Reader Comment 09-03-10 Discovery Terrorist

An anonymous reader took minor exception to my comment about the practical difference between the apparent lone wacko that attacked the Discovery Building last week in Maryland and a member of a terrorist group. Anonymous wrote:

“The difference may be in the terror they would cause. Terrorism isn't defined by killing people, but by causing terror in the general population (often by killing people). A lone killer who is arrested or even killed in an incident usually fails to do so, since the chances of him repeating the act are low. However, an organized group may strike anywhere, anytime again. Which leaves people in terror.”

There is certainly a basic element of truth in this statement. The one point that this overlooks is that incidents like this frequently breed copy cat type attacks. This may actually be a hallmark of many homegrown terrorist attacks in the United States; the lone wacko reaching out to what they believe to be fellow travelers to inspire others to continue the attack cycle. The presence of a political manifesto is often a clue that these wacko attacks should be considered to be a terror attack.

The Problem of the Lone Terrorist

Thanks to BrentDirks, whose Tweet pointed me at a recent report by the University of Maryland's START Center about the Discovery Communications attack. The federally funded National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) labels James Lee an ‘eco-terrorist’. It then goes on to point out how unique this particular eco-terror attack was; the first to involve hostage taking and the first to involve the use of a hand-gun.

Unique attacks are hard to defend against. New targets mean that facilities that did not consider themselves targets based upon past history do not have adequate defenses. New attack methodologies mean that it is hard to determine what defenses are required. Finally, it is hard to get advance warning about any attack conducted by a lone terrorist as there are no communications to intercept.

Defending Against the Lone Terrorist

This is, of course, one of the reasons that the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) does not attempt to determine which chemical facilities are being targeted by terrorists. Instead, it targets facilities, which if successfully attacked, would have the potential to affect a large number of people. Regulating security standards at these facilities helps to ensure that it is more difficult for a terrorist attack to be successful at these high-consequence targets.

All chemical facilities, not just CFATS facilities, are potential targets for eco-terrorists. There are many legitimate eco-friendly groups that have well documented concerns about specific chemicals, processes, or facilities. But, as with any activist culture, there are fringe elements that are dissatisfied with the progress that legitimate protests and legal actions have made in removing these perceived hazards. These elements have a history of advocating and executing ‘direct action’ with a small minority resorting to violent acts against facilities.

Eco-terrorists do not typically strike without warning. There is usually a period of non-violent public complaints and non-violent direct action. Facilities that receive communiqués from known fringe groups or previously unidentified groups threatening direct action need to take such threats seriously. Security measures need to be reviewed and all facility personnel need to be advised of the potential threat.

Finally, all facilities need to have an active shooter response plan in place, trained and periodically exercised. There is no way to absolutely prevent a gunman with a grudge from getting on the premises. The only way to minimize injuries and deaths in the event of an active shooter is to have everyone understand in advance what to do. Until last week no one had heard of an eco-terrorist being a shooter, but things always change. Besides, there are all sorts of other wackos that are well known to become active shooters.

Reducing Eco-Terrorist Threat

One potentially effective method for reducing the individual facility threat from eco-terrorists is to maintain open lines of communication with mainstream green groups. There may never be complete agreement on the facility’s affect on the environment, but facilities that openly deal with and take into account legitimate environmental concerns are less likely to be identified as a problem in the environmental community.

Eco-terrorists and Alternative Energy

There is an interesting story coming out of Plainfield, CT. Reports in the local papers claim that eco-terrorists have executed a ‘chemical attack’ against the future sight of the Plainfield Renewable Energy (PRE) plant. The Norwich Bulletin reported that it had received a letter announcing the attack on the site, a company officer’s home and the home of a local supporter of the project. The Hartford Courant reported that State investigators had found trace amounts of a ‘chemical of concern’ at the site location.

Earth First Attack? 

The letter claims that Earth First was responsible for this ‘attack’. This has been questioned because of the letter’s reference to the Earth First Journal, a ‘reporting’ organization that is careful to remain separate from any organization ‘action’ since they are the public face of the ‘organization’. Referencing this publication has not been a signature of this group. Earth First Journal has denied any knowledge of any planned action in the Plainfield area or against the PRE in particular. If past history is any guide, a successful action by any of the loosely affiliated groups would have been reported on the Journal web site. 

Chemical Attack 

What is interesting in this case is the mode of attack. The letter claimed that the homes had been attacked with a mixture of “mercury and solvents”. Additionally, 1200 lbs of “the same pollution that PRE intends to dump on their neighbors” was supposedly buried at six locations on the future construction site; the letter provided the location of one of the sites. Those chemicals, according to the letter, include lead mercury, asbestos, toluene, benzene, perchloroethylene and creosote. None of these chemicals is acutely toxic, but all have well known long term health consequences associated with relatively low level exposures. 

Depending on the method of burial, directly poured into holes instead of in buried containers, the chemicals could pose a long term threat to drinking water in the area if the materials are not found and properly cleaned up. Chemicals buried in containers would be harder to find. According to the news reports there have been small amounts of ‘chemicals of concern’ found on the site. While the authorities currently refuse to identify the chemical found, one news report says it could be “petroleum-based product” which could describe some of the chemicals listed in the letter. 

The Connecticut DEP told newspapers that there was “not enough contamination to pose an immediate threat to public health, the environment, groundwater, drinking water or other natural resources”. 

My Analysis 

Well, the FBI eco-terrorism team is on the scene which is not surprising considering the ‘Earth First’ letter. If there actually is 1200 pounds of these materials poured into the ground on site it would certainly be a violation of EPA regulations. I don’t think that it would rise to the level of ‘terrorist attack’, but it would certainly be chargeable under anti-terrorism statutes. If there was an attack on the houses of company officials and supporters with mercury and solvent mixture, I think that the situation would certainly change to a terroristic attack. 

What I am not convinced of is the involvement of eco-terrorists or even ecological activists. The method of communications does not feel like an action by the Earth First ‘organization’, nor does it seem showy enough to be one of their actions. I am not familiar enough with the PRE project to really know how ecologically sound it may be, but I would expect that there are enough dirtier projects around to make this rather low on the priority list for such groups. 

What this sounds like to me is that there is someone local that has personal or financial reasons to oppose the construction of this project. The news reports indicate that there has been some opposition, but the normal ways of legally stopping the project seem to have been exhausted. This may be a last ditch attempt by a portion of that opposition to stop or delay the project. 

 What concerns me is that now that this ‘action’ is in play, it might seem like a usable technique by actual eco-terrorist groups. I can think of a number of ways that hazardous chemicals could be used in a public way to enforce an ecological message. That could have a disturbing effect on security issues at chemical distributor locations where these chemicals could be acquired in transportable quantities.

Major Security Breach

If the security gods were ‘shuddering in dismay’ Saturday they are absolutely outraged today. Nancy Bartels in her blog at ControlGlobal.com points us at a story out of Great Britain where an eco-terrorist climbed over the security perimeter at a major British power plant, walked through an unlocked door, shut down a 500 MW power generation turbine, and then walked out of the plant. Oh, yes, he also left a hand made banner that read “No New Coal”. When did this happen? According to the Guardian Newspaper article it happened on November 28th. Police are still investigating, but they have no clue who the individual was. Inadequate Security Security must have been poor, right? Well, the Guardian describes this as the “most heavily guarded power station in Britain”. And rightfully so, it has been the target of a number of ecological protests (see: Evolving Eco-Terrorist Groups) centered on the facility’s massive use of coal. The British have spent £12M on security. The perimeter consists of two 10 foot electrified fences topped with razor wire. The area is covered by video cameras that caught the whole incident on tape. Sounds like impressive security, what went wrong? Well, there were some serious gaps in the security plan. Let’s work backwards from the point where he shut down the turbine:

He was able to physically access a computer control system in the facility; a computer that was apparently neither password-protected nor physically secured. He gained access to the operations floor of the facility through an unlocked door. He walked across the open ground around the facility even though he was captured on the video system (both coming and going) without catching the attention of security. He scaled two electrified security fences without setting off an alarm. He was able to reconnoiter the site without detection.

It sounds like the facility felt secure behind its high-tech fences. It also appears to be a very expensive lack of security. Nancy Bartels has some extremely interesting question in her blog:

“Who was watching those screens? If the answer is "nobody," then why bother to install them in the first place? If the answer is "somebody," shouldn't he or she have done something besides just watch?”

And, of course, she ends her blog with the best question of all, “As for all you folks in charge of your process operation's security, how well are you sleeping tonight?”