Over on my MySpace blog I have been discussing the fire at the Barton Solvents distribution facility in Valley Center, KS (7-17-07, 7-18-07, and 7-19-07). To summarize what is known to date; a plant employee and a truck driver were unloading a “cleaning solvent” into a storage tank at the facility. Apparently there was a static discharge in the head space of the tank that caused an explosion and fire. The fire quickly spread to all of the tanks in the closely spaced tank farm, burning in excess of 235,000 gallons in forty-three solvent and oil storage tanks, according to the county fire marshal. Thousands of local residents were told to evacuate or shelter in place. Most residents are back at home now, though those living closest to the facility are still under evacuation orders because of chemical fumes during the clean-up process. No injuries or fatalities were reported.
There are certainly no indications that this is anything but a very destructive accident, but it easily could have been the outcome of a successful terrorist attack This type of large chemical fire, accompanied by a terrorist claim of responsibility in the national media would have caused panic in this small town and would have increased tensions across the nation. This would be the type of attack that one would hope that the new Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standard (CFATS, 6 CFR part 27) would help to prevent by providing adequate security measures to deter, detect, delay and mitigate (section 27.230) a successful attack.
First off, it is not clear that this facility would have been covered under CFATS. To be covered it would have to be a high-risk facility. To meet the screening requirements for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to look at the facility to determine if it were a high risk facility it would have to have one or more of the 350+ specific chemicals listed in the proposed Appendix A in quantities larger than the Screening Threshold Quantity (STQ) listed for that chemical. While Barton Solvents sells five chemicals that are on the list (Acetone, Cyclohexylamine, Ethylenediamine, Methyldiethanolamine, Triethanolamine), there has not been any mention in the news of the actual chemicals involved in this fire.
None of the chemicals that Barton Solvents sells that make the list in the proposed Appendix A are there for their flammability, though Acetone is certainly a very flammable liquid; two of the chemicals are toxic by inhalation, two can be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons, and Acetone can be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices. It is very likely that none of these chemicals would have been stored in bulk at Barton Solvents; they would more likely have been stored in drums inside the warehouse.
If this facility had inventoried any of the five chemicals, and had enough on hand to meet the DHS requirements for designation as a High Risk Facility, the security program (Site Vulnerability Assessment and Site Security Plan) would be focused on the area where these chemicals would be stored and could completely ignore the potential for attack on the storage tanks.
Suggestions have been made to add a generic flammable liquid STQ to Appendix A, which would probably have brought this facility into the Top Screen system for evaluation. A successful terrorist attack on 635,000 gallons (the potential storage capacity that had existed at this facility) would have looked at least as bad as this accident and a well thought out attack could have looked much worse. Adding a generic flammable liquid STQ would require that facilities like Barton Solvents could be required to plan for potential terrorist attacks designed to produce fires like the one seen in the Middle American community.
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