Wednesday, March 18, 2009

Chemical Security Academy

A little over a month ago one of my readers asked me if I had heard of the Chemical Security Academy. He had heard that this was the training program that all of the CFATS inspectors had to go through. I had only heard of the name (and I cannot even recall the context). I started checking around and yesterday got a nice email from Sue Armstrong at the Infrastructure Security Compliance Division at DHS. She provided a very nice outline of the program.

Trained and Certified Inspectors 

According to Ms Armstrong the purpose of the training is to produce “a trained and certified cadre of Inspectors who are conversant in CFATS and their authorities, familiar with the chemical industry, processes, and safety issues while onsite, and who are ready to assist industry in complying with CFATS, including support for Site Security Plan (SSP) development.”

Inspectors fitting this description should be a welcome addition to the DHS family and should be well equipped to fulfill their rolls at high-risk chemical facilities. Since there is really no pool of qualified chemical facility security personnel for DHS to pull from, they have had to hire people with a wide variety of backgrounds.

They have pulled a variety of people with security backgrounds from DHS (ICE, FSPS, TSA, Secret Service) and other agencies. They have also added to this mix a variety of personnel with experience in and around high-risk chemical facilities, including chemical manufacturing, emergency responders, hazmat responders, and agriculture. This mix of backgrounds, combined with the extensive training program should provide a well rounded inspection force.

Training Program Ms Armstrong describes a rather extensive training program for these inspectors. It starts by bringing all prospective inspectors up to speed on general physical security procedures. This is done by sending them to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) to attend the Federal Protective Service’s Physical Security Academy. Here they should learn the basics of physical security; how to use video surveillance and detection devices, the use of barriers and fences to control access, the role of security personnel, and the coordination with first responders and emergency response personnel.

Once they have completed this basic background development they begin to learn about chemical facilities and their security. In twelve weeks of classroom, hands-on, and on-site training they gain familiarity with, among other things:
CFATS Physical Security - Basic Physical Security – CFATS Specific Other Federal Regulatory Programs - Familiarization HAZMAT Certification HAZMAT Research and Emergency Services Familiarization Chemical Facility and Chemical Operations Familiarization Safety and Personal Protective Equipment
Moving Forward 

While everyone will have ideas for additional training and information that might make these inspectors more professional there is only a finite amount of time available. Further, the first official inspections have not yet happened so no one really has a good handle on how this process is going to work on the ground.

As the inspections begin the inspectors will gain experience at working at the wide variety of facilities that have been declared to be high-risk chemical facilities. The lessons learned from these inspections, not just the results, need to be analyzed. That analysis will need to be fed back into the training development process to keep this inspection force well trained and effective.

Tuesday, March 17, 2009

CSAT Web Page Update – 03-16-09

Sometime yesterday DHS completed a major change to the layout of their CSAT web page. The new page is cleaner and easier to find links to documents. What used to be a single page is now a number of separate pages for each of the major CSAT tools. Each page is easily viewable on a single screen, reducing the need for scrolling to get to needed information. The one thing that I particularly like is the listing of all of the CSAT related documents in a single block on the right hand side of the main page. This will make it very easy to user’s to find the document that they are looking for. The only improvement that I could suggest would be to include version numbers or publication dates to make it easy to see when a document changes. As I have mentioned on a couple of occasions, I think that the team that keeps the DHS chemical security web pages up-to-date has done an excellent job. If there is somebody in the federal government that keeps track of work done on web sites, they should certainly use these pages as an example of how to prepare a successful and helpful web site. I just wish that the folks over at TSA and PHMSA(DOT) would learn from this example.

Napolitano Wants Private Sector Involved in Fusion Centers

Last week Secretary Napolitano addressed the Fusion Center Conference in Kansas City, MO. She re-affirmed the importance of the Fusion Centers as information collection, analysis, and sharing organizations. She also told the conferees that these centers should develop the capability for lateral sharing of information amongst the Fusion Centers as well as sharing with elements of the Federal Government. Finally she noted that Fusion Centers needed to have increased private sector involvement. Private Sector Information Flow While Secretary Napolitano mentioned that Fusion Centers should be processing more than just terrorist information, the primary focus of these centers is counter-terrorism. Since many of the potential terrorist targets are privately owned, it seems obvious that the private sector needs to be included in the information sharing aspects of Fusion Centers. Information needs to flow from these centers to facility security managers about changes in the local terrorist threat status. Increased chatter indicating terrorist interest in a state, region or city should result in increased vigilance and counter-surveillance activities at high-risk facilities. That can only happen when the information gets down to the facility level. Likewise, information needs to flow from facility level to the fusion centers. High-risk facilities need to have a direction information submission channel to the local Fusion center. Reports of suspicious activity, apparent surveillance activities, or testing of security measures are all indications of potential future activities. Fusion centers have the capability to draw these reports together and put them together with information from other sources. Private Sector Analysis One of the main objectives of intelligence analysis is to ‘connect the dots’ between disparate pieces of information. For example, the theft of a single drum of a non-hazardous chemical means little. Combine that with the chemical process knowledge that this chemical is a potent polymerization initiator and you have a possible indicator of a sabotage attack on a chemical facility. Further combine that with the disappearance of an empty tank truck from a company known to ship monomers and you have the potential means to execute an attack and the information necessary to identify potential targets. This type technical information is not normally available to law enforcement personnel. The background to evaluate this type information is not included in the development of most intelligence analysts. This is where the private sector can help in the data analysis function. Unfortunately, there is currently no mechanism for getting the information to technically qualified analysts. And this is true for other sectors than just the chemical sector. Each of the 18 critical infrastructure/key resource (CIKR) sectors in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan has a different set of specialized knowledge that would have to be tapped to adequately protect high-risk facilities in that sector. To make matters worse, each of those sectors has a wide variety of specialties with its own knowledge set. It would be nearly impossible to staff each of the fifty odd Fusion Centers with a sufficiently large set of sector analysts to make a significant difference. Sector Fusion Centers Each of the CIKR has its own Sector Coordinating Council (SCC). For example the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council is made up of representatives of eighteen chemical trade associations. The Chemical SCC works with DHS and other Federal Agencies to ensure that the industry security efforts are coordinated with Federal NIPP efforts. Each SCC could form its own Fusion Center. Each center would provide data analysis unique to its sector, supporting State and regional Fusion Centers. It would also provide a unique base for industry specific data analysis supporting conventional intelligence organizations. It would also allow for communication of intelligence information to high-risk facilities within the Sector. The ‘analysts’ would be drawn from companies within the sector. Mid-level managers that have been identified as future security managers would be seconded to the Sector Fusion Center for a period of 12 to 18 months. This would provide them with the training and experience necessary for managing security and intelligence positions within their parent organization. It would also provide them with personal contacts in the intelligence side of the Federal government as well as personal security contacts across the Sector. Congress has a unique chance to establish a sector specific Fusion Center during the re-authorization of CFATS. The Chemical Sector Fusion Center could be authorized in that legislation. It would serve as a test bed for establishing similar fusion centers in each of the 18 CIKR sectors.

Monday, March 16, 2009

Another CCTV Information Source

Since video security systems are certainly going to be a major component of an site security plan I try to keep an eye on developments in that field. Readers know that I have frequently mentioned John Honovich’s web site. Another source of valuable information has been Doktor Jon out of the UK. He has offered his informative comments on a number of issues on this blog. Recently he has published his first newsletter and was kind enough to send me a copy. It is a little different set of information than provided by John, but I think it will be a valuable resource for security managers looking to install and manage security cameras. Jon is making this newsletter available on-line. And he has promised to keep his eye out for issues specific to chemical facilities.

HS Committee Schedule – Week of 3-16-09

The House Homeland Security Committee has a full slate of hearings this week. There are four subcommittee meetings scheduled covering a wide range of subjects; from FEMA preparedness to human trafficking. Only one looks to be of potential interest to the chemical security community; a hearing on DHS intelligence on Wednesday at 10am EDT to be conducted by the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment. According to the Committee web site the hearing will “examine what homeland security intelligence is; the Department's role in developing it as a new intelligence discipline; and how the Department and others can provide State, local and tribal authorities with national situational awareness of threats while building privacy and civil liberties protections into the process”. I would be happier if the “and others” were more explicitly listed as ‘private sector partners’; the usual term that is applied to the privately held components of the critical infrastructure/key resources (CIKR) portion of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. I have yet to see any specific plan for sharing intelligence or ‘national situational awareness of threats’ with high-risk chemical facilities. I doubt that the Subcommittee will address this issue as none of the witnesses has a background in industrial security nor will there be anyone present from DHS to answer a whole list of questions that I would like to hear asked. It will, however, be interesting to hear from the wide variety of law enforcement types about how they view the current information sharing situation with DHS intelligence types.

Top Five Cyber Targets

According to an article on SCMagazineUs.com chemical facilities are in three of the top five industrial sectors susceptible to web-based malware attacks. According to the March 12th article:
“Based on an analysis of 200 billion web requests processed by the security company [ScanSafe] on behalf of its worldwide customer base, the top five verticals most susceptible to web malware infection were energy and oil, pharmaceutical and chemical, engineering and construction, transportation and shipping and travel and entertainment” (emphasis added).
Currently the target appears to be the vast amounts of intellectual property stored on these systems; information that apparently is being sold to competitors. Unfortunately there is no reason that these criminals will limit their sales to competitors. How much would terrorist organizations pay for access to information about security systems or routings of high-risk chemical shipments? Why Not Sell Access The article only deals with intellectual property theft, but there is no reason that the elements behind these data thefts will necessarily continue to limit their criminal activities to just theft. Process control systems that are electronically linked to facility business systems will inevitably become lucrative targets. Last year the FBI reported that there had been Eastern European electrical power system controls that had been hacked to hold the systems for ransom. As malware authors expand their repertoire there is little reason to believe that high-risk chemical facilities will be spared the threat of having control of their production systems seized for ransom demands. Once that capability has been demonstrated, it opens up the possibility of the malware authors selling access to control systems. An easy way to reduce competitive pressures in tight economic markets would be to access a control system and induce expensive process upsets or equipment shutdowns in a competitors manufacturing system. Even engineering a few noticeable environmental releases could increase a competitor’s manufacturing and regulatory costs. Of even more concern would be the selling of control system access to terrorists. Even if stand-alone safety systems were to prevent a catastrophic process upset, a serious process disruption could provide the level of facility confusion necessary to allow for a successful terrorist attack on the facility. Comprehensive Cyber Security It is becoming increasingly obvious that all organizations are going to have to take a hard look at their cyber security measures. High-risk chemical facilities are going to have to protect both their business and control computer systems from cyber attack.

CSB to Hold Bayer CropScience Public Meeting

On Friday the Chemical Safety Board announced that they would hold a public meeting in Institute, WV to discus the August 2008 fatal accident at the Bayer CropScience facility. The meeting will be held on April 23, 2009 at West Virginia State University. According to the press release: “Pre-registration is not required, but to assure adequate seating attendees are encouraged to pre-register by emailing their names and affiliations to bayer@csb.gov by April 10. There is no mention in the current press release about the previous Bayer warning that the information to be covered in the meeting was protected from public release under provisions of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA). The meeting that was originally scheduled for March 19th, was canceled to allow the CSB to investigate the Bayer claim. I have not seen any public comment about the discussions between CSB and the Coast Guard, the agency that administers the MTSA. There have certainly been discussions, but no one is discussing what limitations (if any) the Coast Guard feels the MTSA information security requirements places on the public discussion of the CSB investigation of the incident. There is always the possibility that Bayer might try to get an injunction to stop the public meeting based on their earlier claim of information protection under the MTSA. Courts are usually reluctant to get involved in pre-emptive disclosure arguments. Alternatively, Bayer might appeal to Secretary Napolitano as the person ultimately responsible for actions taken under MTSA. Action would probably be unlikely if the Coast Guard and the CSB have come to an agreement on disclosure limits. That agreement would probably already have been vetted to the Secretary’s office. It will be interesting to see what questions, if any, the CSB refuses to answer at their meeting. Unless there are questions specifically about the security arrangements at the facility, I would not expect there to be any problems. Security arrangement questions would probably not have been answered by the CSB in any case. I do expect that there will be a Coast Guard representative present at the meeting, probably even the local Captain of the Port, the person responsible for port facility security under MTSA.
 
/* Use this with templates/template-twocol.html */