There was an interesting article
this week over at Net-Security.org about a British
report on the potential use of drones by terrorist organizations. That
report provides an interesting set of data about potential drone threats. It
includes capability tables for a number of aerial (UAV) ground (UGV) and marine
(UMV) drones. Unfortunately, there is no specific discussion about such
vehicles and chemical facilities.
Activist Propaganda
Let me start off by saying that I know of only one ‘instance’
of use of a UAV ‘against’ a chemical facility. Back in 2010 Greenpeace made
a big show using their small blimp to investigate chemical facility
security. There was apparently no attempt made to overfly the facilities and
the photographs published by Greenpeace were from another aircraft (almost
certainly a helicopter) with the blimp in the fore ground and the facility in
the background.
Smaller, more modern UAVs, will not have the same sort of
visual impact that the Greenpeace blimp had. This means that they are unlikely
to be used for propaganda type efforts. These more maneuverable UAVs are more
suited to surveillance and data gathering. The use of onboard cameras and
chemical detectors could be used by various environmental and environmental
justice organizations to document chemical releases at chemical facilities. The
use of UGVs and UMVs can certainly be expected to be added to this effort as
they become more commercially available.
I would not be surprised to hear of the use of UAVs in civil
disobedience actions where they could be employed to deliver paint bombs
against transportation assets in and around chemical facilities. Paint bombs
deployed against tractor or railroad windshields could serve to delay or
disrupt chemical transportation operations.
UAV support of conventional civil disobedience operations is
only going to increase. Aerial filming of the activity and the security/law
enforcement response to the activity can be expected to be used for propaganda
purposes for money raising and encouraging copy-cat operations.
Pre-Attack
Reconnaissance
Because of the large number of relatively cheap UAVs
available with onboard video capability, it is to be expected that there will
be an increasing number of UAV’s flown around, over and through chemical
facilities. While the vast majority of these will probably be flown by local
activists for propaganda purposes or just busybodies looking to see what is
going on, some will be flown by activists or terrorists (different objectives
and ‘attack’ methodologies) gathering intelligence to support possible future
actions.
Activist ‘attacks’ are typically civil disobedience
activities designed to interfere with facility operations, particularly those
associated with transportation activities. UAV reconnaissance would be used to
identify critical activity locations, points of entry and routes between the
two. Of particular interest would be areas to hang banners and choke points
where a small number of activists could block vehicle movements. As UGVs become
more robust and cheaper their use in these types of reconnaissance operations
can be expected to increase.
The British report does a good job of outlining the
experience of many terror groups with the use of UAVs for battlefield
reconnaissance as well as command and control. Significant terror attacks on
chemical facilities will almost certainly include pre-operational
reconnaissance by UAVs.
This type of UAV reconnaissance will include gathering of
the same sort of information that activists would look for, but in much greater
detail. In many cases the reconnaissance effort will include looking for
specific chemical storage and transfer facilities. If a vehicle born improvised
explosive (VBIED) attack is intended, the best site for vehicle placement and
routes to that location will be the primary focus. If smaller, more targeted
IEDs are to be employed, then tanks, valves and transfer lines will be the
recon objectives. In both cases, internal security measures and response routes
for security forces will also be important.
For possible attacks against water-side facilities the use
of UMVs is a possibility. The British report, however, shows that the current cost
of such vessels is quite high and there are only a limited number of options
currently available. This will change if there is an increase in hobby use of
this type of craft.
The use of UGVs is even less likely. Because of the prevalence
of spill containment dikes and multi-story buildings and pipe structures, only
a very limited amount of ground level reconnaissance will be possible. Route
reconnaissance for VBIEDs is one area where UGVs may be very helpful, but they
are still more likely to be detected and intercepted.
Attack Vehicles
All three classes of drones could certainly be used to deliver
explosive devices in attacks on chemical facilities. They have the advantage of
reducing the casualties in the attacking force and could potentially be used to
allow a large diversionary attack at a secondary facility to allow a more
complicated attack to go unopposed at the primary target.
UAV’s have limited payload capability so they would have to
be used in precision type attacks rather than area effect attacks. Placing
explosive devices on the top of storage tanks or isolated pipelines are well
within the capabilities of such vehicles.
UGV’s up to and including remotely operated cars (see the
British report – pg 11 - for an actual incident of such cars being by ISIS)
could deliver larger explosive packages to accessible areas within the
facility. The payload is still going to be significantly smaller than the
typical truck VBIED that have been used by any number of terror groups around
the world.
The high-cost and relative unavailability of UMVs probably
argues against their use for delivery of explosives in an attack in the near
term. It must be remembered, however, that smaller underwater explosives are
more effective due to pressure waves underwater.
Attack Support
As the British report notes, ISIS has been gaining
proficiency in the use of UAVs for battlefield surveillance and command and
control activities. The use of UAV’s in such roles in terrorist attacks has not
yet been seen, but is clearly an activity that can be expected in the future.
For ground based terror operations to seize or destroy a chemical facility, the
ability to use UAV’s to watch responding security or law enforcement personnel
will make for a much more effective terror operation.
The use of small explosive devices deployed by UAVs used to
attack or disrupt such response could be used to allow the ground team to
harden their position or more time to emplace their explosive devices.
Stopping Drones
There is very little that chemical facilities can do to stop
drone operations near, over and in their facilities. In addition to the known
difficulties in spotting and disabling UAVs in flight, there is currently no legal
authority for chemical facilities to take them down, even if they are in the
facility airspace. Currently the best bet is to deploy anti-drone netting to
snare UAVs and prevent them from approaching critically vulnerable assets.
A more important security job, however, is the spotting and
hopefully identifying UAVs as they approach the facility. This should be part
of the facility anti-reconnaissance plan that is designed to detect a terrorist
attack before it happens. Every employee should be required to report any UAV
sighting at or near the facility to their supervisor and the security manager
should consolidate such reports to be submitted to local law enforcement. All
such reports should include the location of the siting, the type of UAV, the
direction of approach and the direction the drone departed.
While little can currently be done to prevent UAV incursions,
facility security managers need to take a hard look at their facility from the
point of view of UAV attack vulnerabilities. Facilities need to begin
consideration of measure that they can take to hide such vulnerabilities or
prevent UAV access.
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