Showing posts with label Guillaume Lopes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Guillaume Lopes. Show all posts

Saturday, October 5, 2019

Public ICS Disclosures – Week of 09-28-19


This week we have one vendor disclosure from Moxa.

Moxa Advisory


Moxa published an advisory describing a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the Moxa EDR-810 Series Secure Routers. The vulnerability was reported by Guillaume Lopes of Randorisec. Moxa has a new firmware version that mitigates the vulnerability. There is no indication that Lopez has been provided an opportunity to verify the efficacy of the fix.

Commentary


This advisory was available on the Moxa CSRT web page when the NCCIC-ICS Moxa advisory for the same product (different vulnerabilities) was published earlier this week. It affects the same product versions and looks like it was mitigated with the same firmware update, and the vulnerabilities were reported by the same organization/researcher. Should the three vulnerabilities have been covered in a single advisory? Probably, but it is hard to tell from the outside.

The interesting thing here is that Moxa now has a CSRT web page where they publish their advisories. They have four advisories that were published on September 25th that would have made it onto last week’s blog post if I had known the CSRT web site existed last week.

It is nice to see an industrial IOT vendor moving forward into the responsible security realm. Let’s hope that this is the start of a trend.

Tuesday, October 1, 2019

4 Advisories Published – 10-01-19


Today the DHS NCCIC-ICS published three control system security advisories for products from Moxa, Yokogawa and Interpeak and a medical device security advisory for products from Interpeak.

Moxa Advisory


This advisory describes two vulnerabilities in the Moxa Moxa EDR 810 router. According to the Moxa advisory these vulnerabilities was reported by Guillaume Lopes of Randorisec (not included in NCCIC-ICS advisory). Moxa has new firmware that mitigates the vulnerabilities. There is no indication that Lopes was provided an opportunity to verify the efficacy of the fix.

The two reported vulnerabilities are:

Improper input validation - CVE-2019-10969; and
Improper access control - CVE-2019-10963

 NCCIC-ICS reports that a relatively low-skilled attacker could remotely exploit the vulnerability to allow remote code execution or access to sensitive information.

Yokogawa Advisory


This advisory describes an unquoted search path or element vulnerability in the Yokogawa Exaopc, Exaplog, Exaquantum, Exasmoc, Exarqe, GA10, and InsightSuiteAE products. The vulnerability is self-reported. Yokogawa has revisions or updates for most of the affected products.

NCCIC-ICS reports that a relatively low-skilled attacker with uncharacterized access could exploit the vulnerability to allow a local attacker to execute malicious files.

NOTE: I briefly reported this vulnerability on Saturday.

Interpeak ICS Advisory


This advisory describes eleven vulnerabilities in Interpeak IPnet stack. These vulnerabilities were previously reported as the Wind River URGENT/11 vulnerabilities. This advisory now reports that the vulnerabilities are also found the following real-time operating systems (RTOS):

ENEA - OSE4 and OSE5;
Green Hills Software - INTREGRITY RTOS;
ITRON; and
IP Infusion – Zebos;

Interpeak Medical Device Advisory


This advisory describes the same URGENT/11 vulnerabilities due to problems in the Interpeak IPnet stack as described above. The only difference is that this version provides links to medical device vendor advisories.

Commentary


The two Interpeak advisories point out (AGAIN) how interconnected software systems are. Vulnerabilities found in one system are frequently found in 3rd party software that is used by vendor instead of writing new code. This is done for a variety of reasons, but frequently it is because a vendor does not have either the resources or the expertise in-house to develop the necessary code. This certainly makes economic sense.

Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a system in place to ensure that other vendors that use the same code are notified in a timely manner so that they can fix the related problems. In some cases, I suspect notifications are made, corrective action is taken, but the vendor never reports the vulnerability. The lack of notification is usually due to not wanting to look bad, but it does little to help owners of the affected products who do not update because their systems are ‘working fine’; their decisions might be made differently (or not) if they knew about the vulnerabilities.

 
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