Friday, March 13, 2009
HS Subcommittee Hearing on Mexican Border Violence
Yesterday the House Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism held a meeting to look at violence on the Mexican border. All five of the witnesses were from various parts of the Department of Homeland Security. It was an interesting discussion about the current state of affairs on that border and what DHS was currently doing and could do in the future to deal with the situation.
While there was an acknowledgement of the seriousness of the current situation, two interesting points were made. First that violent crime was actually down in US border cities like El Paso. Second, the drug cartel violence, according to the DHS Attaché to Mexico, was limited to the Mexican border states and was not a problem in the rest of the country. Both of these observations (neither of which were questioned by the Committee) run counter to a lot of what has been appearing in the press in the last month or so.
DHS is promising to beef-up their efforts to stop guns and money from going South, but admit that there is not a lot of infrastructure in place to do that effectively. All of the inspection type checkpoints, for instance are on the inbound lanes not the outbound lanes of roads crossing the border.
Southern Border Security Task Force
Interestingly, a member of this subcommittee introduced a bill (HR 1437) on Wednesday, calling for DHS to:
“To establish a Southern Border Security Task Force to coordinate the efforts of Federal, State, and local border and law enforcement officials and task forces to protect United States border cities and communities from violence associated with drug trafficking, gunrunning, illegal alien smuggling, violence, and kidnapping along and across the international border between the United States and Mexico.”
The bill would make DHS the lead agency for this task force. It would have 180 days to get the TF set-up and another 180 days to report back to Congress on its efforts. It would also appropriate $10M to fund the effort. The bill was referred to both the Homeland Security Committee and the House Judiciary Committee for review.
No Mention of Chemicals
Once again there has been no mention of the significant commercial trade in hazardous chemicals that crosses this volatile border. There are still no provisions for physically checking the railcars of TIH chemicals that cross from Mexico into the United States for IEDs or other signs of tampering until they change hands (carrier-to-carrier, or carrier-to-receiver) somewhere in the United States. Even carrier-to-receiver inspections are not required by current TSA rules unless the receiver is located in an HTUA.
Anti-IST Public Relations Campaign
An article posted on ICIS.com on Wednesday describes a letter to Congress prepared by a “broad coalition of chemical, refining, industrial and agricultural interests” that urges Congress to re-authorize the CFATS regulations without making major changes. In many ways this letter parallels a letter sent to Congress last fall by a coalition of labor, environmental, and safety advocacy groups urging passage of HR 5577, a bill that would have made significant changes to CFATS..
Unfortunately, the link on the ICIS.com site that is supposed to be to a copy of the letter is actually a link to an API letter to DHS from 2007. This means that I have not actually seen a copy of the letter described in the article. This makes it difficult to evaluate the potential effectiveness of the arguments presented. The article provides a few quotes pointing out the ‘coalition’s’ opposition to “disrupting this security programme (sic) by adding provisions that would mandate government-favoured (sic) substitutions, weaken protection of sensitive information, impose stifling penalties for administrative errors, create conflicts with other security standards or move away from a performance (or risk-based) approach”.
ICIS.com is a British based web-site that reports on the chemical industry. This explains the ‘strange’ (from this side of the Atlantic) spelling found in the quotes. I’m assuming that the editors at the site ‘corrected’ the spelling of ‘programme’ and ‘favoured’. If anyone can point me at a copy of this letter, I would appreciate it. I would be interested in seeing how effective the advocacy actually is.
Unfortunately, the link on the ICIS.com site that is supposed to be to a copy of the letter is actually a link to an API letter to DHS from 2007. This means that I have not actually seen a copy of the letter described in the article. This makes it difficult to evaluate the potential effectiveness of the arguments presented. The article provides a few quotes pointing out the ‘coalition’s’ opposition to “disrupting this security programme (sic) by adding provisions that would mandate government-favoured (sic) substitutions, weaken protection of sensitive information, impose stifling penalties for administrative errors, create conflicts with other security standards or move away from a performance (or risk-based) approach”.
ICIS.com is a British based web-site that reports on the chemical industry. This explains the ‘strange’ (from this side of the Atlantic) spelling found in the quotes. I’m assuming that the editors at the site ‘corrected’ the spelling of ‘programme’ and ‘favoured’. If anyone can point me at a copy of this letter, I would appreciate it. I would be interested in seeing how effective the advocacy actually is.
Thursday, March 12, 2009
HS Subcommittee Looks at Mumbai Attacks
Yesterday the House Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection held a hearing that took a look at the Mumbai attack of last fall and tried to discern the lessons that could be applied to protecting infrastructure in the United States. While the witnesses, with the exception of NYPD Commissioner Kelly, were different than those that appeared before a similar Senate hearing in January, the focus was much the same.
Committee members and witnesses alike tended to focus on potential target in the US that would be similar to those attacked in Mumbai. This certainly provides fertile ground for security planning. Hotels and restaurants, as well as police forces, need to look at these attacks in detail to see what measures they can take to prevent, or mitigate the effects of, similar attacks in this country. But, as more than one witness noted, there is no way to adequately protect soft targets like these in a free society.
It would have been refreshing to hear at least one witness tell the committee that it is not only ‘soft targets’ that have lessons to learn from the Mumbai attacks. Similar types of organized attacks are also a potential threat to hardened facilities. The typical unarmed guards found at all most all high-risk chemical facilities would stand little chance of slowing, much less stopping such an assault.
Only an armed, on-site response force would be able to interpose itself between armed intruders and high-consequence targets within the facility. There are certainly safety issues that would need to be dealt with, but the highest risk facilities are going to have to re-examine their opposition to armed protective forces.
Wednesday, March 11, 2009
HS Subcommittee Hearing on Cyber Security
Yesterday, Rep Yvette Clarke (D, NY) conducted her first hearing as Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology. The hearing was the first of three that she is planning on holding this month on the subject of Cyber Security. That is an aggressive hearing schedule, but to be expected from one of Chairman Thompson’s minions.
There was very little in this hearing that pertained directly to cyber security at high-risk chemical facilities, especially as it pertained to control system security. It mainly dealt with the high-level policy of cyber security and which executive agency would be responsible for developing and implanting the nation’s cyber security program. There did seem to be a consensus that while NSA does have the technical expertise to run cyber security intelligence (and perhaps counter attacks) missions, the operational aspects of running a cyber security program for the civilian sector should probably remain at DHS.
One comment that Chairwoman Clarke made in her opening remarks caught my attention. She said: “I believe this Administration should seek to use a combination of regulations and incentives to ensure that our electricity grid (including the Smart Grid), water facilities, financial systems, and other key infrastructures are properly secured.” It seems that the era of ‘voluntary compliance programs’ is coming to an end.
I was disappointed that while she mentioned the grid and water facilities, she lumped high-risk chemical facilities in with ‘other key infrastructures’. I was hoping to hear an acknowledgement that chemical facility control systems were a potentially threatened cyber system. It will be interesting to see if that is addressed in future hearings.
Reader Comment – 03-10-09 IST Incentives
We do seem to be getting a lot of comments on IST (which is what I am trying to achieve). The latest reader comment comes from Luke Von Cfats (we won’t confuse him with Anonymous) and was posted to the first blog in the series.
Among other things he points out that the HR 5577 provisions on IST also included provisions for the Secretary to make funds available to “help defray the cost of implementing methods to reduce the consequences of a terrorist attack”.
While that money was primarily intended for water treatment and waste water treatment facilities It does serve to introduce a new topic; incentives for IST implementation.
This is part of the continuing series of blogs on Inherently Safer Technology and how it could be made part of the re-authorization of the CFATS program. The previous blogs include:
Writing IST Legislation Reader Comment – 02-24-09
What Standard to Apply for IST - Limits
What Standard to Apply for IST – Cost Estimates
SOCMA and IST
Reader Comments – 03-08-09 – IST Comments
Grants
As Luke Von Cfats noted in his comment, HR 5577 would have appropriated $100 M for IST grants in the first year that it was in effect (and an additional $75 M and $50 M in the second and third years), or almost 1/3rd of the total appropriations for supporting the chemical facility security regulations (§2116). This money would have certainly have allowed for significant changes in the calculations for financial feasibility.
But according to § 2110(e) it is clear that a large portion of that money was intended to go to public water treatment facilities that operate on a tighter budget than most chemical facilities. Luke Von Cfats does not believe that this would have been either cost effective or very effective at reducing the risk at these high-risk chemical facilities.
Now, if the IST provisions were targeted at just the facilities that were Tier 1 or 2 facilities because of release toxic COI, I believe that a case could be made for a positive cost-benefit ratio based on the potential reduction in casualties. Of course, if one does not accept the potential risk as being real, then there can be no benefit and the resulting ratio is negative for any expenditure.
Would the $225 M be an adequate incentive to convert all of the facilities? There is currently no way of knowing. Until each facility is required to conduct a detailed cost analysis of the potential IST provisions for their facility, we cannot even get a semi-accurate guess as to how much money will be involved. Even with double that amount of money, however, I would not be surprised to find that there were a few facilities that could not be economically converted to an IST process.
Tax Incentives
A very common tool available to Congress to ‘encourage socially acceptable behavior’ is the provision of tax incentives. This is one of the reasons that the US Tax Code is so complex as to be unmanageable. In any case, a properly crafted tax incentive is as good as giving someone cash; more so because it is not taxable. There is one significant draw back, it would not apply to publicly owned treatment works.
There are at least two different approaches that could be taken with ‘incentivizing’ IST implementation with tax credits. The first way would be to provide a tax credit based on the amount of money spent on an approved IST project. The draw back to this method is that it would not provide any incentive for the degree of risk reduction.
The second method would be to tie the tax credit to the number of people removed from an at-risk status by the IST implementation. This would provide for risk reduction but would not be linked to the amount of money spent. A blending of the two programs could be to determine a tax credit ‘rate’ to be based on the number of people removed from risk. Then that rate could be applied to the amount of money spent on the IST implementation.
This way the tax credit could reflect both the amount of risk reduction and the money spent on that reduction. Unfortunately, this would be even more difficult to set up before the IST evaluations were completed. A blend of tax incentives and grants could address that situation. Facilities could use the tax credit in their calculation for financial feasibility. Then DHS could target the grants at facilities that still had to deal with economic infeasibility.
Internalize Risk
There is another technique that I have not seen or proposed with regards to this issue. That would be to require that high-risk facilities assume a measure of fiscal responsibility for the risk to the surrounding community. The easiest way to do that would be to require all high-risk chemical facilities to buy terrorism insurance for their facility. The amount of coverage required would be determined by the number of people exposed to the risk of a potential successful attack on the facility.
The benefits from the policy would be paid directly to the affected population in the event of an attack. This would have two additional benefits. First it would increase the costs of not implementing an IST program and directly increase the number of financially feasible projects. Second, it would add the insurance industry as an inspector of high-risk facility security implementation. Properly implemented security measures would also serve to reduce the premiums for that insurance.
The one downside of this program would be that it is likely that there would be facilities that not only could still not afford to implement an IST program, but could not afford to remain in business at that location while paying the required insurance premiums. There are those that would argue that this would be a good thing as it would ultimately eliminate the risk at that location. On the other hand, especially in the current economic environment, politicians would have a hard time justifying anything that would close a facility and put more people on the unemployment roles.
Combination Plans
The most effective incentive program would probably combine elements of all three of these techniques. A properly crafted set of incentives would go a long way to getting industry buy-in for a mandatory IST provision in the CFATS re-authorization bill.
While that money was primarily intended for water treatment and waste water treatment facilities It does serve to introduce a new topic; incentives for IST implementation.
This is part of the continuing series of blogs on Inherently Safer Technology and how it could be made part of the re-authorization of the CFATS program. The previous blogs include:
Writing IST Legislation Reader Comment – 02-24-09
What Standard to Apply for IST - Limits
What Standard to Apply for IST – Cost Estimates
SOCMA and IST
Reader Comments – 03-08-09 – IST Comments
Grants
As Luke Von Cfats noted in his comment, HR 5577 would have appropriated $100 M for IST grants in the first year that it was in effect (and an additional $75 M and $50 M in the second and third years), or almost 1/3rd of the total appropriations for supporting the chemical facility security regulations (§2116). This money would have certainly have allowed for significant changes in the calculations for financial feasibility.
But according to § 2110(e) it is clear that a large portion of that money was intended to go to public water treatment facilities that operate on a tighter budget than most chemical facilities. Luke Von Cfats does not believe that this would have been either cost effective or very effective at reducing the risk at these high-risk chemical facilities.
Now, if the IST provisions were targeted at just the facilities that were Tier 1 or 2 facilities because of release toxic COI, I believe that a case could be made for a positive cost-benefit ratio based on the potential reduction in casualties. Of course, if one does not accept the potential risk as being real, then there can be no benefit and the resulting ratio is negative for any expenditure.
Would the $225 M be an adequate incentive to convert all of the facilities? There is currently no way of knowing. Until each facility is required to conduct a detailed cost analysis of the potential IST provisions for their facility, we cannot even get a semi-accurate guess as to how much money will be involved. Even with double that amount of money, however, I would not be surprised to find that there were a few facilities that could not be economically converted to an IST process.
Tax Incentives
A very common tool available to Congress to ‘encourage socially acceptable behavior’ is the provision of tax incentives. This is one of the reasons that the US Tax Code is so complex as to be unmanageable. In any case, a properly crafted tax incentive is as good as giving someone cash; more so because it is not taxable. There is one significant draw back, it would not apply to publicly owned treatment works.
There are at least two different approaches that could be taken with ‘incentivizing’ IST implementation with tax credits. The first way would be to provide a tax credit based on the amount of money spent on an approved IST project. The draw back to this method is that it would not provide any incentive for the degree of risk reduction.
The second method would be to tie the tax credit to the number of people removed from an at-risk status by the IST implementation. This would provide for risk reduction but would not be linked to the amount of money spent. A blending of the two programs could be to determine a tax credit ‘rate’ to be based on the number of people removed from risk. Then that rate could be applied to the amount of money spent on the IST implementation.
This way the tax credit could reflect both the amount of risk reduction and the money spent on that reduction. Unfortunately, this would be even more difficult to set up before the IST evaluations were completed. A blend of tax incentives and grants could address that situation. Facilities could use the tax credit in their calculation for financial feasibility. Then DHS could target the grants at facilities that still had to deal with economic infeasibility.
Internalize Risk
There is another technique that I have not seen or proposed with regards to this issue. That would be to require that high-risk facilities assume a measure of fiscal responsibility for the risk to the surrounding community. The easiest way to do that would be to require all high-risk chemical facilities to buy terrorism insurance for their facility. The amount of coverage required would be determined by the number of people exposed to the risk of a potential successful attack on the facility.
The benefits from the policy would be paid directly to the affected population in the event of an attack. This would have two additional benefits. First it would increase the costs of not implementing an IST program and directly increase the number of financially feasible projects. Second, it would add the insurance industry as an inspector of high-risk facility security implementation. Properly implemented security measures would also serve to reduce the premiums for that insurance.
The one downside of this program would be that it is likely that there would be facilities that not only could still not afford to implement an IST program, but could not afford to remain in business at that location while paying the required insurance premiums. There are those that would argue that this would be a good thing as it would ultimately eliminate the risk at that location. On the other hand, especially in the current economic environment, politicians would have a hard time justifying anything that would close a facility and put more people on the unemployment roles.
Combination Plans
The most effective incentive program would probably combine elements of all three of these techniques. A properly crafted set of incentives would go a long way to getting industry buy-in for a mandatory IST provision in the CFATS re-authorization bill.
UP Tries to Avoid Chlorine Shipment
Last week I briefly mentioned that the UP was attempting to get the Surface Transportation Board to allow it not to quote a rate for shipping chlorine over a new route through several HTUA. That comment was based on brief article I found at JOC.com. Yesterday, based on UP’s petition (PD 35219.0) the STB instituted a declaratory order proceeding under 49 U.S.C. 721 and 5 U.S.C. 554(e).
Public comments are requested (STB Finance Docket No. 35219) and are required to be submitted by March 31, 2009. UP's rebuttal and reply to comments are due by April 20, 2009. These comments will not be filed using the Regulations.gov web site, but may be filed either electronically (using the E-FILING link on the Board’s website) or by mail (1 original plus 10 copies to STB and 1 original to UP) at:
Surface Transportation Board
395 E Street,S.W.
Washington, DC 20423
Tonya W. Conley
Union Pacific Railroad Company
1400 Douglas Street
Omaha, NE 68179.
Issues
The UP was approached by a customer (not disclosed in the public copy of the filing) in Utah wanting a rate quote for the bulk shipment of chlorine to locations in Louisiana and Texas. UP maintains that their only available route for the shipment would require them to transit four HTUAs (Salt Lake City, UT, Kansas City, KS/MO; and Fort Worth, TX) and a number of other large cities. Re-routing is not an option because neither “UP nor any other railroad has a route structure that would allow these shipments to avoid HTUAs.”
They maintain that there are closer sources of chlorine available to all four of the destinations, within 70 miles of the Louisiana locations and within 300 miles of the Texas locations. The shipments from those alternate supply locations would not require transit of other HTUAs or large cities.
Furthermore, they along with all other rail road carriers have been approached by TSA and the FRA to be engaged in an effort to reduce the number of TIH loads, like chlorine, shipped through HTUAs. UP claims that the shipper’s request works against that goal.
What UP Wants
UP is requesting that the STB provides “clarification of whether a shipper has an
unlimited fight to ship TIH wherever it chooses without considering the safety of the employees and the public who would be put at risk unnecessarily in light of demonstrably better alternatives.” UP would also like the STB to consult with TSA and the FRA before ruling on this matter.
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
Reader Comments – 03-09-09 – CFATS Alternatives
Yesterday another (or maybe the same, who knows) Anonymous reader posted a comment about my blog on the CFATS re-authorization legislation. The comment, in its entirety is listed below.
Amend CFATS Authorization
The §550 authorization could be amended by either stripping out the wording in §550(b) that terminates the authorization in three years from the date of passage (“Provided, That the authority provided by this section shall terminate three years after the date of enactment of this Act.”). The wording could also be changed to read ‘four years’ or ‘five years’ or what ever number one cares to substitute. Either amendment would extend CFATS. Such an amendment would not need to be in a ‘CFATS’ bill. By common usage and the rules of the House, it would have to be in a bill that related to Homeland Security and preferably infrastructure protection.
Typically this would be slipped into a bill like the Homeland Security appropriation bill, but it could show up in just about anything. This is one of the reasons that I read almost all of the homeland security related bills. An extension of a year would put it passed the current economic problems (hopefully) and into a period when Congress could devote more time to the various issues involved.
Two years would put it on the 112th Congress with what ever personnel and party power changes that comes with that. Removing the ‘sunset’ provision from §550 would leave the current structure in place and leave Congress to modify it in a piecemeal manner. Many of the other changes included in last year’s HR 5577 could be handled on a stand alone basis without major fights in Congress. While the other provisions are not supported by everyone, they do not generate the same level of controversy as IST provisions.
Ignore the Sunset Provision
I have heard this proposal on other occasions. It is believed that simply authorizing money for the use of the program is all that is needed to allow the program to continue. In other words there is a de facto rather than de jure extension of the program. I am not a lawyer, and certainly not a constitutional authority, so I cannot provide a definitive comment on this idea. Having said that I think that with the level of discussion involved in the October 2009 expiration of the CFATS authorization will ensure that any back door authorization will generate a high level controversy.
Many facilities can be expected to try to avoid the expenditure of large sums of money on apparently unneeded security measures based on the sunset provisions clearly stated in §550. The resulting court and political battles would do little to make chemical facilities more secure. If Congress is going to simply extend the current authorization, I believe that they ought to at least specifically address that extension rather than just adding one more line to the budget authorization.
“....or a bill could be passed that strips out the sunset date. Even if nothing is done, if money is appropriated for the program, that should suffice legally to continue the program even without explicit reauthorization.”Anonymous is certainly correct; I only gave three potential ways for Congress to deal with the re-authorization issue when I discussed the possible consequences. There are certainly more creative ways for Congress to partially deal with this issue. Lets look at the two suggested by Anonymous.
Amend CFATS Authorization
The §550 authorization could be amended by either stripping out the wording in §550(b) that terminates the authorization in three years from the date of passage (“Provided, That the authority provided by this section shall terminate three years after the date of enactment of this Act.”). The wording could also be changed to read ‘four years’ or ‘five years’ or what ever number one cares to substitute. Either amendment would extend CFATS. Such an amendment would not need to be in a ‘CFATS’ bill. By common usage and the rules of the House, it would have to be in a bill that related to Homeland Security and preferably infrastructure protection.
Typically this would be slipped into a bill like the Homeland Security appropriation bill, but it could show up in just about anything. This is one of the reasons that I read almost all of the homeland security related bills. An extension of a year would put it passed the current economic problems (hopefully) and into a period when Congress could devote more time to the various issues involved.
Two years would put it on the 112th Congress with what ever personnel and party power changes that comes with that. Removing the ‘sunset’ provision from §550 would leave the current structure in place and leave Congress to modify it in a piecemeal manner. Many of the other changes included in last year’s HR 5577 could be handled on a stand alone basis without major fights in Congress. While the other provisions are not supported by everyone, they do not generate the same level of controversy as IST provisions.
Ignore the Sunset Provision
I have heard this proposal on other occasions. It is believed that simply authorizing money for the use of the program is all that is needed to allow the program to continue. In other words there is a de facto rather than de jure extension of the program. I am not a lawyer, and certainly not a constitutional authority, so I cannot provide a definitive comment on this idea. Having said that I think that with the level of discussion involved in the October 2009 expiration of the CFATS authorization will ensure that any back door authorization will generate a high level controversy.
Many facilities can be expected to try to avoid the expenditure of large sums of money on apparently unneeded security measures based on the sunset provisions clearly stated in §550. The resulting court and political battles would do little to make chemical facilities more secure. If Congress is going to simply extend the current authorization, I believe that they ought to at least specifically address that extension rather than just adding one more line to the budget authorization.
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