Friday, February 5, 2010

DHS Budget

Next week Secretary Napolitano will start the process of explaining the DHS FY 2011 budget request to Congress. She is currently scheduled to appear before both the House and Senate Homeland Security Committees next week. Wednesday morning she is scheduled to appear before the Senate Committee and Thursday before the House Committee. Both hearings will be webcast. Don’t expect to hear much about CFATS; it is a relatively small program and these hearings will likely be general overviews. Various Assistant Secretaries and Directors will be making the trek to Capitol Hill later this year to explain the program numbers. Rand Beers and Sue Armstrong will probably be the ones to explain the CFATS numbers and their detailed effects on the CFATS program. CFATS Budget Numbers While CFATS is important to the chemical security community, it is just not a large enough program to make the high-level budget summaries that are available on the OMB web page. The closest you can find there is a listing for the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). The NPPD budget request for FY 2011 shows a 3% decrease over the FY 2010 authorized level. To get the numbers for the Infrastructure Security and Compliance Division (ISCD – the outfit that actually runs the CFATS program) I had to turn to contacts at DHS. The ISCD budget request for FY 2011 is $105 M an increase of 1.6% over the FY 2010 budget passed by Congress last fall. The FY 2011 budget request fully funds the number of CFATS inspectors that DHS has been planning for. It does not address the number of additional inspectors that HR 2868 would require for adding in FY 2010 and FY2011. Since that bill was not passed last year and there are no guarantees that it will be passed this year, DHS could not act on those requirements. Again, like I reported in yesterday’s blog, DHS did include another one year extension of the CFATS authorization in their budget request. This is not a DHS comment on HR 2868, rather it is recognition of the political fact that there is no guarantee that Congress will be able to pass any legislation to make CFATS permanent by the time the current authorization expires in early October.

Thursday, February 4, 2010

New CFATS Legislation

A long time reader just emailed me a press release from a staff member representing Sen. Collins (R, ME) announcing the bipartisan introduction of a Senate bill that would extend the current CFATS authorization until October 4th, 2015. The copy of the bill that was included in the email includes two other provisions (a chemical security training program and a chemical security exercise program), but certainly the most significant is the CFATS authorization extension. The press release says that there are three co-sponsors for the bill; two Democrats {Senators Pryor (D,AR) and Landrieu (D,LA)} and a Republican {Senator Voinovich (R,OH)}. I have checked the web sites for all four Senators and the Senate Homeland Security Committee, but the press release has yet to make it to any of their sites. I won’t be able to confirm the introduction of the bill until the Congressional Record is published in the morning, so I don’t yet have a bill number. According to the press release: “The ‘Continuing Chemical Facilities Antiterrorism Security Act’ would reauthorize the law that is now set to expire in October, providing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with sufficient time to fully implement the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards program.” Sen. Collins had previously expressed her dissatisfaction with the IST mandate provisions in the HR 2868 and had announced her intention to introduce alternative legislation. The support of Pryor and Landrieu provides some indication of the problems that the supporters of HR 2868 might have in getting the current bill through the Senate. Support (or opposition) to the house bill does not fall strictly along party lines so it is hard to predict how the bill will fare in the Senate. A lot depends on the final wording of some of the more controversial sections in the bill. Still to be heard from is Senator Lautenberg (D, NJ) who also vowed to introduce his own version of a chemical security bill last fall. Lautenberg’s version of such a bill would be expected to include stricter rules on mandating IST implantation and expanded states rights to legislate on chemical security issues. This expansion of the controversy surrounding legislation to make CFATS authorization permanent provides support to the Administration’s inclusion of a one year extension of CFATS authorization in the DHS budget. The more involved this political battle gets, the less likely Congress is to resolve the issues before the current October 4th, 2010 deadline passes.

Reader Comment – 02-02-10 IED Training

Edward posted a comment to my earlier blog on IME. Edward made two points in his post. First he noted the difficulty in getting American law enforcement to take IED’s seriously. Second he noted that potential IEDs in the United States would be fundamentally different than those found in places like Iraq and Afghanistan were the military has gained their principle experience with IEDs. Law Enforcement and IEDs Edward wrote:
“This is a valid point, we saw this need two years ago and developed training for first responders, not only how to detect their use, but also their manufacturing and testing. We also included in the training how to respond to an IED. When peddled to police departments, they all asked ‘Why do we need this? We aren't in Iraq’”
This isn’t too surprising; Americans have always felt safely isolated behind their two oceans. This is one of the reasons for the major psychological shock that accompanied the 9/11 attacks. Those attacks drove home the fact that we were as vulnerable as the rest of the world to terrorist attacks. Since then, the lack of attacks and the ineptitude of the terrorists that have been publicly apprehended have allowed us to plaster over that shock and return to our illusion of isolated safety. The next attack will be an even bigger shock to our psyche. New IED Techniques Edward wrote:
“As we in the US do not have thousands of unexploded artillery rounds laying in stockpiles, the terrorist must and will procure explosives by any means possible. I have long stated that one of my biggest fears are the blast products made for mining. Hopefully we will not have to experience the effects of these weapons before we take action.”
Edward’s point is that that the bulk of IED’s in combat zones are based upon compromised military explosives or military munitions. Since this is not a combat zone those explosives will not be readily available to terrorist bomb makers. So the terrorists will have to turn to more readily available alternatives. The mining explosives that Edward refers to are based on ammonium nitrate. Ammonium nitrate is widely available in this country and the other components of an AN-IED are also readily available. These explosives are readily adaptable to large vehicle born explosives (VBIEDs). A wide variety of other chemicals are available to make both liquid and solid explosives that are more suitable for smaller devices. Americans and Explosives What is strange in this discussion is that Americans have been long enamored with explosives and improvised explosive devices. As a teenager I played with pipe bombs and made a few improvised explosives. One only has to watch the local press around the country to find frequent references to mailbox bombs, low-yield chemical explosive devices constructed in large soda bottles; they are usually teenage pranks. And there is a substantial folklore associated with more professional bombers in this country. Given all of that, it is still the ‘can’t happen here’ attitude encountered by Edward that seems to prevail with most law enforcement personnel. This is true even though every major city in the US seems to have a bomb squad on staff or the use the resources of one at a local military facility. But, I’m afraid that Edward is right, that attitude won’t change until terrorist IED’s start taking American lives on American soil.

Wednesday, February 3, 2010

Another CFATS Extension in the Budget

There was an article Wednesday at ICIS.com about the fact that the President’s FY 2011 budget includes a provision that would extend the authorization. Last year, during discussions and hearings on HR 2868, many Republicans in the House made numerous arguments against approving that legislation because of a similar provision in the FY 2010 budget proposal. With the reported extension request in this years budget proposal (I still can’t find a copy of the detailed budget publicly posted yet) I decided to ask my contacts in DHS Infrastructure Security Compliance Division why the Department was including the extension in this years budget request. I got the following reply from a Department spokesman:
“The Department supports a permanent authorization and maturation of responsibilities for the CFATS program. Given the complexity of the chemical facility regulation, the Department is committed to fully exploring all issues relating to making the program permanent. The Department is committed to working with Congress and other security partners to pass standalone chemical security legislation that includes permanent authority in FY 2010. Recognizing the time constraints and challenges of passing such comprehensive authorization laws, the President’s FY 2011 budget includes a request for a one-year extension of the statutory authority for CFATS, which will allow the time, if needed, to craft a robust permanent program while avoiding the sunset of the Department’s regulatory authority on October 4, 2010.”

I know that the Department worked closely with the House Homeland Security Committee and the Energy and Commerce Committee on HR 2868 last year. I also understand that they are currently working with the Senate Homeland Security Committee to ensure that they will be able to develop workable regulations for whatever legislation becomes law. CFATS legislation will not be as complex as health care reform or global warming legislation, but it is certainly controversial in its own right with widely disparate views of how the program should be managed. With the currently strained and divided political atmosphere in the Senate and a fall election campaign looming for both houses of Congress, it is very possible that final passage of HR 2868 or some alternative CFATS legislation will not happen before October 4th. With that in mind, it surely appears to be prudent for the President to request an additional year extension of the current authority for CFATS. This will ensure that the participants in the CFATS legislative debate can do their work with out the pressure to substitute a CFATS bill that does not address the shortcomings of the current authority just as a means to ‘pass something’ in time. So the word to Senate staffers is: go forth and create a good bill that deals with the legitimate security concerns of all parties; prepare a bill that DHS can enforce with workable regulations, industry can implement without loosing more jobs and will protect chemical workers and their neighbors from potential terrorist attacks on high-risk chemical facilities.

Reader Comment – 02-01-10 TSDB

Background Check added a new comment to the discussion of the Terrorist Screening Data Base (TSDB). Background Check wrote: 

“nice post! I am also wondering... regarding with the TWIC background check if it was made to monitor the watch list of terrorist why is it that there are still terrorist who are free to enter United states?” 

Well, Background Check is a little confused (and many people are so don’t feel lonely), the TSDB is not exactly the same as the ‘no fly’ list and the TWIC has nothing to do with allowing personnel into this country. The TWIC only deals with access to MTSA covered facilities. But the question, if not quite accurate in wording, is really applicable to MTSA security. Let’s reword the question: if terrorists can enter the United States because they are not on the TSDB, what is to stop them from getting a TWIC and gaining access to secure areas around our ports? 

The Underwear Bomber incident in December may have pointed out some problems with the sharing of intelligence and the management of the TSDB, but it should have also pointed out a more important security issue; systems are fallible. Because these systems are designed by humans they will never be perfect. More importantly, our adversaries watch and learn how these systems work; they then modify their procedures to take advantage of known weaknesses in the system. 

Anyone that thinks that if a person has a legitimate TWIC it means that they are absolutely not associated with terrorists, sadly expects too much from the government. While the TWIC system will eliminate most terrorists, it is inevitable that one or more terrorists will obtain these credentials. Whether or not they are able to use those TWICs to successfully complete a terrorist attack will depend on how well security managers realize that they cannot depend on a single layer of protection when designing a successful security system. Layered defenses are always necessary.

Possible Dry Run at Chem Plant

There is a short article at OrlandoSentinel.com that should probably be brought to the attention of the chemical security community. The Sentinel reports the discovery of an “electronic device welded to a drum of alcohol”. While the device was determined not to be hazardous it has yet to be identified according to the article. If a small, remotely controlled detonation device had been attached to the drum and detonated while it was in a warehouse, the results could have been serious depending on how much isopropanol was stored in the same area and what other chemicals were nearby. It is comforting in the immediate case that this was not a detonator, but that should not mean that the incident can be ignored. This could have been a dry run to determine how long it would take for such a device to found; valuable information for planning a terrorist attack. Of course, this could be something entirely unrelated to terrorism and a full investigation is certainly warranted. More importantly in the short term, chemical facilities should ensure that receiving personnel are alerted to this incident so that they can be alerted to watch all incoming drums for such devices.

Reader Comment – 02-01-10 Cyber Sec Resp

D3 continued our discussion of responsibility for cyber security education with his recent comments appended to my earlier response. His lengthy response is well worth reading by anyone concerned with general cyber security issues. Unfortunately, our discussion is straying from the cyber security issues of greater interest to the chemical security community; providing security for industrial control systems. And that is part of the problem with discussions of cyber security. Most people are more concerned about the identity theft, or larceny, or industrial espionage aspects of cyber security than they are with ICS security. The reasons are two fold, first more people understand how these more common topics could affect them personally. The second reason is even more problematic, most people have a hard time understanding how an attack on an ICS could affect them. The surprising part is that the second issue is prevalent even in the chemical process community. Control systems are arcane tools, used by many but understood by only a couple of people at most facilities. When operators manipulate electronic controls, they don’t understand the sophistication of the communications and decision making protocols involved. Subtle disruptions of those interactions can have catastrophic consequences. The problem is magnified by the intended and unintended linkages of the control system computers with the enterprise software that runs the business side of chemical operations. Since the enterprise systems normally have electronic connections that cross the fence line, they potentially allow unauthorized personnel access to the control systems upon which facility safety so clearly relies. A successful attack on an ICS at a high-risk chemical facility could have a wide range of potential effects. They could be as benign as out-of-spec product. A product spill or release of hazardous chemicals could be the result. A worst case result could be a catastrophic runaway reaction with safety devices disabled. It would all depend on the knowledge and skill of the attacker. So yes, general cyber security issues are important, but it is time that we also started taking cyber security issues seriously.
 
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