironmentalLeader.com about how the so-called ‘Smart’ technology will not just be limited to the electrical grid. The author, Rebecca Sternberg, makes the point that running real time inventory and process data is not only valuable for maximizing manufacturing efficiency, but that the increasing environmental regulatory load will make that real time data invaluable for ‘tweaking’ processes to minimize their environmental impacts. One point that Ms Sternberg completely ignores in this valuable discussion is the issue of process security. The increasing integration of process and inventory control systems with enterprise software only makes it more likely that there will be new avenues opened to allow access to the critical process systems by outsiders with a variety of nefarious intents ranging from industrial espionage, industrial sabotage and potentially including terrorist attacks. System developers need to take this into account when designing the interfaces between these systems. While ensuring that process commands cannot be sourced through the ERP side of the system will go a long way to preventing the use of that linkage in a terrorist attack, it will do little to prevent industrial espionage or industrial sabotage. As companies expand their integration of ERP and ICS systems they need to become more cognizant of the cyber security implications of that networking. The problem is even greater with older ICS systems because they were developed without significant security applications. They were originally intended to be isolated from outside connectivity so security protocols were not included in the design of the systems.

PTC Final Rule Nears Release

The Positive Train Control (PTC) final rule was approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), last week. This is one of the last administrative hurdles that a final rule has to clear before it is published in the Federal Register. The only thing left to do is to complete any corrections or updates required by OMB. The final rule will likely be published this month. While the PTC rule is not really a hazardous material regulation (HMR), it will certainly affect the rail shipments of poison inhalation hazard (PIH) chemicals. The pending regulations have already been used by the Union Pacific Railroad to justify drastically increased rates for shipping railcars of chlorine in a pending case before the Surface Transportation Board (STB). The requirement for railroads to install expensive automated train controls on lines over which significant amounts of PIH chemicals travel will certainly increase operating costs for those railroads. If the railroads are allowed to pass those costs directly to PIH shippers (certainly an economically justifiable move), this could result in a dramatic reduction in the amount of these chemicals shipped by rail over certain routes. Whether this will be the result of end users switching to newly cheaper alternative chemicals, or producers switching to newly cheaper alternative transportation remains to be seen.
 
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