Two sets of changes were made today to the CFATS Knowledge Center web page. Early in the morning a new entry was placed in the ‘Latest News’ section and then later in the day a separate entry was removed from that section.
Addition to Page
The added news item today stated that: “The CFATS Personnel Surety Privacy Impact Assessment is now available.” This was a vague restatement of a note in the Article that I discussed yesterday that stated that the privacy impact assessment could be found at www.dhs.gov. Neither statement was very helpful in telling people where the document could be found.
Actually, all anyone had to do was to look at the ‘Documentation’ section at the bottom left of the page to find a link to “CFATS Personnel Surety Privacy Impact Assessment”. This link was apparently added at the same time as the ‘Latest News’ item. This section of the page has links to just about every conceivable CFATS document published by DHS.
Removed from Page
Sometime later in the day the ‘Latest News’ had the 4-13-11 item removed that had reported the opening of the registration for the Chemical Sector Security Summit. This was an appropriate removal since the registration has been closed since the 20th of May.
The article that supported that news item (Article 1720) remains on the site providing information about the CSSS.
Wednesday, June 15, 2011
Emerging Threats to Rail Security
Yesterday the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation held a full committee hearing on the emerging threats to rail security. I have not had a chance to review the video of the hearing, but a quick review of Administrator Pistole's written testimony and Chairman Rockefeller’s opening remarks continue to show that the main emphasis of the politician’s remains focused on passenger rail and transit operations, not freight rail. The GAO report that formed the written testimony of Mr. Lord does make significant observations about freight rail security matters, though it too concentrates on transit issues.
Training
The GAO report continues to take TSA to task for its failure to implement the training regulation requirements of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. It does note that TSA reports that they intend to publish a notice of proposed rule making in the fall of this year. The report fails to note that according to the semi-annual Regulatory Agenda reports published every six months or so by DHS, TSA has had intentions of imminently publishing such an NPRM for quite some time.
Information Sharing
The GAO report addresses the multiple information sharing efforts for transit security, but notes that freight rail carriers are not satisfied with the security and intelligence information provided to them. Three of the Class I railroads that GAO interviewed for this report noted that they frequently receive intelligence information from the media before they receive the same information from TSA.
It will be interesting to see if the video of the hearing shows that the politicians on either side of the committee dais addressed these GAO concerns in their discussions during the questioning period of the hearing. I hope to have a chance to review that video this weekend.
Training
The GAO report continues to take TSA to task for its failure to implement the training regulation requirements of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. It does note that TSA reports that they intend to publish a notice of proposed rule making in the fall of this year. The report fails to note that according to the semi-annual Regulatory Agenda reports published every six months or so by DHS, TSA has had intentions of imminently publishing such an NPRM for quite some time.
Information Sharing
The GAO report addresses the multiple information sharing efforts for transit security, but notes that freight rail carriers are not satisfied with the security and intelligence information provided to them. Three of the Class I railroads that GAO interviewed for this report noted that they frequently receive intelligence information from the media before they receive the same information from TSA.
It will be interesting to see if the video of the hearing shows that the politicians on either side of the committee dais addressed these GAO concerns in their discussions during the questioning period of the hearing. I hope to have a chance to review that video this weekend.
Tuesday, June 14, 2011
CFATS Knowledge Center Update 06-14-11
Today the folks at DHS ISCD updated their CFATS Knowledge Center web page to reflect the publication of three notices in the Federal Register about the proposed CFATS personal surety program. The updated information includes a brief news item, a revised FAQ response and a new article on the program.
Latest News
The Latest News section of the page provides a one paragraph summary of the three documents published in today’s Federal Register. The description if full of jargon and if you don’t follow the ins and outs of the regulatory processes involved, it could be a little confusing. It does, however, identify the event and notes that the Documentation Section at the bottom left of the page contains links to all three documents.
FAQ Update
Both the question and response to Frequently Asked Question 1368 has been updated as was explained in the ICR Response Notice.
I sincerely believe that this is a bureaucratic oversight and that there was no intention to require fire fighters and EMS personnel to have to undergo background checks to take part in drills and training at high-risk chemical facilities.
Personal Surety Article
Article # 1721 has been added to the list of articles maintained on the CFATS Knowledge Center. As with most of the other articles, this one provides a fairly high level summary of how the new personal surety program will work. Anyone working CFATS issues should read the article in its entirety. It provides a much more understandable description of the program than did the notices published in today’s Federal Register.
The article provides one very valuable piece of information that was not included in the earlier notices. It notes in the last section of the article that: “DHS anticipates launching the Personnel Surety Program in the fall of 2011.” Given the way the previous CSAT tools were launched, we might expect to see an early version of the program to be run-out with a few Tier 1 facilities this summer to work out the bugs. Those early implementations would have ISCD personnel working side-by-side with the facility personnel submitting the information.
ISCD would then fine tune the program and publish two manuals for use of the tool that would provide detailed instructions for facility personnel to use the system.
NOTE: Links on the CFATS Knowledge Center for articles and FAQ are no longer ‘permanent’ links. This is the reason that I have not provided links within this posting; they would not work when a reader clicked on them. To find the links to the article and FAQ listed in this post go to the CFATS Knowledge Center Page and click on the ‘Personal Surety’ button on the bottom of the page. It will then list the two links.
OUT-OF-DATE INFORMATION: I have been avoiding mentioning this, but I can no longer help but point out that the 4-13-11 news item on the Chemical Sector Security Summit listed on the CFATS Knowledge Center page is woefully out of date. It should have been changed on May 20th when registration was closed. I suspect that the change was not made due to a lack of communications between the Chemical Sector-Specific Agency in OIP and the folks at ISCD.
Latest News
The Latest News section of the page provides a one paragraph summary of the three documents published in today’s Federal Register. The description if full of jargon and if you don’t follow the ins and outs of the regulatory processes involved, it could be a little confusing. It does, however, identify the event and notes that the Documentation Section at the bottom left of the page contains links to all three documents.
FAQ Update
Both the question and response to Frequently Asked Question 1368 has been updated as was explained in the ICR Response Notice.
The question originally asked: “Are background checks required for fire department personnel (firefighters and fire protection engineers)? If so, would the background check used for initial employment be acceptable?”Again, as I noted in my blog earlier today, this response continues to keep emergency responders (typically considered to be fire and EMS personnel) in a separate category from law enforcement personnel who are exempted from the personal surety requirements when they gain access to restricted areas or critical assets ‘in performance of their duties’.
The old response was: “6 CFR Part 27 does not require that fire department personnel undergo background checks.”
The revised question now reads: “Are CFATS background checks required for emergency responders prior to access to restricted areas or critical assets during emergency situations?”
The new response now reads: “No. During emergency situations, 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12) does not require CFATS background checks on emergency responders at the state or local level that gain unescorted access to restricted areas or critical assets.”
I sincerely believe that this is a bureaucratic oversight and that there was no intention to require fire fighters and EMS personnel to have to undergo background checks to take part in drills and training at high-risk chemical facilities.
Personal Surety Article
Article # 1721 has been added to the list of articles maintained on the CFATS Knowledge Center. As with most of the other articles, this one provides a fairly high level summary of how the new personal surety program will work. Anyone working CFATS issues should read the article in its entirety. It provides a much more understandable description of the program than did the notices published in today’s Federal Register.
The article provides one very valuable piece of information that was not included in the earlier notices. It notes in the last section of the article that: “DHS anticipates launching the Personnel Surety Program in the fall of 2011.” Given the way the previous CSAT tools were launched, we might expect to see an early version of the program to be run-out with a few Tier 1 facilities this summer to work out the bugs. Those early implementations would have ISCD personnel working side-by-side with the facility personnel submitting the information.
ISCD would then fine tune the program and publish two manuals for use of the tool that would provide detailed instructions for facility personnel to use the system.
NOTE: Links on the CFATS Knowledge Center for articles and FAQ are no longer ‘permanent’ links. This is the reason that I have not provided links within this posting; they would not work when a reader clicked on them. To find the links to the article and FAQ listed in this post go to the CFATS Knowledge Center Page and click on the ‘Personal Surety’ button on the bottom of the page. It will then list the two links.
OUT-OF-DATE INFORMATION: I have been avoiding mentioning this, but I can no longer help but point out that the 4-13-11 news item on the Chemical Sector Security Summit listed on the CFATS Knowledge Center page is woefully out of date. It should have been changed on May 20th when registration was closed. I suspect that the change was not made due to a lack of communications between the Chemical Sector-Specific Agency in OIP and the folks at ISCD.
ICS-CERT Updates Progea Movicon Advisory for Known Exploits
When the DHS Industrial Control System Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS- CERT) first published their advisory on the Progea Movicon TCPUploadServer Vulnerability back in March they stated that: “No exploits are known to target this vulnerability.” That has obviously changed as the revision to that advisory published today notes that: “Known exploits are now targeting this vulnerability. ICS-CERT strongly urges existing users to update vulnerable installations as soon as possible.”
Have There Been Attacks?
The ‘strongly urges’ wording would seem to imply that exploits have been detected in actual use against systems using the Progea Movcon human machine interface identified in this advisory. If this is the case, it would be nice if ICS-CERT would clearly state that and provide appropriate (and probably limited) details about such attacks (appropriately scrubbed to protect the victim’s identity, of course).
HMI Vulnerabilities
Readers might recall that this was just one of a number of HMI related ICS-CERT advisories and alerts issued this year. One of the problems with these systems is that they are typically bundled as part of an overall control system. While one might expect to find this vulnerable HMI in a Progea SCADA system, it is not clear that only Progea systems would contain this HMI.
Given the recent history of HMI vulnerabilities and now possibly actual attacks via those HMI vulnerabilities, it would be a very smart move for facility cyber security officers to know what HMI is used in their on-site SCADA systems. The vendor should certainly be able to provide that information (whether they are willing is potentially a completely different story).
Remember though; if your SCADA system uses (for example) the Progea Movicon HMI do not assume that you can apply the Progea patch to a non-Progea system. Contact your vendor or ICS-CERT for advice on how to proceed.
Have There Been Attacks?
The ‘strongly urges’ wording would seem to imply that exploits have been detected in actual use against systems using the Progea Movcon human machine interface identified in this advisory. If this is the case, it would be nice if ICS-CERT would clearly state that and provide appropriate (and probably limited) details about such attacks (appropriately scrubbed to protect the victim’s identity, of course).
HMI Vulnerabilities
Readers might recall that this was just one of a number of HMI related ICS-CERT advisories and alerts issued this year. One of the problems with these systems is that they are typically bundled as part of an overall control system. While one might expect to find this vulnerable HMI in a Progea SCADA system, it is not clear that only Progea systems would contain this HMI.
Given the recent history of HMI vulnerabilities and now possibly actual attacks via those HMI vulnerabilities, it would be a very smart move for facility cyber security officers to know what HMI is used in their on-site SCADA systems. The vendor should certainly be able to provide that information (whether they are willing is potentially a completely different story).
Remember though; if your SCADA system uses (for example) the Progea Movicon HMI do not assume that you can apply the Progea patch to a non-Progea system. Contact your vendor or ICS-CERT for advice on how to proceed.
Methyl Bromide Exemptions for 2014
Today the Environmental Protection Agency published a solicitation in the Federal Register (76 FR 34700-34703) for submission of requests for critical use exemptions for the use of methyl bromide as a pest control agent in 2014. As readers of this blog are probably painfully aware by now, the use of methyl bromide has been being phased out since 2005, but EPA (under the Montreal Protocol) has provided critical use exemptions to that phase out for uses where no alternative pest control agent exists or is approved for use.
This notice begins the exemption process for methyl bromide uses in 2014. User and producer submissions made in response to this notice will be used by EPA to determine what uses will be allowed in 2014 and how much methyl bromide will be produced that year to meet those uses.
Personal Rant Warning: The reason that I keep harping on this relatively obscure action is that in 2007 when DHS was formulating the list of chemicals that would be used to determine if a facility needed to submit a Top Screen to start the CFATS process, they accepted the word of EPA that methyl bromide was being phased out and removed it from their proposed list of chemicals that became Appendix A to 6 CFR part 27.
So today, facilities that produce, store or use methyl bromide, a toxic inhalation hazard chemical, may not be covered by the security requirements of CFATS unless they have some other listed chemical in their inventory. Clearly, the EPA expects that methyl bromide use will continue through at least 2014 (and probably much longer; methyl bromide is just too effective a fumigant to be able to be easily replaced in all applications).
So, once again, I urge DHS in their current review of the chemicals listed in Appendix A to consider putting methyl bromide back on the list of DHS chemicals of interest with a screening threshold quantity based upon the same reasoning used for similar toxic inhalation hazard chemicals.
This notice begins the exemption process for methyl bromide uses in 2014. User and producer submissions made in response to this notice will be used by EPA to determine what uses will be allowed in 2014 and how much methyl bromide will be produced that year to meet those uses.
Personal Rant Warning: The reason that I keep harping on this relatively obscure action is that in 2007 when DHS was formulating the list of chemicals that would be used to determine if a facility needed to submit a Top Screen to start the CFATS process, they accepted the word of EPA that methyl bromide was being phased out and removed it from their proposed list of chemicals that became Appendix A to 6 CFR part 27.
So today, facilities that produce, store or use methyl bromide, a toxic inhalation hazard chemical, may not be covered by the security requirements of CFATS unless they have some other listed chemical in their inventory. Clearly, the EPA expects that methyl bromide use will continue through at least 2014 (and probably much longer; methyl bromide is just too effective a fumigant to be able to be easily replaced in all applications).
So, once again, I urge DHS in their current review of the chemicals listed in Appendix A to consider putting methyl bromide back on the list of DHS chemicals of interest with a screening threshold quantity based upon the same reasoning used for similar toxic inhalation hazard chemicals.
CFATS Personal Surety Program Moves Forward
Today DHS published three notices in the Federal Register outlining the requirements for submitting data on personnel to DHS as part of the CFATS Personal Surety Program. These notices are:
Affected Personnel
The ICR Notice outlines two classes of personnel that are covered by the requirement for a high-risk facility to submit personal identifying information to DHS to compare against the TSA Terrorist Screening Data Base (TSDB); these are known as ‘affected personnel’. Additionally, three classes of individuals are listed as being exempted from the terrorist ties screening requirement.
The affected personnel are:
The one vague area in this discussion is the issue of dealing with contractors and vendors; are they visitors or facility personnel. DHS noted that that “determination should be a facility-specific determination, and should be based on facility security, operational requirements, and business practices”. The facility would outline how it handled the situation as part of its site security plan.
DHS addressed an issue that I have mentioned a couple of times here in this blog in discussing remote access to control systems computers. They specifically note that if “a networked computer system is listed as a restricted area or critical asset in an approved SSP, then individuals with access to that networked computer system would be affected individuals for purposes of RBPS-12”.
The three categories of personnel that are exempted from the background check requirements of RBPS 12, and thus the terrorist ties checks in particular, are:
Other Federal Credentials
There are a number of other Federal programs that require that personnel are vetted against the TSDB. These include:
Procedure
While we won’t know the details of the procedure until the appropriate manuals are published, the ICR Notice provides an overview of how the personal surety program will work. DHS will develop a Personal Surety Program tool in CSAT. As with the other tools in CSAT, facility management will designate a submitter and other agents to enter data into the tool. Once the data has been submitted and checked by DHS for format and completeness of data, DHS will provide the facility with an acknowledgement of receipt of the data; facilities will use those acknowledgements to demonstrate compliance with the submission requirement for RBPS 12.
Facilities will be able to use a third party background check vendor to submit data in the personal surety tool in CSAT, by designating an individual from that vendor in the appropriate role in CSAT for that tool. Companies with multiple CFATS facilities could consolidate their submission at the corporate level using the same technique; though the individual facility would have to be identified as a place where the individual would have access. Presumably the tool would be designed to make that a relatively simple operation.
Once the data is submitted and checked DHS will then submit the data to TSA’s Office of Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing (TTAC) for the check against the TSDB for an initial check of potential terrorist ties. If a match occurs at this point, TSA will forward the data to the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) for a final determination if the individual has been identified as someone with known or suspected terrorist ties.
DHS still maintains that they will not routinely notify a facility if a submitted name comes up as a match through this system. They insist that it could compromise an investigation if routine notice were provided to the facility or the individual prematurely.
This is the main reason for DHS to publish the Privacy Act NPRM today. Privacy Act rules would normally require individuals to be informed when personal information was collected and adverse information was placed into the record. DHS is claiming one of the standard law enforcement exemptions to that Privacy Act communication requirement in their NPRM Notice.
Program Comments
The public comment process has now been completed on the Information Collection Request with the publication of this reply to the 30-day Notice. The Privacy NPRM has a 30-day comment period that starts today. Comments on that NPRM can be made on the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov/; Docket Number DHS-2011-0033). Those comments should be filed by July 14, 2011.
I would expect that the Office of Management and Budget can be expected to make their final ruling on the acceptability of the ICR within the 30-day comment period of the NPRM. Then all that would remain to allow implementation of the program would be the publication of the final rule on the Privacy Act exemption. That process could go fairly quickly and we could have a new CSAT manual covering this new tool being published as early as late July or early August (hopefully this year).
● Reply to comments from the 30-day CFATS Personal Surety Program Information Collection Request (ICR) (76 FR 34720-34732; ICR Notice)These three notices are part of the establishment of a system within CFATS to require covered high-risk chemical facilities to submit information to DHS to allow a determination of whether affected personnel are on the list of known/suspected terrorists, a check required by 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv). These notices are a legal follow-up to a 60-day ICR notice published on June 10th, 2009 (74 FR 27555) and the 30-day ICR notice published on April 13th, 2010 (75 FR 18850).
● Notice of the establishment of a Privacy Act system of records supporting the CFATS Personal Surety Program (76 FR 34732-34736; Privacy Act Notice)
● Notice of proposed rule making (NPRM) proposing a Privacy Act exemption for the CFATS Personal Surety Program system of records (76 FR 34616-34618; Privacy Act NPRM)
Affected Personnel
The ICR Notice outlines two classes of personnel that are covered by the requirement for a high-risk facility to submit personal identifying information to DHS to compare against the TSA Terrorist Screening Data Base (TSDB); these are known as ‘affected personnel’. Additionally, three classes of individuals are listed as being exempted from the terrorist ties screening requirement.
The affected personnel are:
● Facility personnel who have or are seeking access, either unescorted or otherwise, to restricted areas or critical assets; andThe first category caused more than a few complaints in the earlier comment process. Most people who objected to this read §27.230(a)(12) to mean that only people with unaccompanied access required the background checks, including the check for terrorist ties. Unfortunately, the wording of that section is quite clear; the term ‘facility personnel’ is not modified by any discussion of access, so it should apply to all facility personnel. Visitors, however, only require the background checks listed in this paragraph if they have “unaccompanied access to restricted areas or critical assets”.
● Unescorted visitors who have or are seeking access to restricted areas or critical assets.
The one vague area in this discussion is the issue of dealing with contractors and vendors; are they visitors or facility personnel. DHS noted that that “determination should be a facility-specific determination, and should be based on facility security, operational requirements, and business practices”. The facility would outline how it handled the situation as part of its site security plan.
DHS addressed an issue that I have mentioned a couple of times here in this blog in discussing remote access to control systems computers. They specifically note that if “a networked computer system is listed as a restricted area or critical asset in an approved SSP, then individuals with access to that networked computer system would be affected individuals for purposes of RBPS-12”.
The three categories of personnel that are exempted from the background check requirements of RBPS 12, and thus the terrorist ties checks in particular, are:
● Federal officials that gain unescorted access to restricted areas or critical assets as part of the performance of their official duties;It is an unfortunate distinction between how law enforcement and emergency response personnel receive their exemption. If an emergency responder is taking part in training or an exercise at a high-risk facility, the ICR Notice seems to indicate that they would require background checks since that is not ‘during emergency situations’. Law enforcement personnel would retain their exemption since they would clearly be in ‘the performance of their official duties’. I’m sure that DHS did not intend for this distinction to exist, but that is the way the wrote their notice.
● Law enforcement officials at the State or local level that gain unescorted access to restricted areas or critical assets as part of the performance of their official duties; and
● Emergency responders at the state or local level that gain unescorted access to restricted areas or critical assets during emergency situations.
Other Federal Credentials
There are a number of other Federal programs that require that personnel are vetted against the TSDB. These include:
● Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program,DHS will ‘accept’ the credentials from these programs, but will still require the facility to submit data to allow DHS to check that the credentials are still current and valid. A slightly different set of data will be acceptable for checking these credentials and a facility is not required to accept these alternative credentials.
● Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME) program,
● NEXUS program,
● Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) program, or
● Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program.
Procedure
While we won’t know the details of the procedure until the appropriate manuals are published, the ICR Notice provides an overview of how the personal surety program will work. DHS will develop a Personal Surety Program tool in CSAT. As with the other tools in CSAT, facility management will designate a submitter and other agents to enter data into the tool. Once the data has been submitted and checked by DHS for format and completeness of data, DHS will provide the facility with an acknowledgement of receipt of the data; facilities will use those acknowledgements to demonstrate compliance with the submission requirement for RBPS 12.
Facilities will be able to use a third party background check vendor to submit data in the personal surety tool in CSAT, by designating an individual from that vendor in the appropriate role in CSAT for that tool. Companies with multiple CFATS facilities could consolidate their submission at the corporate level using the same technique; though the individual facility would have to be identified as a place where the individual would have access. Presumably the tool would be designed to make that a relatively simple operation.
Once the data is submitted and checked DHS will then submit the data to TSA’s Office of Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing (TTAC) for the check against the TSDB for an initial check of potential terrorist ties. If a match occurs at this point, TSA will forward the data to the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) for a final determination if the individual has been identified as someone with known or suspected terrorist ties.
DHS still maintains that they will not routinely notify a facility if a submitted name comes up as a match through this system. They insist that it could compromise an investigation if routine notice were provided to the facility or the individual prematurely.
This is the main reason for DHS to publish the Privacy Act NPRM today. Privacy Act rules would normally require individuals to be informed when personal information was collected and adverse information was placed into the record. DHS is claiming one of the standard law enforcement exemptions to that Privacy Act communication requirement in their NPRM Notice.
Program Comments
The public comment process has now been completed on the Information Collection Request with the publication of this reply to the 30-day Notice. The Privacy NPRM has a 30-day comment period that starts today. Comments on that NPRM can be made on the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov/; Docket Number DHS-2011-0033). Those comments should be filed by July 14, 2011.
I would expect that the Office of Management and Budget can be expected to make their final ruling on the acceptability of the ICR within the 30-day comment period of the NPRM. Then all that would remain to allow implementation of the program would be the publication of the final rule on the Privacy Act exemption. That process could go fairly quickly and we could have a new CSAT manual covering this new tool being published as early as late July or early August (hopefully this year).
Monday, June 13, 2011
More Tests Show GPS Interference
A news report this weekend from AP reports that additional tests have been showing potential interference with GPS signals from the planned deployment of the new LightSquared high-speed broadband wireless network. The so-called 4G network is part of the FCC’s general plan to push high-speed internet access to larger portions of the US population.
The article expands on the results from the previous tests that I reported on in an earlier blog. They note that during the tests in April at Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico “GPS receivers built into farm equipment made by John Deere lost signals, as did most General Motors' OnStar navigation systems”.
Apparently as a result of the John Deere tests the House Appropriations Committee has weighed into the discussion again, this time in the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2012. The Committee report on the bill includes instructions to the Department of Agriculture “to ensure the FCC is aware of these concerns and to work with other Federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation, to address them” (page 4; House Report 112-101). I suspect that we will see similar provisions in the DOT appropriations bill report when it comes out of Committee. It will be interesting to see what is included in the bill that provides funding for the FCC.
The article states that the most recent test results from RTCA, a nonprofit group that advises the FAA, “found that LightSquared's use of airwaves closest to the GPS spectrum would cause a ‘complete loss of GPS receiver function’ over large metropolitan areas”. Again there is no indication that the GPS timing signals used by various SCADA systems was specifically included in these tests, but a ‘complete loss of GPS receiver function’ does not portend well for SCADA systems.
The FCC is scheduled to receive a report this week from the technical working group that has been investigating the interference issue. The article notes that the following week we should see a request for public comments on the final deployment of the LightSquared system. I’ll certainly provide further information on that when it occurs.
The article expands on the results from the previous tests that I reported on in an earlier blog. They note that during the tests in April at Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico “GPS receivers built into farm equipment made by John Deere lost signals, as did most General Motors' OnStar navigation systems”.
Apparently as a result of the John Deere tests the House Appropriations Committee has weighed into the discussion again, this time in the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2012. The Committee report on the bill includes instructions to the Department of Agriculture “to ensure the FCC is aware of these concerns and to work with other Federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation, to address them” (page 4; House Report 112-101). I suspect that we will see similar provisions in the DOT appropriations bill report when it comes out of Committee. It will be interesting to see what is included in the bill that provides funding for the FCC.
The article states that the most recent test results from RTCA, a nonprofit group that advises the FAA, “found that LightSquared's use of airwaves closest to the GPS spectrum would cause a ‘complete loss of GPS receiver function’ over large metropolitan areas”. Again there is no indication that the GPS timing signals used by various SCADA systems was specifically included in these tests, but a ‘complete loss of GPS receiver function’ does not portend well for SCADA systems.
The FCC is scheduled to receive a report this week from the technical working group that has been investigating the interference issue. The article notes that the following week we should see a request for public comments on the final deployment of the LightSquared system. I’ll certainly provide further information on that when it occurs.
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