Showing posts with label HF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label HF. Show all posts

Monday, June 10, 2024

CSB Announces New Investigation of Honeywell Facility in Louisiana

Today, the Chemical Safety Board announced that it had initiated an new investigation of the Honeywell facility in Geismar, LA. The Board will investigate a hydrogen fluoride release last Friday that injured a contract maintenance worker who required hospitalization for injuries sustained in the incident.

According to an article at TheAdvocate.com:

“The latest incident on Friday did not prompt disclosures from Honeywell on its website or local Facebook page nor from the local agencies that respond to and oversee public safety incidents in the parish's chemical sector, including the Ascension Parish Sheriff's Office and the state Department of Environmental Quality.”

The article goes on to explain that a Board spokesperson reported that the CSB became aware of the incident through their incident reporting process.

According to the CSB’s Current Investigations page there are four current investigations, not including today’s announced investigation and the recently announced Chattanooga, TN investigation. One of those investigations is looking into a January 2023 incident at the same facility which also included an HF release.

Friday, September 1, 2023

CSB Comments on EPA HF Initiative

Yesterday the Chemical Safety Board published a news release on “CSB Applauds New EPA Initiative on Safety at Chemical Facilities that Use Hydrogen Fluoride”. The release is referring to an EPA memorandum published last week on “FY 2024 – 2027 National Enforcement and Compliance Initiatives”.

Buried in the discussion of the six FY 2024 – 2027 National Enforcement and Compliance Initiatives, under Initiative #6, Chemical Accident Risk Reduction (continued from prior cycle), on page 6, the EPA notes that: “. In addition, recent incidents involving the release or potential release of highly toxic hydrogen fluoride, used in the petrochemical manufacturing, and concerns about the potentially catastrophic consequences of a hydrogen fluoride release support a focus on these facilitiesusing these hazardous chemicals in their processes.”

The EPA report then goes on to vow:

“Facilities using anhydrous ammonia and hydrogen fluoride have had dangerous releases, some of which nearly caused catastrophic impacts on surrounding communities, while many others required medical response and evacuations and caused serious injury and fatalities. OECA will use all available enforcement tools to address violations of risk management requirements, including holding entities criminally responsible.”

While this is hardly announcing a major effort to actively conduct a series of inspections at HF facilities to look for risk management program violations, the CSB news release reports that:

“CSB Chairperson Steve Owens said, “The CSB applauds EPA for continuing to focus on preventing accidental releases from chemical facilities and for recognizing the need to emphasize inspections and compliance efforts at facilities that use hydrogen fluoride.  EPA can help ensure that facilities that use HF are operated safely.””

CSB is ‘applauding’ the EPA’s action, but it has not updated the three accident investigation recommendations calling for EPA to look at HF alkylation units:

2018-02-I-WI-12 Husky Energy Superior Refinery Explosion and Fire, and

2019-04-I-PA-1 Philadelphia Energy Solutions (PES) Refinery Fire and Explosions, and

2019-04-I-PA-3 Philadelphia Energy Solutions (PES) Refinery Fire and Explosions

Saturday, December 12, 2009

Reader Comment - 12-11-09 - Water Sprays II

Fred Millar, a long time reader and frequent commentor, provided a lengthy commentary on my blog about the water spray mitigation system used at the CITGO refinery that experienced the explosion and fire this summer. Fred has been actively involved in the movement to get refineries to change over from HF to sulfuric acid or solid catalyst use. As is usual with his comments, he provides a great deal of information and his entire comment is certainly worth reading. Fred makes the point that: “The question is the adequacy of such systems and the reliability of these. Even an accident in an HF refinery reportedly often damages and renders inert the water systems.” He also points to tests done by industry in the 80’s that demonstrate the extent of the hazard from an HF release without mitigation. The fact that there were no off-site deaths associated with the Corpus Christie HF release provides encouraging information about the importance of properly designed mitigation measures. The term ‘properly designed’ is the key part of that statement and is the reason for the CSB issuing their emergency recommendation for work on those systems. The calculation that 4,000 lbs of HF escaped the water spray system is a major concern for local residents and facility employees. Fred also makes a valuable point about the survivability of these systems in the types of devastating accidents that too frequently occur in refineries. The huge amounts of volatile explosively flammable chemicals found in these facilities mean that safety systems of all sorts must be designed to withstand violent explosions and fires. A system that does not work when there is an explosion that causes a catastrophic failure of the HF containment is useless. Fred does not explicitly make the point here (though he has in other venues) that water sprays alone are insufficient to protect on-site workers and facility neighbors. Alarm systems to detect and track releases, notification systems and training for those affected to soon to evacuate, and a well planned and exercised evacuation plan are all measures that need to be in place in addition to spray mitigation systems. All of those procedures as well as hardening HF storage systems are necessary if facilities are unwilling (or unable) to follow the real recommendation that Fred and many others make that these refineries should make the process changes to remove HF from their refineries. While that is a complex debate being carried out in a number of venues, there is no argument that the only way to completely remove the threat of a potential HF release is to remove the HF from the facility.
 
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