Friday, April 3, 2009

No Congressional Hearings Next Week

With the passage of H. Con. Res. 93 today in the Senate, the House of Representatives and the Senate start their ‘Easter Recess’. Neither house plans to be back in session until the week of April 20th (4-20 for the Senate and 4-21 for the House). The only hearing that I see scheduled is one by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and that is a ‘field hearing’ on the Economic Stimulus Act on April 7th. The only other hearing currently on the horizon will be the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations April 21st hearing on the Bayer SSI threat against the Chemical Safety Board hearing on April 23rd. The hearing is not listed on the Energy and Commerce Committee website, but it was reported by the NY Times. It looks like it is going to be a quiet two weeks as far as Congress is concerned. Happy Easter.

Future of the Homeland Security Council

For those of you interested in the grand debate over whether the Homeland Security Council in the White House should be expanded or folded into the National Security Council there is a new report that provides some insight into that discussion. Published by the George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI), the report (The Homeland Security Council: Considerations for the Future) is a general review of the issues involved. According to the HSPI press release:
“The report is the product of a bipartisan Task Force composed of former senior federal officials, practitioners at the state and local levels, and subject matter experts in the area of homeland security policymaking. Co-chaired by HSPI Director Frank Cilluffo and Deputy Director Daniel Kaniewski, the Task Force identified and reviewed arguments for and against merging the Homeland Security Council and National Security Council, and also assessed crucial factors that merit consideration whether or not there is a merger.”
Personally I think the issue boils down to who the President is and the strength of the advisors that he brings with him. A President who is focused on foreign affairs will allow the National Security Council to predominate whether or not the two councils are blended or not. Since many of the policy setters (politicians not staff) in Executive Branch are on both Councils, combing the two will reduce the number of meetings that they would have to attend, but it would also likely extend the length of that meeting to ‘cover all the issues’. But my opinion has little sway in this discussion. The list of the Task Force members, on the other hand reads like a list of the movers and shakers in Washington politics. Former elected politicians, political appointees, high-level staffers and Think Tank executives are all well represented. This is a document that will at least be read and quoted, and it may even influence the outcome of the debate.

Cyber Security Standards

There is an interesting blog post by Joe Weiss over on ControlGlobal.com about what cyber security legislation should look like. Joe is one of the few people that well known for his interest and expertise in control system security and recently testified before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation about control system security issues. Joe recommends that regulatory scheme for control system security should include “NIST SP800-53 or a close derivative”. Unfortunately, I am not familiar with the details of this standard (though I suppose that will probably change in the near future). What I do know is that the first real attempt at a federally regulated security program for private industry where electronic control systems are widely used will not include this standard. Risk-Based Performance Standards DHS, as all of the readers of this blog are aware, is prohibited from requiring any ‘standard’ in their review of Site Security Plans. They can only used ‘risk-based performance standards’ to evaluate how well each high-risk chemical facility is doing at reducing or controlling the risk at their specific facility. The Risk-Based Performance Standards Guidance (Guidance) document that is soon (hopefully) to be published by DHS will only provide loosely worded suggestions for strategies that facilities might want to consider employing as part of their layered plan to protect their facility (I hope I got enough qualifiers in there). To make matters worse the Draft Guidance that we had a chance to look at last fall did little to provide even loosely worded suggestions for control system security. In fact, the cyber security section of the draft seemed to imply that DHS was looking for standard IT security procedures to protect control systems. Many of those IT security techniques would, in effect, be attacks on control systems. Perhaps the final version of the Guidance will better address the issue of control system security, but I doubt it. There was only one comment that addressed the control system security issues. While that comment from the ISA99 Committee on Industrial Systems Security was very detailed, most observers (myself included) do not expect significant changes to the Guidance document. Require Cyber Security Standards Joe’s blog posting yesterday expressed the opinion that there ought to be industry wide legislation. He said that: “there is a need for legislation to mandate its [NIST SP800-53] use in all critical infrastructure industries. This will not only provide the best existing standard, it is also the best chance for interoperability across all industries”. Joe may be getting his wish in S 773, a bill introduced in the Senate on Wednesday by Senator Rockefeller, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. We won’t know for sure until the GPO publishes the text of the proposed bill, probably today. The problem with any industry wide requirement is trying to figure out how it will be enforced. With the White House apparently becoming the head office for Cyber Security, it will be difficult to see how there could be effective enforcement. On the other hand, for high-risk chemical facilities there is already an enforcement mechanism in place, CFATS. Of course, this would require modifying the authorizing language to allow the Secretary to specify NIST SP800-53 compliance. Of course, that authorizing language is due for update this spring, so this is a good time to start talking cyber security requirements.

Thursday, April 2, 2009

DHS Laws & Regulation Web Page Update 04-01-09

Yesterday, DHS updated the Chemical Security section of their Laws and Regulation web page. This web page provides links to a wide variety of US Government sites where there are records maintained about laws and regulations dealing with DHS actions. The Chemical Security section provides links to everything from the CFATS authorization legislation (with subsequent amendments) to the CSAT Privacy Act Assessments. The update yesterday did not provide any new information. It just made the document listing more comprehensive. The following links were added:
Draft Risk-Based Performance Standards Guidance. For propane CFATS Regulatory Evaluation. Agricultural Facilities Time Extenuation Notification. Draft Risk-Based Performance Standards Guidance. 60 Day Notice Information Collection Request 30 Day Notice Information Collection Request Update, published October 27, 2008 CSAT Privacy Act Assessment

A Closer Look at Hazmat Truck Security

As I reported yesterday a recent GAO report took TSA to task for their inadequate response to security in the commercial motor carrier industry. There is a lot of good information in the report, but one of the underlying conclusions is suspect because of the shortsighted way that GAO looked at terrorist attack data. Instead of security standards for all trucking, as suggested by GAO, TSA and Congress ought to look at regulating transportation of selected hazardous chemicals. Regulate Trucks or Explosives? GAO questioned TSA’s focus on hazmat transportation (page 8) when there have been few attacks on hazmat shipments and most trucking related terrorist attacks have been vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) (pages 11&12) attacks on other targets. From this fact GAO concluded that there should be more work on protecting the larger trucking industry from having their vehicles used in future attacks. As I noted yesterday, there are almost 12 million commercial trucks on the road in the United States. Trying to protect all of these from potential theft would be a very expensive proposition, and those costs would inevitably be passed onto consumers. To make matters more complicated, the two large scale VBIED attacks in the United States used rental trucks. To stop rental trucks from being used as VBIED would be next to impossible. Even if all truck renters had to be vetted through a terrorist data base check, it would not stop attacks like the Oklahoma City bombing that was conducted by a US citizen with no known connections to terrorists. Instead of focusing on the ‘vehicle’ component of VBIED it seems much more reasonable to focus on the ‘improvised explosive’ component. Without the explosive component there is no VBIED. DHS is already working on limiting unauthorized access to the most common ‘improvised explosive’ component, ammonium nitrate (AN). The CFATS program is working on protecting the locations that manufacture and store large quantities of AN. DHS is writing regulations to control and monitor sales of AN to ensure that the commercial grade fertilizers are not used in VBIEDs. The only component that is not being closely addressed is protecting the transfers of AN enroute, mainly because TSA is forced to rely on voluntary security measures for hazmat transportation. What Hazmat to Regulate? Detailed security regulations should certainly not be required for all hazardous material truck shipments. While successful attacks against any hazmat shipment would endanger people in the immediate vicinity of the attack (otherwise the material would not be hazmat), the scale of the endangered area would be relatively small for most materials. Extensive regulation to protect against small scale attacks is unreasonable. What is needed is a risk-based assessment of hazmat; much like what DHS did for the Appendix A list of ‘DHS chemicals of interest’ (COI) used to identify high-risk chemical facilities for CFATS regulations. The idea of identifying a chemical and the quantity of that chemical that triggers regulation is one that should be seriously considered. Using the same list of chemicals for both CFATS and CTATS (Chemical Trucking Anti-Terrorism Standards, my term) would make it easier to tie the shipper and receiver security requirements into the CFATS regulations. Serious consideration could even be given to using the same screening threshold quantity for both regulations. Some might argue that the Rail Security-Sensitive Material (RSSM) list would be a better starting point for discussing what material would be covered by CTATS, since these hazmat are already being regulated in transportation. The smaller number of covered materials in the RSSM list is predicated on the limited routes available for rail transportation and the extreme difficulty that someone would have in hijacking a rail car. What to Regulate? The harder thing to identify would be what CTATS would require in the way of security. Because of the problems that DHS has had with developing ‘standards’ for their risk-based performance standards, I would recommend that care should be taken in using the broad RBPS approach. I do believe that many security requirements should be based on the particular risk associated with the COI being transported. There are two security related requirements, however, that should apply to all covered hazmat shipments; communications and tracking Communications. The one thing that should be required for all hazmat shipment (covered by CTATS or not) would be two-way communications capability. Because of the hazards associated with the load being carried, the driver should be able to communicate with first responders in what ever area the vehicle is located. I don’t believe that the technology currently exists to be able to require long-haul drivers to directly contact local first responders at every point along their route. Satellite communications techniques certainly do exist to allow drivers to be able to contact a central dispatch facility. Tracking. Independently of the communications link there ought to be a separate system to track the location of hazmat trucks in real time. Again, this would certainly have to be satellite based to provide coverage across the wide expanses of this country. I would suggest that the tracking should be done by a government center (probably TSA’s Freedom Center) rather than just the trucking company. This way local law enforcement and emergency response personnel could access data on the location of covered hazmat shipments in their jurisdiction. To be effective CTATS would require a lot more thought by a variety of people. Regulation of selected hazardous material transportation is too important to be left to voluntary measures. TSA and Congress need to take a long hard look at what is needed to regulate these hazardous materials in transportation along the countries highways.

Wednesday, April 1, 2009

Motor Carrier Transportation Security Report

Last Friday the GAO delivered to Chairman Thompson a report on the status of the DHS efforts to secure the commercial vehicle sector. This was the third in a series of GAO reports that the House Homeland Security Committee Chair had requested about surface transportation security. According to a committee press release, the reports indicate “serious security shortcomings in all modes of the nation’s surface transportation systems”. While the report excoriates TSA, and to a lesser extent DOT, for not following through on a multitude of congressional mandates there are some positives, especially for the chemical security community. Motor carriers that handle hazmat shipments, the report notes, do a significantly better job of instituting security measures than companies that did not. Interestingly, this is a matter of concern for the writers of the GAO report:
“In lieu of a completed risk assessment, TSA leadership has decided to implement a current strategy which focuses on examining security risks posed by the shipment of hazardous materials. However, available information from ongoing risk assessments does not appear to support this emphasis, and the basis for TSA’s decision for this strategy is unclear.” (page 8)
This is actually the basis for GAO’s complaints about TSA’s security efforts. They maintain that TSA has not done an adequate job of assessing the potential terrorist risks to the commercial motor carrier sector. Nor has it conducted a systematic vulnerability assessment for the sector. Without a comprehensive risk and vulnerability assessments, the report notes, TSA cannot formulate an effective security program to protect the public from the consequences of attacks on commercial motor carrier targets. The scope of the problem of conducting these assessments is briefly noted in the report. On page 98 in Table 5 the report notes that there are over one million truck motor carriers (with almost 12 million vehicles) currently operating in the United States and almost 4,000 motor coach carriers (with 75,000 vehicles) included in the commercial vehicle industry. Even if the problem were only restricted to hazmat carriers (Table 6, page 99), it would still mean evaluating more than 60,000 carriers with almost 4 million vehicles. The only way that TSA is going to be able to acquire any useable data to do an industry wide vulnerability assessment would be to develop a web-based vulnerability assessment tool similar to the SVA tool developed for CFATS implementation. That is not going to happen without direction and authorization from Congress.

TWIC Reader ANPRM – Risk Groups

This is the second in a series of blogs about the advanced notice of proposed rule making (ANPRM) that the Coast Guard recently published about the potential regulation of transportation worker’s identification credential (TWIC) reading devices. These devices would be used to verify the identity of people working in ships and facilities covered under the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA). The other blogs in this series include: TWIC Reader ANPRM – Identification Techniques The ANPRM expresses the Coast Guard’s current thinking about what types of requirements will be included in the regulations that will be formally proposed later this year. This post looks at the risk based deployment requirements that might govern the actual use of the TWIC Readers. General Risk Considerations There are two different types of security consideration that the Coast Guard is considering to use to define the requirements for the use of these devices to validate the identity of workers authorized unescorted access to secure areas within MTSA covered facilities. The first is the security risk specifically associated with the facility where the TWIC Reader will be used. To provide a useable measure of this risk all MTSA covered vessels and facilities would be classed into one of three risk groups (A – highest risk, B, and C). The second type security risk is more general in nature and is expressed as the Maritime Security (MARSEC) level (1 – highest risk, 2, and 3). MARSEC is published by the Coast Guard for all MTSA covered facilities in a specified area and is based on current intelligence assessments. Risk Group Determination The Coast Guard has used the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) to develop a risk-based ranking for all covered vessels and facilities by type. Three factors were used in the MSRAM to produce the risk-based ranking; the “maximum consequence resulting from a terrorist attack, the criticality to the nation's health, economy and national security, and the utility of TWIC in reducing risk” (74 FR 13363). Once the MSRAM had produced a risk rank list for each type of vessel or facility covered under the MTSA regulations, those lists were analyzed using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to divide each list into three groups. Because of the importance of these groupings to this potential regulation the Coast Guard has asked the “Homeland Security Institute (HSI) to provide an independent peer review of our analysis” using the AHP. The HIS review will, when completed this fall, be placed in the docket for this ANPRM and subsequent NPRM. Proposed Risk Groups The ANPRM (74 FR 13367) provides the descriptions of covered vessels and facilities as they fit into the three Risk Groups. Risk Group A would include:
(1) Vessels that carry Certain Dangerous Cargoes (CDC) in bulk; (2) Vessels certificated to carry more than 1,000 passengers; (3) Towing vessels engaged in towing a barge or barges subject to (1) or (2) above; (4) Facilities that handle CDC in bulk; (5) Facilities that receive vessels certificated to carry more than 1,000 passengers; and (3) Barge fleeting facilities that receive barges carrying CDC in bulk.
Risk Group B would include:
(1) Vessels that carry hazardous materials other than CDC in bulk; (2) Vessels subject to 46 CFR Chapter I, Subchapter D, that carry any flammable or combustible liquid cargoes or residues; (3) Vessels certificated to carry 500 to 1,000 passengers; (4) Towing vessels engaged in towing a barge or barges subject to (1), (2), or (3) above; (5) Facilities that receive vessels that carry hazardous materials other than CDC in bulk; (6) Facilities that receive vessels subject to 46 CFR Chapter I, Subchapter D, that carry any flammable or combustible liquid cargoes or residues; (7) Facilities that receive vessels certificated to carry 500 to 1,000 passengers; and (8) Facilities that receive towing vessels engaged in towing a barge or barges carrying hazardous materials other than CDC in bulk, crude oil, or certificated to carry 500 to 1,000 passengers. (9) All OCS [Outer Continental Shelf] facilities subject to 33 CFR part 106 would fall into risk group B.
Risk Group C would include:
(1) Vessels carrying non-hazardous cargoes that are required to have a vessel security plan; (2) Vessels certificated to carry less than 500 passengers; (3) Towing vessels engaged in towing a barge subject to (1) or (2) above; (4) Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODU); (5) Offshore Supply Vessels (OSVs) subject to 46 CFR chapter I, subchapters L or I; (6) MTSA-regulated facilities that receive vessels carrying non-hazardous cargoes that are required to have a vessel security plan; (7) Facilities that receive towing vessels engaged in towing a barge carrying non-hazardous cargoes; (8) Facilities that receive vessels certificated to carry less than 500 passengers.
 
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