Two weeks ago there was an attack by Mexican radicals on gas pipelines in Mexico that shut down many US and Mexican manufacturing facilities in Mexico. The EPR (Ejercito Popular Revolucionario) claimed responsibility for the attacks. Recent information indicates that the rebels almost certainly had inside knowledge about the pipelines attacked; placement of the charges showed an understanding of the flow and control of materials through the pipes and were designed to do the maximum amount of damage and to burn for as long as possible after the initial explosion.
While there are many possible ways that this knowledge might have been obtained, two possibilities have direct implications for security interests in the United States; Al Qaeda training or industry infiltration.
Back in February of this year an Al Qaeda affiliate group threatened attacks against countries that were major suppliers of oil to the United States (Mexico, Canada, and Venezuela being the largest in the Western Hemisphere); it would not be unreasonable to suppose that this type of attack could have been done with training and financial support of Al Qaeda. If such attacks can be conducted in Mexico, they can certainly be done on pipelines here in the United States.
It is probably more likely that members of the EPR had infiltrated PEMEX, the Mexican Oil company, and had gained a working knowledge of pipeline operations in that way. While that would not be a direct threat the United States (EPR does not have any particular animosity to the US beyond the normal cultural mistrust found in many Latin Americans) it is indicative of a potential security problem at any US chemical or energy facility; infiltration by people that have an interest in attacking this country.
In recent testimony before the House Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, John Alexander of the United Steel Workers Union complained about the requirements for background checks on current employees of chemical facilities included in the recently established Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS, 6 CFR part 27) regulation. He argued that such checks could be used as a tool against union organizers and whistle blowers.
While no one with any understanding of labor-management relations could completely discount his concerns, there is certainly the possibility of politically (or economically) disaffected people working in the chemical industry. The knowledge available to such an insider would be valuable beyond price to anyone wishing to attack such a facility. That is the reason the DHS is looking for some sort of personal surety program for personnel with unaccompanied access to critical areas in chemical facilities as one of the performance standards to be included in any Site Security Plan. The specifics for such a program are left to facility management in keeping with the Congressional mandate that gave DHS to authority to draft these regulations.
A well managed personnel surety program will have to be an integral part of any successful security program. We will just have to rely on the diligence of Union leadership and the impartiality of the National Labor Relations Board to insure that some anti-union managers do not use this legitimate security tool for union busting purposes.
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