HR2419 Update 05-14-08

According to the conference report found on the House Rules Committee web site, the version of HR2419 reported favorably out of conference includes three chemical security related provisions instead of the two that I reported on in an earlier blog (see: "Farm Bill Contains Chemical Security Provisions"). The two previously reported provisions are still there and there is a new grant provision for security of anhydrous ammonia nurse tanks.

Previously Reported Provisions

The requirement to report on the effect of the CFATS propane provisions on agriculture are all that remain of earlier provisions to exempt agricultural facilities from all propane security provisions of CFATS. This section has been renumbered "Sec. 14206".

There is one provision of this section that should be practically a dead issue at this point in time. The provision requires DHS to conduct an educational outreach to agricultural facilities that might be required to complete a Top Screen. Since facilities that have had propane on site since before December 2007 should have already completed the Top Screen this provision should be essentially moot.

Section 15343 (again renumbered from the previously reported version) provides tax credits for actions taken to provide security for dangerous agricultural chemicals. The provisions remain unchanged from those reported in my original blog.

Anhydrous Ammonia Provision

I probably missed the ‘new’ provision in my original review of HR2419. Section 14203 of this final version of the bill provides a rather small grant (up to $60 per valve) for agricultural facilities to place a lock on valves of anhydrous ammonia nurse tanks. This is not to protect against terrorist attacks, but to prevent the theft of anhydrous ammonia for the manufacture of methamphetamines. Even so, this still serves to provide an additional barrier to the theft of a potential terrorist chemical weapon.

Future of HR2419

The two houses of congress will be voting on the reported version of HR2419 in the near future. Various news reports indicate that President Bush has vowed to veto this bill for reasons having nothing to do with the security provisions. It is not yet clear whether there will be enough votes in favor of this bill to override the threatened veto.

LATE ADDITION: The House passed the conference version of HR2419 by 318-106, a veto-proof margin. According to the article in the Baltimore Sun, the Senate is also expected to pass the bill by a veto-proof margin.

Tags: Chemical Facility Security, Farm Bill Update, Farm Bill Chemical Security Provisions

IST In New Jersey

New Jersey has the reputation for being the bad boy in the chemical security world, holding industry’s feet to the fire to insure the safety of the population around what is one of the largest concentrations of chemical manufacturing in the United States. Recent news shows that they are not as radical as they have been portrayed; new rules call for mandatory evaluation of IST by high-risk chemical facilities but do not require implementation.

Many had expected that the Corzine administration would require implementation of IST rather than just evaluation. The political reality is that the chemical industry is a 500 lb gorilla in New Jersey because of the 80,000+ jobs and large amount of money that it spends in the economy and in politics. You do not get to remain governor for more than 1 term if you shoot big holes in the profits of your state’s major industry.

Needless to say many environmental and union groups are upset that Corzine backed off of mandatory implementation. What these groups fail to understand is that IST is not a golden bullet that will cure all security and environmental ills. While it is effective in many cases it can also be as counterproductive as cutting off one’s head to cure acne; it works but it may kill the patient.

The one thing that everyone must remember in this debate is that chemical companies are in business to make money. They have a legal responsibility to their owners (a very large number of whom are also workers) to make money. Granted they have a responsibility to do it safely and legally, but if they cannot make money they will not stay in business.

Mandatory evaluation, if done properly, will lead many facilities to implement IST programs. The evaluations will show that those companies can save money by avoiding the costs of environmental and security controls. The company stockholders will then mandate implementation.

Information Note: In looking at the series of blogs and articles about this latest news I ran across an interesting document from the New Jersey hearings on the new IST rules. It is a listing of the various comments (and hearing officer responses) received at the hearings. I’ve only had a chance to quickly scan the document, but it surely shows the naivete of some of the people making presentations at the hearings.

Tags: Chemical Facility Security, IST, New Jersey Regulations

Updates of CSAT Top Screen Manuals

As I mentioned last week (see: "Update of CSAT Web Page and Manuals"), DHS has revised their four published CSAT manuals, two dealing with facility registration and two dealing with the Top Screen. I have already reviewed the changes to the registration manuals (see: "Updates of CSAT Registration Manuals"). Today we will look at the revisions to the two Top Screen manuals.

CSAT Top Screen Questions Manual

There were a number of minor changes to the format/information included in the Top Screen Questions manual. Unfortunately those changes do not include the addition of a change log so a user has to search through the manual to find the changes. Those changes include:

• OMB Expiration Date changed to 03-01-2011 (from 2-29-08)
• Facility Information rearranged
• Updated EPA web site reference for RMP guidance
• Updated EPA web site reference for RMP*Comp

CSAT Top Screen Users Manual

This manual does have a newly added change log. In fact, the list of changes for this version extends to more than two pages. Most of the changes are editorial in nature and would be of interest only to lexicographers. They do reflect an increased interest in English usage and editorial consistency.

A portion of the recent DHS clarification of the rules concerning propane (see: "DHS Clarifies Propane Mixture Rule") are now included in the manual. The Propane note box on page 40 now includes: "The COI Propane refers to products containing at least 87.5 percent of the chemical propane, as well as other release-flammable COI." Unfortunately it does not specifically state that the other COI included in propane do not have to be reported on the Top Screen for amounts of propane less than the 60,000 lbs STQ for propane.

Underground Storage of Release Toxic and Flammable COI

Both manuals refer to a completely new series of questions about the underground storage of both Release Toxic and Release Flammable COI. On page 22 of the Top Screen Questions manual we find the definition of underground storage:

• "Under CFATS, a COI is considered stored underground if it is physically buried in the ground (i.e., basement level storage is not considered underground). If any amount of the COI is stored underground the facility must check yes, and will then be required to answer a series of specific questions on underground storage."

The first underground storage questions show up on the Onsite Quantity/Distance of Concern Table where there are Yes and No check boxes for each chemical to indicate those stored underground. A check in the Yes box leads to subsequent questions for those COI stored underground.

The next set of questions shows up on page 32 of the Top Screen Questions Manual (page 61 for Flammable COI): "The following questions regarding underground storage should only be answered about the amount of COI stored underground.

• "Enter the number of underground storage tanks.
• "Enter the collective capacity of the underground storage tanks (pounds).
• "Enter the distance from the underground tank(s) to the nearest infrastructure (in feet) that is not associated with the underground storage operation."

These questions are then followed (pages 36/71) by "The following questions regarding underground storage should only be answered about the amount of COI stored underground.

• "Enter the pressure rating of tank(s) (psig).
• "Is/Are the tank(s) double walled?
• "Enter depth (from ground surface to tank top) of underground tanks (feet)."

Finally, Methane (natural gas) is singled out for additional special attention when stored underground. The Top Screen Questions Manual (pages 79 and 80) has added additional questions about the underground storage of gaseous methane including whether the methane is stored in caverns, number of wells in storage field, surface area of storage formation, total storage weight, as well as detailed information about well heads in High Consequence Areas (HCA).

What Effect on Recently Completed Top Screens?

Nothing in either manual sheds any light on why these changes were made to these manuals. Neither is there any indication whether or not the Top Screen submissions completed earlier this year will have to be updated with information about underground storage tanks.

It is interesting that such a significant change in the Top Screen procedure has been made without explanation or notice. I would be willing to bet that few facilities noticed the extent of the changes in the manuals if they noticed that the manuals had changed at all.

Of course it could be that DHS has made these changes in preparation for notification of a special class of chemical facilities of the requirement to complete a Top Screen. If the intention was to just change the rules for that special class of facilities (certainly within the Section 550 authorization), it fails to take into account that any facility with a recent change in inventory may be required to submit a new Top Screen. A facility that completed a Top Screen earlier this year could be very confused when they attempt to re-submit.

Tags: Chemical Facility Security, Top Screen Manuals Update, Underground Storage

Blog Comment 5-12-08

I ran into a comment about last week’s blog on security guards (see: "Security Guard Background Checks") on CrimCheck.com. The comment by Ryan Sherman was that: "It is the contract company’s responsibility to get their guards screened." Actually, that was the whole point of the original article and my blog; there is little or no regulation of unarmed guards in many jurisdictions. That and the fact that the chemical facility management will be responsible to DHS for those checks, not the guard companies.

This is the problem that DHS and chemical facility management are going to run into when they start to work the personal surety issues associated with securing high-risk chemical facilities from potential terrorist attack. The lack of federal regulations governing security guards will make it difficult to establish acceptable guidelines under CFATS for what must be done for these security guards.

In fact, the same problems exist, under current rules, for the background checks for facility personnel with unaccompanied access to sensitive areas of the facility. The CFATS regulations do not spell out what kind of background checks must be done. Neither do they spell out what findings on such a check will prohibit an employee or security guard from working at a high-risk chemical facility.

Tags: Chemical Facility Security, Guards and Background Checks, Reader Comments

Updates of CSAT Registration Manuals

As I mentioned last week (see: "Update of CSAT Web Page and Manuals"), DHS has revised their four published CSAT manuals, two dealing with facility registration and two dealing with the Top Screen. I had more of a chance to review the changes and found that the Top Screen changes are more extensive so I will review those separately. Today we will look at the changes made to the two registration manuals.

CSAT User Registration Manual

As I noted in a blog earlier this year (see: "Change to CSAT Registration Manual") DHS had changed the security settings on the newest versions of their manuals so they could neither be printed or abstracted (sections electronically copied from the text). On the newest version of the Registration Manual this has been changed to allow local printing.

Since many people still prefer hard copies of manuals this is a beneficial change. I still don’t understand why DHS does not allow electronic copying of passages from these manuals. It certainly makes it easier for reporters and explicators such as my self to quote from the manuals; simply cut and past. Now I have to actually re-type the passages; how 20th Century.

Two other changes to this manual were even less earth shattering. The OMB Approval Expiration date shown in one of the screen shots (and presumably on the actual web site) was changed from 2008 to 2011. It is a tad bit ironic that the OMB approval expires well after the legal authority for the site expires in 2009.

CSAT Account Management User Guide

This used to be called the Change Request Users Guide; the new name reflects the increased capabilities added to this portion of the CSAT registration site. It now allows an almost one stop site for making changes to current user information, changing roles, and adding new users to the system.

A big part of this change is the addition of the "Update My Information" option on the web site. In addition to allowing the updating of passwords (see: "Potential DHS PHISHING Alert"), it allows for updating the personal information of currently registered users. It allows users to edit name, address, phone-number, email-address and organization name without involving the Help Desk.

The new system also has increased capabilities to change the roles of registered users and to add new users to the system. The system now can handle transferring specific facility roles of a registered user instead of only being able to transfer all roles. Again, this makes it easier to facilities to adapt their systems as they evolve without having to go through the Help Desk personnel.

One last revision updates this manual for a change made in the previous Registration Manual. This manual now explains that the Submitter and Authorizer must be employees of the organization that owns or operates the facility. This change had actually been made to the system earlier this year.

Tags: Chemical Facility Security, CSAT, CSAT Manuals.

Comments on Rail Security and Safety Rules – 5-9-08

There are currently three rules recently published in the Federal Register dealing with the security and safety of rail transportation of various hazardous chemicals. All three rules are in the comment period. Generally speaking the comments made on each of these rules are posted on the Regulations.gov web site. The last review was posted on 4-28-08 (see: "Comments on Rail Security and Safety Rules – 4-25-08").

PIH Tank Car Rule

Comments are to be submitted by June 2, 2008. The FRA added a number of additional documents to the docket file. There were no other comments on this docket. The added documents were:

• Relative Effectiveness of AAR Industry Standard and Government Proposed Performance Standard – Explains the methodology DOT used to evaluate the relative effectiveness of the proposed DOT design and the industry proposed design.
• Influence of Shell Thickness on Tank Car Shell Impact Performance – Explanation of the method of analysis used to evaluate the influence of shell thickness on impact performance.
• Update on Ongoing Tank Car Crashworthiness Research: Research Overview – A copy of a presentation made to the Fertilizer Institute on 2-14-08.
• Update on Ongoing Tank Car Crashworthiness Research – A copy of a presentation made to the Tank Car Builders.
• Update On Ongoing Tank Car Crashworthiness Research: Predicted Performance And Fabrication Approach – A copy of an article published in the Proceedings of 2008 IEEE/ASME Joint Rail Conference.
• Analysis Of Railroad Tank Car Shell Impacts Using Finite Element Method - A copy of an article published in the Proceedings of 2008 IEEE/ASME Joint Rail Conference.
• Analysis of Impacts Associated with Restricting Poisonous by Inhalation (PIH) Train Speeds to 30 mph in Non-Signalized Territory – Explains the DOT reasoning for restricting the speed of PIH trains to 30 mph in non-signaled territory.
• Major Railroad Accidents Involving Hazardous Materials Release: Composite Summaries 1969-1978 – A copy of a 1980 report on railroad accidents.

• Impact Performance of Draft Gears in 263,000 Pound Gross Rail Load and 286,000 Pound Gross Rail Load Tank Car Service – A copy of a 2006 DOT report on effects of over-weight tank cars.

Route Security Analysis Rule

Comments are to be submitted by May 16, 2008. No new comments filed.

Appeal of Adverse Rail Routing Decisions Rule

Comments are to be submitted by June 16, 2008. No comments have been posted since the proposed rule was published.

Commentary

The lack of public comment on these three rules is disappointing. The Federal rule making structure relies on the input of private citizens, organizations, and companies to ensure that the rules used to regulate the country are the product of the views of both the government and the governed.

While the first two rules are on their second round of comments, the original comments were made some time ago and do not necessarily remain germane. This is especially true when you consider how much these rules have changed since they were last published for comments. Additionally, there were specific requests for information and comments in the current proposed rules.

The most controversial of these three rules, the Route Security Analysis Rule, has had no public comments. I find this particularly surprising considering the vehemence expressed in comments on this blog (see: "Another comment related to Railroad Hazmat Route Selection Rule"). The comment period for this rule ends this coming Friday. It will be interesting to see what happens between now and then.

Tags: Chemical Facility Security, Rail safety and security rules

Security Guard Background Checks

NOTE: This blog was originally posted on my MySpace.com blog (see: "Security Guard Background Checks") on 5-29-07.

A recent article in the Columbus Ledger Enquirer has some important implications for chemical plants that fall under the new regulations for protecting chemical plants against terrorist attack. This is an AP article that claims that private security guards in Georgia are not getting the background checks required under Georgia law. It seems that the 2,600 armed guards in Georgia get their FBI fingerprint check because they are state licensed and that check is done as part of the licensing process. The 50,000+ unarmed guards are not licensed and are only required to under go a local records check. Furthermore, the state does not keep records on the unlicensed guards so has no way of knowing if even the local records checks are being done.

The new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regulations (6 CFR part 27) that go into effect on June 8th require that high-risk chemical facilities ensure that all personnel that have unaccompanied access to sensitive areas of the facilities have extensive background checks. These checks include criminal background checks and checks against terrorist watch lists. While chemical companies will be responsible for checking on their own employees, most guards at these facilities work for contract guard companies. These guard companies are going to have to get these checks done on their employees.

The DHS regulations do not spell out what items uncovered in the background checks would prohibit people from working in sensitive areas of chemical facilities. While terrorist connections, membership in violent groups, and convictions for violent crimes would certainly make someone unsuitable for work in such areas, people with lesser felonies and misdemeanors are not automatically prohibited. Unfortunately for the guard companies, they will not be the ones required to make those decisions, it will be the chemical facilities responsibility.

This brings up privacy issues. If there are minor issues in a guard’s background, how much data does the guard company have to share with the facility management? Are they going to have to get the guard’s permission to share this information? Will it be sufficient for the guard company to certify to the chemical facility that the background check has been made and there are no findings, or will they have to show the facility the background investigation results?

These are all issues that are going to have to be ironed out before chemical facilities start submitting their site security plans later this year.

Tags: Chemical Facility Security, Personal Surety, Guards