FRA’s National Rail Plan Ignores Security

The Federal Railroad Administration published a request for comments on their National Rail Plan (NRP) on Monday, in the April 5th, 2010 (actually published on the Internet on the previous Saturday - yesterday) Federal Register. The development of the NRP is a new responsibility for the FRA, the requirement having just been established in the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA). Last fall the FRA had submitted a Preliminary NRP to Congress as required by PRIIA. A copy of that document is available on the FRA web site. According to this request for comments that preliminary plan “set forth FRA's proposed approach to developing the long-range NRP, including goals and objectives for the greater inclusion of rail in the national transportation system” (75 FR 17203). FRA Plan Ignores Freight and Passenger Security I cannot find a single mention of any security issue in either the request for comments or the preliminary plan. I understand that the Transportation Security Agency is the lead agency for all transportation security issues, but both documents address environmental issues that fall under the purview of the Environmental Protection Agency. To make matters worse, the FRA lists 46 agencies and groups that will be included in their outreach effort (Appendix A, Preliminary National Rail Plan). That list includes Federal Agencies like the Department of Housing and Urban Development, State and local government groups, and private industry and labor organizations. The one agency that is pointedly missing in their out reach effort is the Department of Homeland Security. Any plan that purports to chart the future course of development of the nation’s rail infrastructure, yet fails to take into account the efforts necessary to protect those systems from terrorist attack is short sighted and self-defeating. Railroads and their customers will be spending time and energy in protecting their passengers and freight from terrorist attacks. Failing to take into account those efforts and resources will certainly result in other components of the plan from coming into fruition through lack of available resources. Suggestions for Additional Questions The request for comments provides a list of questions that the FRA would like to see addressed in the public comments on the NRP. The questions are broken into ten categories. There are additional security related questions that should have been asked for most of these categories. The questions posed below are examples of the types of questions that could have been asked and are certainly not exhaustive. The proposed questions are tied into existing categories.

1. Strategies for funding. What sources of funding will be available for the implementation of security practices necessary to prevent terrorist attacks? Would protection of passengers from terrorist attack be better funded by private or governmental organizations? When there is a conflict between funding necessary counterterrorism activities and expanding other rail services, which should have higher priority? 2. Passenger service on freight rail lines. Who will be responsible for protecting passenger trains from chemical releases from attacks on freight railcars on adjacent tracks? How often will TIH railcars be forced to be stopped on unsecure rail sidings waiting for passing passenger trains? 5. Transportation safety issues. How much money should be spent on strengthening TIH railcars? How long should current railcars be allowed to be used instead of being upgraded to safer TIH railcars? 7. Land use issues. How will small community safety be weighed in determining the proper routing of TIH railcars? How much money should be set aside for moving rail yards out of urban areas to reduce the threat of terrorist attack on TIH railcars in those rail yards?

Reissue NRP Request for Comments The FRA’s inability to consider the security issues involved in their development of a National Rail Plan greatly compromises the utility of that planning effort. FRA should seriously consider withdrawing their request for comments. Once withdrawn they could actively work with TSA to address security issues that will affect the effective development of a National Rail Plan. Only then can the FRA develop a NRP that actually will have some reasonable chance to guiding the future development of the rail transportation infrastructure in the United States.