Showing posts with label ISCD Personnel Issues. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ISCD Personnel Issues. Show all posts

Friday, April 5, 2013

DHS IG Report – Perceptions of Retaliation


I did not delve too far into the DHS IG report on Wednesday; there is a lot of information there and there are a number of other things going on as well that deserve some attention. But this is a blog about chemical facility security and some readers have taken me to task for glossing over some of the apparent inadequacies of the report, particularly as it deals with (or doesn’t depending on how you look at things) with a variety of personnel issues.

Locality Pay

I did mention the locality pay issue and that was principally because I have heard about that issue from a number of Chemical Security Inspectors (anonymously) and headquarters folks over the years. A number of attempts (with varying success) to shift blame from management to CSI poisoned the atmosphere in ISCD and left many outsiders with suspicions about the integrity of the inspection force. The detailed description of the problem in the IG report will help correct the latter problem, but will do nothing to ease the first. More importantly (to an admittedly limited number of CSI) the IG made no recommendation to address the inequities of the repayment problem.

Retaliation

One of the problems that I have heard about from a number of sources within ISCD (past and present) is the long history (spanning the rein of a number of acting and actual directors) of management retaliation against employees and staff that have had the temerity to point out the shortcomings of whatever short-term manager was sitting in the head office.

The most obvious example was the firing of Assistant Secretary Todd Kiel when the questioning in Congress got too heated. One has a hard time feeling sorry for a political appointee that gets fired when the political heat gets too hot, but this is certainly resulted in a retaliation complaint that made the national news. It is not, however, surprising that the IG ignored this complaint; their mission is not to protect politicians.

I haven’t reported on the large number (my subjective opinion) of complaints that have made their way to my electronic mailboxes about personnel inequities encountered at ISCD. I have been around long enough to be well aware that many (maybe even most) such complaints are realized only in the mind of the offended party. Since I have no way of conducting any kind of investigation I did not want to be guilty on incorrectly besmirching someone’s reputation on the basis of an imagined slight.

I have received a number of reports about inequitable personnel actions that appeared to have been caused (according to the admittedly one-sided reports) by an attempt to punish the individual for complaining about or questioning the legality or efficacy of a management decision. I have heard that a number of these had been referred to OIG, the DHS EEOC office and a variety of Congressional offices.

This OIG report only notes that a number of complaints had been filed at and the OIG was “unable to substantiate any claims of retaliation or suppression of nonconforming opinions” (pg 84 Adobe). Unfortunately, the report does provide a partial answer to the reason for not being able to substantiate some of those claims; the OIG did not initiate a thorough investigation of the reported problems until after they received multiple congressional requests for an investigation.

Now I understand that a small number of these complaints have made their way into the court system from the EEOC complaints process. Now I haven’t actually seen any of the complaints or depositions, so I can’t comment on the ‘legitimacy’ of the action involved. But to get before a judge a lawyer has had to review the evidence and decided that the complainant would have a reasonable chance of succeeding in the action; after all, in most cases the lawyer will not get paid unless the action prevails.

Now that limited number of federal court cases were unlikely to have been examined to closely by the OIG. Most federal judges have an almost knee-jerk reaction against having an executive agency review their proceedings before a judgment has been rendered. It looks too much like interference in the execution of their office.

Poor IG Record Keeping

Given the five pages of detailed information and explication provided by the DHS OIG dedicated to the coverage of the locality page issues, it seems odd that so little space is given to a problem that so completely undermines the trust of the field force in its management. Upon closer examination the answer is relatively obvious, the complaint record maintained by OIG does not arrange information in a manner that is designed to allow for an investigation to logically access the information.

The OIG report notes that:

“The DHS OIG Hotline received complaints from NPPD employees, but hotline staff could not provide us an accurate count of the complaints received. This is because DHS OIG’s Office of Investigations uses a database that is name or case number driven, and it is not searchable by topic or beyond a DHS component level.” (pg 50 Adobe)

Remediation Suggestions

Because the OIG was unable to substantiate any specific claims of retaliation due to their inability to actually investigate most such claims, they made no suggestions for NPPD and ISCD for correcting the underlying mistrust issues. That is a shame because without trust between management and the field inspection force, this program is probably destined to die a slow and politically agonizing death.

Saturday, December 15, 2012

Another NPPD Insider Complains


I got an interesting email from John Doe (you know the cousin to Anonymous) the other day entitled “CSAT/IP/NPPD/ Waste, Abuse, Fraud and mismanagement”. An attachment to that email was a scanned copy of a letter John wrote to Senator Cardin (D,MD) outlining some interesting allegations of fraud, waste and abuse within some programs at DHS NPPD, including CFATS. The copy of that letter sent to me was appropriately redacted to limit the chance that I would be able to determine who John actually was and to hide the identity of other personnel (good and bad) mentioned in the letter. So having said that, and being forced to take everything with a large helping of salt because of that, here are some of the problems that have been allegedly identified.

CFATS Program Review


John Doe reports that DHS IP/ISCD contracted with the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute to conduct an “independent peer review of the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) risk assessment methodology”. He further complains that former NPPD/IP personnel were working at the Institute and that compromises the independent nature of the review. Of course it would be difficult to find a HS think tank that didn’t have former NPPD personnel working for it.

He also reports that the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council (Chemical SCC) has raised questions about the conduct of the study in meetings in September and November. I can’t confirm that since the Chemical SCC meeting minutes are not generally available to the public,  but if they have complaints about the study, the members have the political clout to be able to get their concerns heard in Congress.

Preliminary Authorization Inspections


John Doe confirms what I have been saying about the PAI’s being conducted by the ISCD folks; they were an effort to collect the data needed for SSP reviews. This was data that should have been collected by the SSP tool in CSAT, but wasn’t due to poor design of the questionnaire. John does add that “inspectors were instructed to make them last at least a week, despite the fact that most PAIs could be completed during a single day or even by means of a phone call”. He also noted that the 4 to 7 man PAI teams all “received TDY and comp time for travel and related expenses”. Their being paid is not unreasonable, but the unnecessary travel is questionable.

Locality Pay Issue


Back in January 2011 I identified this issue as one that was causing friction between the Chemical Facility Inspection force and ISCD management. John Doe provides some new insights into the problem. He notes that inspector “were given no choice but to accept the locality pay for the metropolitan area to which they were being assigned (by NPPD Human Capital)(sic), despite protests by some that they did not live in that area or anywhere close to it”.

He also notes that the situation causing the underlying problem continues to exist today. In Region 3 he notes that only one inspector is permanently assigned to the Regional Office in Westchester, PA; all others are assigned to their homes as their permanent duty stations. And it is not practical to re-assign these CSI to regional offices as it would require a permanent change of station authorization including the payment of moving expenses.

Problems at Headquarters


John reports that ISCD requested that three floors of its office in Arlington, VA be classified for open storage of secret material. Anyone that has worked with classified materials knows that such areas require a huge amount of extra security to maintain proper protection levels for classified documents lying around on desk tops. Such expenses are reasonable when the daily use of such documents is so common that the requirement to secure them in safes and what not when not actually being used creates more problems than the open storage costs.

John notes that most ISCD employees do not routinely handle classified documents. In fact he reports that in four years working at ISCD he never saw a classified document, nor had most of his colleagues. Apparently ISCD recognized this problem in mid-2011 as they began talking about declassifying the space according to John’s report.

John also questioned the expense of requiring the vast majority of ISCD employees to have Secret security clearance since the costs of the background investigations and other processing ranged between $3,000 and $15,000 per employee. I understand his concern with so few employees routinely handling classified documents, but DHS could reasonably expect that the handling of classified intelligence reports might be required. It just isn’t practical to try to get clearances on short notice when they become necessary, so it seems to me that this would be a reasonable expense in an organization dedicated to homeland security.

CFATS Personnel Surety Program


John Doe reports that ISCD held a number of industry conference calls in October of this year to “allow industry to share these [their?] concerns with ISCD staff in order to enlighten the new proposed submission” even though the new ICR had already been written. While he notes that there was “an internal push to release the new ICR in the days prior to the November 2012 Presidential Election” we still haven’t seen that ICR published. Perhaps revisions are being made to the document even though he claims that DHS “had no intent of taking into consideration any of the concerns raised by industry during these meetings”. Either that or some other agency (OMB?) is once again holding up this ICR.

Alternate Security Plan Templates


We have been hearing for some time about the work being done to develop Alternate Security Plan templates that facilities can use in lieu of the SSP template on CSAT. John Doe reports that the work by private industry has been “astounding and resulted in a well-organized and simple ASP that is as useful to regulated facilities as it is to those at DHS charged with reviewing and inspecting against it”.

John complains that rather than using the ASP template as a model for correcting the deficiencies in the SSP tool, “ISCD is proposing a series of working group sessions to be held at locations around the country with industry participants”. The purpose would be to get user feed-back to re-tool the existing SSP tool.

Requesting Congressional Action


[Note: I mispelled Sen. Cardin's name in the original post from this point on. Sorry about that. Thanks to a sharp eyed reader for catching and reporting the mistake. 12-18-12 15:00 EST]

As I reported earlier in this post, the letter sent to me is a copy that was sent earlier this month to Sen. Cardin. John reports that he has attempted to get appropriate attention to these problems through normal channels, but he has been rebuffed at every turn. In fact, since he made known his attention to bring this to the attention of Congress, he claims that he has been the victim of whistleblower retaliation by the leadership of ISCD and NPPD.

I hope that someone on Cardin’s staff takes a serious look at these allegations. I am not in the position to say that I know that all of the allegations are true or even reasonably close to true. They do match in many instances things that I have been told by other insiders. Unfortunately, Cardin is not on the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee so it is unlikely that he has anyone on his staff that is well acquainted with the CFATS program or the individuals involved.

I suspect that John Doe turned to Cardin because he was a Senator for the State where he lives. It probably would have been more effective if he had delivered this to Sen. Carper (D,DE) who will be taking over the Homeland Security Committee next month. Maybe Carding’s staff will share it with Carper’s. If John Doe has the documentation he claims in the letter, these allegations certainly deserve serious investigation by Congress.

Thursday, December 22, 2011

More Problems at ISCD

There is an interesting article over at FoxNews.com about an internal report on some management and personnel problems at the DHS Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD), the people that manage the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. Many of the areas addressed in the article will not be news to long-time readers of this blog; I started reporting on some of these issues almost a year ago.

I’m glad to hear that Rand Beers, the undersecretary for DHS’ National Protection and Programs Directorate (the home of ISCD), initiated this internal investigation of the issues and problems facing the program. More importantly it appears, from this article at least, that he is attempting to do something about solving those problems.

It would be nice, however if the report were made public, so that we all could see the extent of the problems and the proposed solutions. I’m sure that members of the regulated community would have some valuable input.

Don’t Forget the Accomplishments


While negative reports like this attract lots of public attention and press scrutiny, it is good to remember the good things that have been accomplished by the hard working folks at ISCD. They include:

• Starting a regulatory program from scratch with little guidance from Congress;

• Writing, publishing for public comment and revising the CFATS regulations within the deadline given to the Department to publish an Interim Final Rule without the comment process;

• Developing and beta testing a set of innovative on-line tools for registering potentially affected facilities, collecting chemical inventory and facility data to winnow the facilities that were not at high-risk of terrorist attack;

• Established a training program for a unique security inspection program; and

• Developing, publishing for public comment and revising a Risk-Based Performance Standard (RBPS) guidance document to help facilities to understand the security requirements of the program.

More importantly all of the above were accomplished while maintaining a strong working relationship with the regulated community even while the program was costing facilities large amounts of money to implement the requirements of the program.

Congress Should Share the Blame


When Congress added the §550 authorization for the CFATS program to the DHS Appropriations Act FY 2007, they saddled the folks at ISCD with a lot of unnecessary baggage that may have contributed to the problems the program now faces. Two major problems resulted from that authorization process, regulatory uncertainty and unenforceable standards.

With the program clearly being a stopgap measure because of the political inability to reach a consensus on program goals (conventional security measures vs inherently safer technology being the major sticking point), both industry and the environmentalists have been completely amazed at their inability to convince the other side to acquiesce to their minimal program demands and there has been little effort to find a reasonable middle ground.

Industry finds this particularly galling as they are spending or programming for spending large amounts of money on non-productive projects that could become a complete waste of time and money if long-term authorization of the program is based upon the environmentalist agenda.

The unenforceable standards problem more directly relates to the current delays in the site security plan approval and subsequent inspection programs. With Congress forbidding the Secretary from requiring the implementation of any specific security process or tool, the ISCD program managers cannot tell a facility how to upgrade their programs to meet the requirements of the RBPS. They can only explain the deficiencies in the facility’s plans to meet the loosely defined standards and then hope that the facility will subsequently identify a suitable remedy.

Moving Forward


I would certainly extend my support to the comment by Beers at the end of the Fox article; I too “am presuming that this is a program that the American people and the Congress of the United States want, and that we will continue to improve our ability to (implement it)". I would also like to remind people that if a successful terrorist attack on a high-risk chemical facility occurs during this implementation interregnum, political and corporate heads will roll.

Congress needs to make it a high priority to review this DHS report in detail when they return from the end of year holidays and to resolve who is responsible for the oversight of this program and then conduct some real oversight hearings focusing on program accomplishments and shortfalls.

Sunday, January 23, 2011

ISCD Labor Issues

Last weekend I talked about some personnel issues at ISCD. At the time I did not have any specific information about the cause of the problems, just the information about the removal of the Acting Director and Acting Assistant Director and the upcoming union vote for the Chemical Facility Security Inspectors (CFSI).

Since then I have received some information from an anonymous source I am going to call Insider. I have not been able to verify this information (I am a blogger not an investigative reporter), but from the tone and wordings of the communication, Insider does appear to be what he (generic pronoun use) claims, a person with close personal contacts in the CFSI community.

The following discussion is based upon this anonymous, unverified information. I am perfectly willing to discuss a similar response from ISCD management or what ever labor organization is working on the issue.

Locality Pay

According to Insider the current labor dispute revolve around the handling of two separate pay issues for Locality Pay and Authorized Uncontrollable Overtime (AUO). To understand the first issue the reader may need to understand how the CFATS inspection force is organized.

There are 10 regional offices that are supposed to be established (I am not sure if they have all been set up and staffed, delays in Congressional funding have made this process difficult for ISCD).

Because of the wide disparity of the cost of living within this country, the Federal government provides a base level of pay for their employees and then adds a ‘locality pay’ to compensate the employees for the high cost of living in many cities. Typically that pay is limited to a 50-mile radius around the center of that area.

With CFSI spending most of their time on the road doing inspections within their region, one can understand why an inspector might not feel the need to relocate their family to within a 50 mile radius of their duty station or home office. This is particularly true since the original intent was for the CFSI not to have formal office space at the regional office; their offices would for all intents would be their laptop computers.

According to Insider:

“At the time of job postings the PD [Personnel Department] never stated that you had to work inside the locality area. For new hires this meant a drop in pay immediately from what they agreed to and promised by NPPD. Some Inspectors would of never left their past jobs with this bait and switch method.”
Now I can understand how the detailed explanation of how ‘locality pay’ would be handled might not come up in the initial pre-employment interview process. The people doing these interviews would have been people that had worked in the Federal government for a while and the administrative aspects of the Federal pay system would be second nature to them. One would like to think, however, that as the pre-employment process moved along that pay issues would have been better explained.

Insider goes on to explain:

“For the veteran Inspector cadre, those living outside the 50 mile area of a duty station, have been receiving the locality pay for their respected duty station. Some Inspectors have received paperwork that they must now repay the Government upwards to $30k since these new locality pay rules have come to fruition.”
Being required to re-pay that amount of money does not sound like just a failure to explain the details of the Federal pay system. It sounds like there was a change in the way the pay system was administered. In fact, Insider explains that CFSI “are being left on the hook to pay back wages that upper level administrators signed off on long ago”.

Now I can fully understand changes being made to the way the compensation program was being managed; the Federal government, like most governments and private sector companies, is trying to reduce their costs. But, making changes and then making them retroactive, seems to be a bit much. What I suspect happened, is that ISCD stood up this entirely new personnel program and didn’t fully understand the intricacies of the Federal payroll system. Then the IG or some other oversight group checked on the program and found problems with how this was being administered. Base upon this type review someone declared that some of the CFSI had been overpaid.

Now I have seen similar things happen in the military. I have personally been overpaid when I received an advance pay and was then paid my full pay for the same period in the next paycheck. This was, of course, back before the full automation of the pay system and I was fully warned that it would happen and that Uncle Sam would take back the excess money at some future date. The difference, of course, was that pay problem was fully understood and the people making the ‘advance pay’ were completely up front in about what could be expected to happen.

What seems to have happened here is that ISCD management made a mistake in the way they set up their compensation program. When that mistake was identified and corrected the CFSI were left to pay for the mistake of management. Now management makes mistakes from time to time; it is the nature of the beast. To leave the work force holding the bag for those mistakes, however, is always inexcusable. Unfortunately, bureaucracies seldom have the flexibility to do otherwise.

If what I think happened was the cause of this problem, I’m afraid that only Congress will be able to fix the issue. It would be nice to think that the people who caused the problem at ISCD would lobby Congress to fix the problem, but again, political realities would suggest that that can’t happen. The political controllers would be loath to allow the professionals to call such a problem to the attention of Congress; it would reflect poorly on their control of reigns of government.

Authorized Uncontrollable Overtime

The accountability issue with locality pay is also affecting another portion of the compensation program for CFSI. CFSI hold salaried positions; they receive a base salary figured on a 40-hour workweek. It is fully recognized, however, that because of the inherent nature of their job, that they will be working substantially more than 40 hours on a fairly routine basis and that it would be unreasonable to have that overtime work specifically approved in advance.

So they are compensated for that overtime under a program known as ‘Authorized Uncontrollable Overtime’ (AUO). To keep that system under some sort of control they are expected to account for the amount of time that they spend at work, over and above the standard 40 hours. From a budgeting perspective, management typically sets forth some general guidance about how much AUO is generally going to be expected. That expectation gets passed down to the workers so that they know how much work will be okayed without prior approval.

To keep the AUO system from being abused, employees must provide justification for the amount of overtime that they perform. In jobs like those performed by the CFSI, this is a difficult process at best. Since they don’t maintain regular office hours and can’t forecast how much time they will be putting in, it is very difficult to keep track of this on an on-going basis.

So what typically happens is that people in these types of positions use guidance that they receive from management on expected overtime as the figure that they report for their overtime. That usually understates the amount of time they are actually putting in, but the approval process for time over that is typically viewed as not worth the effort to get the actual time approved. Management stays happy because they remain within budget (and in fact look good because they are able to forecast overtime so well) and the employees receive compensation for most of their hard work.

Two potential problems arise out of this type system. First, overtime, employees begin to see the routine overtime compensation as part of their regular pay and base their personal budgets on that higher figure. If something happens to reduce the routine overtime, they may be hurt financially when that pay is cut. No one sees the time CFSI spend on the CFATS implementation inspections being cut anytime soon. They are so far behind in the inspection process (due to slow funding for new inspectors, the archaic hiring process and underestimation of the time to complete the inspection process) that they are going to be extremely over worked for the foreseeable future.

The second problem is caused by the fact that the bureaucracy requires that the overtime pay is justified each pay period. Since it takes a severely anal retentive personality to faithfully keep the detailed records necessary to accurately account for the additional time spent on this type of job, and no one is going to be actually paid for the hours spent in excess of the amount ‘authorized’ by management, this justification is typically more of an exercise in creative writing than in time management.

Generally this works out okay. The employees receive a consistent level of pay that almost compensates for the long work hours and excessive time on the road and management looks good for their ability to forecast and control their departmental expenses. As long as both sides trust each other, this sort of thing generally works really well.

Unfortunately, that trust has now evaporated in ISCD. The CFSI, based upon what they have seen happen with locality pay, are now worried about their justifications of AUO. They are very afraid that they may be asked to repay all or parts of the AUO that they have received because of potentially inadequate records to back up the justifications that they have filed to date. The justifications provided were acceptable to management when submitted, but the CFSI can no longer feel that management will stand behind their earlier judgments’.

Inevitably what is going to happen is that the CFSI will start to get more attentive to their record keeping about the amount of time that they spend on the job. That will just as inevitably detract from the time spent on actually doing their job. Since they can no longer trust management to back them up on these sorts of things, when they reach the time limits set by management in the AUO guidance, they will stop work. One just typically cannot expect people to put in too much free work for a management team that is not trusted.

Problem Resolution

It seems to me that for the CFATS program to be an effective program there needs to be a minimum level of understanding and trust between the CFSI and the folks running ISCD. That does not currently seem to be the case. This issue needs to be resolved and I am afraid that unionizing the CFSI will do little to resolve that underlying trust and understanding problem. If the information provided by Insider is correct, I understand why people would look towards forming a Union to protect them from what appear to be unfair practices. I just don’t think that unionization will resolve the larger, underlying issues.

Congress, exercising their oversight responsibility, needs to step up and look into this problem immediately. Since they control the purse strings, they are the only ones that can now resolve the pay problem associated with the collection of back pay on the locality pay issue and provide the guidance going forward to resolve the issue. If that issue is not resolved promptly, I’m afraid that the AUO issue will further slow the implementation/inspection process. That would destroy the creditability of the CFATS program.

Rep. King and/or Sen. Lieberman need to tell DHS to stop the collection of back locality pay pending further Congressional investigation. And that needs to happen immediately. Otherwise, we are going to end up with a security program that operates in the same way that OSHA and EPA enforce chemical safety programs, effective security enforcement action will only be taken at facilities that have had a serious security incident. We can’t afford another such program.
 
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