Today CISA and the NSA jointly released
a Cybersecurity Advisory on Control System Defense. The document [labeled Alert (AA22-265A)]
provides an overview (with footnotes) of how adversaries plan and carry out
cyberattacks on industrial control systems and then outlines steps that
owner/operators can take to prevent, or at least mitigate, such attacks.
Commentary
There is a great deal of valuable information in this
document, but it is mostly derivative. That is adequately documented in the 16
footnotes. Given the scope of the topics being covered, the 12-page document is
only able to hit the high-points of the discussion. This is fine if an
organization has an inhouse process control engineering team, they will be able
to digest the provided information and apply it to their unique control system
needs.
This document will be less helpful to smaller organizations
that have had to rely on contract integrators for the installation and maintenance
of their control systems. Unless those earlier contracts included cybersecurity
support, many of these smaller system owners are going to find it difficult to
find the necessary support to add the discussed mitigation measures to existing
systems. And the add-ons are likely to be expensive if qualified personnel can
be found.
What is seriously missing from this discussion about what to
do when the attack occurs. Smaller organizations may have an advantage if they
can continue limited operations in the manual mode. This would allow them
continue operations while they work through the process of restoring operations
from backups. Interestingly, this is another topic that is strangely missing
from the discussion in the CISA/NSA alert. This is a primary response tool for
ransomware attacks, arguably the most common cyberattack seen by most
organizations.
For a more detailed look at the CISA-NSA alert, see my
article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/cisa-nsa-publish-ot-security-alert
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