Saturday, September 9, 2017

Bills Introduced – 09-08-17

With just the House in session yesterday there were 17 bills introduced. Of those, only one may be of specific interest to readers of this blog:

HR 3712 To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide for the establishment and operation of reserve component cyber civil support teams, and for other purposes. Rep. Kilmer, Derek [D-WA-6]


It will be interesting to see what sorts of definitions and limitations are applied to the use of these teams to ensure that they do not compete with private cybersecurity firms.

Friday, September 8, 2017

House Passes FY 2018 Continuing Resolution

This morning the House agreed to the Senate amendment to HR 601 after adding an additional amendment that provided for continued funding for the federal government through December 8th, 2017. Yesterday’s amendment to HR 601 in the Senate had added a similar short-term extension of the debt limit as well as funding for the response to Hurricane Harvey. The Senate is expected to take up the much-amended bill early next week. This removes the near-term deadline of September 30th for all three of these potential problems.

The vote in the House was a significantly bipartisan vote of 316 to 90. In line with the agreement reached earlier this week between President Trump and the Democratic leaders in the House and Senate, all 183 Democrats in the House voted for the bill, more than offsetting the 90 Republicans that voted against the measure.

After the morning vote, the House continued to work on the floor action to amend and pass HR 3354, the omnibus spending bill that it has been working on since Wednesday. With the end-of-month deadline erased, the House did not find it necessary to stay late today to finish work on the measure. A final vote is expected Wednesday.


While the expected passage of HR 601 in the Senate next week is expected to obviate the short term need to pass HR 3354, a spending bill does need to be crafted to be signed by the President by December 8th. Passage of this bill would allow for consideration and amendment in the Senate and allow a conference committee time to work out the differences between the two houses of Congress in something approaching regular order.

ISCD Updates Two CSAT Manuals

Yesterday the DHS Infrastructure Security Compliance Division updated its Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Security (CFATS) program web site to provide links to new versions of two of its CFATS Chemical Security Assessment Tool (CSAT) 2.0 manuals. These two new manuals are not the simple tweaks and clarifications that we have been seeing in CSAT 2.0 manuals since the program was changed last October. They are significant re-writes.

The two new versions of the manual are:

Interestingly the new manuals are dated today, not yesterday.

The Site Updates


The most obvious web site update is found on the CFATS Knowledge Center page. This page provides a notice in the ‘Latest News’ section about the two new manuals with links to the manuals found in the ‘Documentation’ section of the page. Listings for the older versions of the manuals were removed from that section.

The main landing page does not contain any mention of the new documents, but it was updated with a link to a new version of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program page. That new page does not mention any program changes and still provides a link to the old PSP Manual. The CSAT page was not changed (still dated June 21st, 2017), but the link to the CSAT Portal Users Manual now takes you to the new manual through an updated intermediate page.

PSP Manual


The new PSP manual is a complete re-write of the manual with a completely new format. This means that it will be time consuming to determine what program changes (if any) have actually been made that were reflected in the new manual. At first glance, I do not see any major changes, nor do I expect there to be any since there was no update provided on the PSP web page. There may, however, have been some changes to the way the web site is used. More on that in a future post.

CSAT Portal Manual


The changes to the Portal Manual do not involve a complete rewrite so I can take a quick look at the table of contents to initially look for changes to this manual; and there are some interesting ones. It does not look like any real policy change, but there appear to have been some additions made to the CSAT Portal tool.

I do not see any changes in the table of contents until we get to Section 9, User Management Tab. First the manual completely changes Section 9.4, Users. That section not provides the following information:

9.4.1 Export User List
9.4.2 View User Information
9.4.3 Reset Password
9.4.4 Delete User Account
9.4.5 Administrator
9.4.6 Personnel Surety Program

A completely new subsection is then added; 9.5, Groups. That subsection includes:

9.5.1 Corporation Group
9.5.2 Create Group
9.5.3 Edit Group
9.5.4 Delete Group
9.5.5 Merge Group

So far, no new policy; just some added functionality and/or better listing of capabilities already existing within the system.

Next, we find that ISCD has flipped Sections 10 and 11. The new Section 10 addresses Personnel Surety Program issues. This is a complete re-write and probably is related to the changes in the PSP manual that I mentioned in passing earlier. I’ll probably address this new section in detail when I cover the new PSP manual. In the meantime, the following new subsections were added to Section 10:

10.1 Search Affected Individuals
10.2 Affected Individuals
10.2.1 Add Individual
10.2.2 View an Affected Individual
10.2.3 Edit an Affected Individual
10.2.4 Remove Affected Individual(s)
10.2.5 Bulk Upload
10.2.6 Export to PDF
10.3 User Defined Fields
10.3.1 Create User Defined Fields
10.3.2 User Defined Field List

The new Section 11 is just the old Section 10, Manage My Account. No other changes appear to have been made.

I have not yet gone completely through the manual to see if any significant changes have been made to any of the other portions of the manual. That is fodder for a potential future blog post, if there are any changes.

Commentary


It is not unexpected to see a major rewrite of the PSP manual. ISCD has been implementing the PSP program in the hand-holding mode since its inception last year. I am sure that there have been a large number of lessons learned and hopefully this new manual accurately reflects those changes. I am more than slightly disappointed that there was not more of a formal role out of this new manual. As controversial as the PSP program has been since it was first mentioned, I would have thought that ISCD would have announced a webinar to explain what had been learned in the first year of the operation of this program.

At first glance it looks like the CSAT Portal Manual is just a routine update of both the CSAT site and the Users Manual. The only problem is that you cannot be sure about that without doing an almost line-by-line examination of the manual.

One of the things that ISCD changed when they started CSAT 2.0 was the removal of version numbers and change logs from their new publications. I suspect that this may have been a DHS wide requirement because most other DHS agencies have not been that user friendly in their publications. It does make it difficult for users of these manuals to keep up with what is going on in the program.

Most facility or corporate security managers do not hold just that job. It is an additional duty place on top of their normal corporate responsibilities. This means that they do not have the time to do the type of page-by-page analysis of new program manuals (and there are a bunch of manuals supporting the CFATS program) to ensure that they understand the changes that are being made in the program. Failure to understand those changes, however, could result in their organizations falling out of compliance with program requirements.


I hate to say this about anything involved with the government, but failure to properly document changes in program manuals is not fair. It puts an improper burden on the regulated facilities, a burden that most cannot bear, particularly the smaller facilities. DHS really needs to play fair with the CFATS community if it wants to continue to operate the program as a partnership with the chemical community rather than as an adversarial regulatory relationship.

Thursday, September 7, 2017

HR 3101 Passes in Committee – Port Cybersecurity

This morning the House Homeland Security Committee adopted HR 3101, a bill that would establish a number of modest cybersecurity requirements for (and in support of) port operations. No amendments were offered and the bill was adopted in a voice vote; signifying significant bipartisan support.

As I mentioned in my earlier post, this bill relies on the IT-centric definition of cyber risk that would exclude control systems from the modest requirements established by this bill.


The bill will probably be taken up in the House at some future (probably not near future) date under the suspension of the rules provisions. No floor amendments would be allowed under those circumstances and a supermajority would be required for passage. If the bill makes it to the floor of the Senate, it would almost certainly pass.

ICS-CERT Publishes 4 Advisories

Today the DHS ICS-CERT published two medical device security advisories for products from Smiths Medical and i-SENS. They also published to control system security advisories for products from PHOENIX CONTACT and SpiderControl.

Smiths Medical Advisory


This advisory describes eight vulnerabilities in the Smiths Medical Medfusion 4000 Wireless Syringe Infusion Pump. The vulnerabilities were reported by Scott Gayou. Smiths Medical is developing a new product version to mitigate the vulnerabilities; compensating controls have been developed.

The eight reported vulnerabilities are:

• Buffer copy without checking size of input - CVE-2017-12718;
• Out-of-bounds read - CVE-2017-12722;
• Use of hard-coded credentials - CVE-2017-12725, CVE-2017-12724;
• Improper access control - CVE-2017-12720;
• Use of hard-coded password - CVE-2017-12726;
• Improper certificate validation - CVE-2017-12721; and
• Password in configuration file - CVE-2017-12723

ICS-CERT reports that an uncharacterized attacker could remotely exploit the vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access and impact the intended operation of the pump. Despite the segmented design, it may be possible for an attacker to compromise the communications module and the therapeutic module of the pump.

No FDA safety communication has been released on these vulnerabilities.

i-SENS Advisory


This advisory describes an uncontrolled search path element vulnerability in the i-SENS SmartLog Diabetes Management Software. The vulnerability was reported by Mark Cross. i-SENS has produced a new version that mitigates the vulnerability. ICS-CERT reports that Cross has been provided the opportunity to verify the efficacy of the fix.

ICS-CERT reports that an authorized user with local access could exploit the vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the target system.

PHOENIX CONTACT Advisory


This advisory describes a null pointer deference vulnerability in the PHOENIX CONTACT mGuard firmware. This vulnerability was self-reported. PHOENIX CONTACT has produced a firmware version that mitigates the vulnerability.

ICS-CERT reports that a relatively low skilled attacker could remotely exploit the vulnerability to cause a remote denial of service and force a restart of all IPSec connections.

SpiderControl Advisory


This advisory describes an improper privilege management vulnerability in the SpiderControl SCADA Web Server. The vulnerability was reported by Karn Ganeshen. SpiderControl has produced a new version that mitigates the vulnerability. There is no indication that Ganeshen has been provided an opportunity to verify the efficacy of the fix.


ICS-CERT reports that a relatively low skilled attacker with authorized access could exploit the vulnerability to escalate their privileges under certain conditions.

ISCD Publishes CFATS Update – Sept 2017

Yesterday the DHS Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) published their September update of the data for the implementation of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The data shows that the implementation of the new data collection tool (CSAT 2.0) and risk assessment process continues to increase the number of facilities covered under the CFATS program while the Chemical Security Inspectors (CSI) continue the ongoing compliance inspections of facilities under the program.

The Current Report


Table 1 shows the data reported for the facilities currently covered under the CFATS program. It shows a net increase in the number of facilities covered under the program. The numbers for the remaining activities reported would seem to be disappointing except for the fact that we have seen a continuing removal of facilities from the program. Part of this removal is due to the change in the risk assessment process that accompanied the implementation of CFATS 2.0 and the remainder is due to proactive actions taken by chemical facilities to reduce the risk associated with their chemical inventories.

Current Facilities
August
2017
Sept
2017
∆
Covered Facilities
3,381
3,441
+60
Authorization Inspections
2,346
2,354
+8
Approved Security Plans
2,271
2,266
-5
Compliance Inspections
2,070
2,071
+1
Table 1: Current Facility Status

To provide a better look at the actual activities undertaken by ISCD in August you need to look at Table 2. This provides data on activities conducted since the program began in 2007. Looking at differences between last month’s data we can see that there has been significant work done on ensuring that facilities with approved site security plans are actually complying with the provisions of those plans.

Total Facilities
August
2017
Sept
2017
∆
Authorization Inspections
2,932
2,946
+14
Approved Security Plans
2,750
2,756
+6
Compliance Inspections
2,544
2644
+100
Table 2: Program Data to Date

Data Analysis


With five CFATS Updates published since CSAT 2.0 was implemented, I think we now have enough data points to be able to start to take a look at the CFATS implementation process over time. I will start with Graph 1 which shows all of the data reported to date. The initial data set is from the final CFATS update when the old CSAT was shut-down last October.

Graph 1: CFATS 2.0 Update Data

Okay, this graph is more than a little busy but it does demonstrate that most of the data has changed relatively little since the implementation of CSAT 2.0. Only two data streams show a significant change, covered facilities and total compliance inspections. The first is expected from the large number of previously uncovered facilities that ISCD required to re-submit Top Screens. The second is attributable to the ongoing work of CSI mentioned above.

Looking at the compliance inspection data in Graph 2 we can see that there is a rate of inspection disparity between to total number of inspections completed as compared with existing facility data. Assuming that the existing facility data reports the number of facilities with a current compliance inspection (an apparently reasonable assumption based upon the current SSP data also shown in the graph) we might expect that the difference between the total and existing data reflects the number of previously covered facilities that have left the program.

Graph 2: Compliance Inspection Data

The problem with that expectation is that it assumes a one-to-one correlation between the number of inspections and the number of facilities inspected. We know from the 2015 GAO report on the CFATS program that the CFATS program, at least initially, had a very high compliance inspection failure rate. Each of those facilities that failed their compliance inspection would require a subsequent re-inspection. If ISCD reports re-inspections as a compliance inspection (a reasonable reflection of agency resource utilization), then we can no longer assume that the difference between the two sets of reported data simply reflects facilities that have left the CFATS program.

Graph 3 shows the data for authorization inspections. The data here is relatively flat over the reporting period. This is because ISCD has been having to do very few authorization inspections for facilities that were already in the program before the CSAT 2.0 implementation. Most of those facilities had already moved beyond that point in their facility implementation of the CFATS program. It does, however, look like we are starting to see an uptick in the number of authorization inspections. This is to be expected as the then CSAT 2.0 facilities start to submit their site security plans for review.

 Graph 3: Authorization Inspection Data

Similarly, the data for approved site security plans (Graph 4) shows relatively little change over the period to date. The numbers are a little different, but neither the approved SSP data nor the authorization inspection data indicates that there has been a large number of facilities exiting the CFATS program since May.

Graph 4: SSP Data

With that in mind, I have tried to use the data presented to determine how many facilities have left the program since ISCD presented their initial CSAT 2.0 results. Table 3 shows my results. The data was calculated from the month-to-month changes in both total facility and current facility data provided in the CFATS updates.

Lost Facilities
June
2017
July
2017
Aug
2017
Sep
2017
Total to Date
Authorization Insp
-41
-7
-10
-6
-64
Approved SSP
-6
-22
-13
-11
-52
Compliance Insp
-73
-93
-176
-99
-441
Table 3: Lost Facility Estimates

Commentary


The data from authorization inspections and site security plan approvals would seem to indicate that there has generally been very little loss of facilities from the CFATS program since May. It looks like the 5% tiering out rate that ISCD had reported in their initial report on the CSAT 2.0 implementation. That may be because facilities that had taken actions to reduce their risk may have voluntarily submitted the new Top Screens early in the process.

I cannot, however, explain why there are significant discrepancies between the two data sets. Interestingly, there is a fairly constant (182 to 195) difference between the total data for authorization inspections and approved site security plans over the reporting period. The range is significantly larger (67 to 105) for the current facility differences and there is no correlation between the data sets (R2 = .25).


The compliance inspection data seems to indicate that ISCD is still seeing a relatively large percentage of facilities failing their initial CFATS compliance inspections and perhaps some subsequent re-inspections. This is disconcerting if true. Approved site security plans are a negotiated agreement between the facility and ISCD on how the facility will meet the facility security requirements of the CFATS program.

Wednesday, September 6, 2017

House Passes HR 3388 - SELF DRIVE Act

Today the House passed HR 3388, the Safely Ensuring Lives Future Deployment and Research in Vehicle Evolution (SELF DRIVE) Act by a voice vote. The bill provides for a regulatory scheme for the introduction of highly automated (self-driving) automobiles. It includes significant and relatively comprehensive requirements for the establishment of cybersecurity regulations for these vehicles (see my posts here, here, here and here).


It the Senate take up this bill (always a difficult to predict) I suspect that it would pass with substantial bipartisan support.
 
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