Yesterday the DHS Office of the Inspector General published
the report on their investigation of the management of the Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The investigation covered
many of the program and personnel problems that have been discussed in this
blog over the last three years (in fact there is a brief mention of one of
those blog posts).
The OIG made 24 recommendations for improvements to the
implementation of the CFATS program and the NPPD response agreed with 19 of
those suggestions. All but one of the recommendations has been considered ‘resolved
but open’ with the OIG awaiting further information on the Departments implementation
of the corrective action.
ISCD Response
David Wulf, Director of ISCD, sent an email to each CFATS
facility (which NPPD was kind enough to provide me a copy of) telling them
about the OIG report and briefly explaining that actions were already underway
to correct the noted deficiencies. He noted that:
“While there remains work to be
done, we have made significant and tangible progress, and OIG acknowledges that
nearly all of the recommendations contained in its report have been resolved.
We are working to address the one remaining, unresolved recommendation
and will provide the OIG supporting documentation so it can close out the
recommendations that have already been resolved.”
Problem Areas
The report looks at a wide range of problem areas with the implementation
of the CFATS program. They include:
• CFATS Program Tools Need
Modification to Improve Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Utility;
• SSP Review Process Has Hindered
CFATS Program Progress;
• Management of the Personnel
Surety Program Resulted in Premature Expenditure of Funds;
• Congress Provided ISCD Additional
Chemical Security Regulatory Responsibility;
• Confusing Terminology and Absence
of Appropriate Metrics Led to Misunderstandings of CFATS Program Progress;
• IP, NPPD, Congress, and DHS OIG
Provided Limited Oversight of ISCD and the CFATS Program;
• Overall Coordination,
Communication, and Actions Taken to Address Facility Tiering Methodology Errors
Were Ineffective, and Concerns Remain That Tiering Is Still Flawed;
• Pressure to Implement the CFATS
Program Led ISCD To Rely on Contractor Support;
• ISCD Struggles to Provide
Employees With Appropriate Training;
• Inability to Follow Sound
Government Practices Has Resulted in Noncompliance and Wasted Resources;
• Dysfunctional Culture Contributed
to Perceptions of Retaliation and Suppression of Nonconforming Opinions within
ISCD;
• NPPD Has a Process to Report
Allegations, but DHS OIG Contact Information Is Outdated; and
• Industry Supports the CFATS
Program, but Challenges Remain and Corrective Action Is Necessary
With the exception of one recommendation the OIG reports
that the Department is making progress on correcting the noted deficiencies
even where NPPD disagreed with the OIG findings. The one remaining area of significant
contention between ISCD and the OIG is reflected in finding #19:
“Eliminate the authorization and
payment of Administratively Uncontrollable Overtime for all ISCD personnel.”
Personnel Issues
It is heartening to see that the report addresses almost all
of the personnel issues that I have covered here in this blog. Particularly
important is the discussion of the locality pay issue (page 69 thru 73, Adobe)
since many in the press and Congress have tried to portray this issue as an
attempt by Chemical Security Inspectors to defraud the Government. The OIG’s
report clearly identifies this as a management issue where some CSI were left
holding the financial bag. Unfortunately, the OIG did not make any
recommendations with regard to the 22 CSI that were expected to pay back a
total of $143,760.40.
Moving Forward
DHS and ISCD have a lot of work ahead of them to correct the
problems identified in this report. Some of the more interesting actions
pending include:
• Improvements to the CSAT
applications, including Top Screen, Security Vulnerability Assessment, and Site
Security Plan;
• Development of procedures to
address Top Screen resubmissions and Redetermination Requests;
• Implementing Ammonium Nitrate
Security Program; and
• Implementing cybersecurity
training for inspectors;
It will be interesting to see how quickly ISCD is able to
move on completing actions recommended in the OIG report.
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