Short Takes – 11-5-25 – Space Geek Edition

White House renominates Isaacman to be NASA administrator. SpaceNews.com article. Pull quote: “The statement did not explain why Trump decided to renominate him. The description of Isaacman was identical to what Trump wrote in December 2024 when he first announced his intent to nominate the billionaire businessman and private astronaut.”

Musk cheers Trump’s pick to lead NASA Jared Isaacman. TheHill.com article. Pull quote: “However, the decision to reassign him to the role suggests Musk’s detente with Trump has some staying power.”

China delays Shenzhou-20 crew return after suspected space debris impact. SpaceNews.com article. Pull quote: “Earlier stated CMSEO [China Manned Space Engineering Office] redundancy and contingency options include the Shenzhou-20 crew using the recently-arrived Shenzhou-21 spacecraft to return to Earth. China keeps another Shenzhou spacecraft and Long March 2F in a state of near readiness at Jiuquan for emergency situations, and these could be readied for launch in 8.5 days.”

Astronomer reveals first look at Comet 3I/ATLAS as it reappears from behind the sun. LiveScience.com article. Pull quote: “Qicheng Zhang, a postdoctoral fellow at the observatory, has subsequently found that the comet is also visible using small telescopes, posting an example of this to his Cometary blog on Sunday (Nov. 2). According to Zhang, standard amateur telescopes should now start picking up the comet across much of the Northern Hemisphere.”

The (possibly) great lunar lander race. TheSpaceReview.com article. Pull quote: “How much time, at least beyond that that notional 2027 date for Artemis 3, is still unclear, as well as if there really is any faster option to return humans to the Moon, using Starship or another vehicle.”

Why the moon is not the South China Sea: reframing lunar space ahead of the next ‘race’. SpaceNews.com commentary. Pull quote: “First, the analogy [link added] to the South China Sea misunderstands the legal and normative context of lunar exploration. That marine region involves complex historical claims of sovereignty and maritime rights. The moon, by contrast, is governed by the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, whose Article II explicitly prohibits national appropriation of celestial bodies by “claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” Unlike the South China Sea, the moon resides under an established international legal framework that forbids sovereignty claims. A Chinese taikonaut planting a flag, as a symbolic act, would not legally translate into sovereignty any more than the planting of the U.S. flag by the Apollo 11 crew did.”

China targets 2026 for first Long March 10 launch, new lunar crew spacecraft flight. SpaceNews.com article. Pull quote: ““Regarding the specific timeline, we remain steadfast in our goal of achieving a Chinese lunar landing by 2030. It should be noted that many new technologies still need to be verified, the product development workload is substantial, the quality requirements are high, the flight test schedule is tightly coordinated, and the progress is tight, presenting various risks and challenges,” Zhang said.”

Stilsat-1: A Russian-owned and Chinese-built satellite watching Ukraine (part 1). TheSpaceReview.com article. Pull quote: “Clearly, the need to purchase an observation satellite abroad is considered an embarrassing fact which exposes shortcomings in Russia’s satellite production capabilities and its own satellite coverage of the war zone in Ukraine. Stilsat-1 is seen as a technology demonstrator for future Stilsat satellites, which will be built by Russia itself and inherit the Chinese optical system. Despite convincing evidence to the contrary, both the Kremlin and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs have recently denied allegations of high-level cooperation between Russia and China in obtaining satellite imagery of the battlefield in Ukraine.”

China conducts ground tests on inflatable, reconfigurable space manufacturing module. SpaceNews.com article. Pull quote: “The announcement [link added] follows the on-orbit testing of a small expandable module aboard the Shijian-19 retrievable satellite mission launched in September 2024. That experiment was carried out by the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) under China’s main space contractor, CASC. CAST built the modules for the Tiangong space station.”

SpaceX launches private space station pathfinder 'Haven Demo,' 17 other satellites to orbit. Space.com article. Pull quote: “"The first step in our iterative approach towards building next-generation space stations, Haven Demo will test critical systems for Haven-1, including propulsion, flight computers and navigation software," Vast wrote in a description of the satellite.”

Article Backlog List

• Analysts question Germany’s request for defensive and inspector satellites,

• Airbus, Leonardo and Thales agree to combine space businesses,

• H3 launches first HTV-X cargo spacecraft,

• How to understand exoplanets — space scientists call on lab-based chemists to help, and

• FCC proposes ‘licensing assembly line’ to accelerate satellite approvals.

Review – 5 Advisories Published – 11-4-25

Today CISA’s NCCIC-ICS published five control system security advisories for products from IDIS, Radiometrics, Delta Electronics, Survision, and Fuji Electric.

Advisories

IDIS Advisory - This advisory describes an argument injection vulnerability in the IDIS ICM Viewer (IDIS Cloud Manager Viewer).

NOTE: CISA reports that: “IDIS requires all users to upgrade to v1.7.1. Failure to do so will render the ICM Viewer unusable.”

Radiometrics Advisory - This advisory describes three vulnerabilities in the Radiometrics VizAir weather monitoring and forecasting system.

Delta Advisory - This advisory describes a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the Delta CNCSoft-G2.

Note: I briefly discussed this vulnerability on September 27^th, 2025.

Survision Advisory - This advisory describes a missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in the Survision License Plate Recognition Camera.

Fuji Advisory - This advisory describes two vulnerabilities in the Fuji Monitouch V-SFT-6.

 

For more information on these advisories, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/5-advisories-published-11-4-25 - subscription required.

Process Chemistry and Data

There was an interesting commentary by Jake Brodsky on ScadaMag.Infracritical.com about understanding process data. It looks at process data from an engineer’s point of view and as is usual Jake provides some interesting insights, well worth reading. It also made me think back to my beginnings as a process chemist, fresh out of  college.

I started back to college (that’s a whole different story for another day) while working in a specialty chemical plant as a technician. My job at that time had little to do with process chemistry, I was shipping samples of products to customers and salespeople. But, I had to get my samples from the plant where I worked and I worked closely with plant operators.

When I graduated, I moved into the research lab, working on supporting the toll manufacturing group in the company. Initially that meant troubleshooting process upsets, particularly out-of-spec batches. Some of those problems were easy to solve; talk to the operators, see what they did ‘wrong’ and change the batch instructions to make clear how not to do that again. Toll manufacturing frequently involves short runs of unique products where operator experience with the process is lacking, this makes many operator ‘errors’ more a problem with instructions rather than operator skills.

It quickly became apparent that better instructions depended more upon a better understanding of how the chemical reaction process proceeded than could be gained in small-scale lab-reactions. So, I needed to collect process data to understand what was happening in the reaction vessel. Part of this was straight chemical analysis, collect frequent samples (every 15 minutes over a three-hour period on one of the first products where I used this technique) from the vessel and using analytic chemistry to track the changes in chemical composition.

To make this analysis worthwhile for operators, I had to tie that analytical data to process variables that the operator could observe and control. Unfortunately, at the time (middle 90’s) the process measurement was very primitive by today’s standards, circular chart recorder for temperature, on-vessel pressure gauges, and digital readouts in the control room for load cells. And operator written notes for times of manually opening and closing valves, and starting and stopping pumps; in some cases ‘manually’ meant pushing buttons for air-actuated valves, in others it was turning valve handles by hand. To be able to link all of these operations together into a reasonably accurate timeline, it meant running around the control room and the plant floor watching controls, readouts, and operator actions. All that work was worthwhile though; I was able to refine the process control instructions and reduce the batch process time by 30%. My bosses were well pleased; operators not as much, as I made their jobs more complicated with more detailed instructions.

As the plant moved to an electronic control system (an interesting process itself) this process became much easier. I could sit in the control room and watch an operator HMI and record the data in ‘real time’, with very little lag between recording the various variables. As I continued to refine process instructions it became apparent that something was ‘wrong’ with some of the data that I was collecting; the correlation between the process data and the analytical data was not as tight. Still, process times continued to shorten and finished product variables were tightened; the businesspeople loved it.

Process upset investigations actually became more difficult. Unless I had been watching (and recording data on) the batch at the critical point (and most of these batches ran for 24 hours) I had to rely on operator notes and recollection for problems with the increasingly detailed process control scheme. A customer suggested that we get a data historian that would be able to record the data in detail on every batch we made. They were an important customer (and they paid for their raw materials, so they had a vested interest in eliminating off-spec batches) so a well-known data historian was acquired. My job became more of a computer-data analysis job, and I was able to spend less time looking over the shoulders of operators.

Still, there were data anomalies that I could not explain; flow rates did not accurately track load cell changes, there were lags between valve operations and expected changes in measured process values, and a number of other problems too numerous to mention. For the most part I could ignore these problems in early stages of process improvement, but as the process got tighter these issues became more important. It was not until the company hired a process engineer (another interesting story), that someone was able to explain these issues (many discussed in Jakes article) and we were able to take these ‘control variables’ into account in additional process improvements.

In any case, I hope that this helps to explain why the operations folks (and their managers up the line) are intimately interested in process data. I was fortunate that my managers did not demand ‘real time’ access to the raw data. They were happy with the analysis that I was able to provide from that data. Unfortunately, new management came with a new owner, and it was decided that a process chemist was no longer needed when the plant had a process engineer. But that is another story.

Review – HR 5061 Introduced – cUAS Authority

Back in August Rep Garbarino (R,NY) introduced HR 5061, the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act. This bill is a comprehensive attempt to address issues related to counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (cUAS) activities. It includes amendments to, and an extension of, the cUAS authorities granted to DHS and DOJ under 6 USC 124n. No new spending is authorized.

HR 5061 is similar to HR 8610, the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act, that was introduced by Rep Green (R,TN) in June of 2024. The House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee held a business meeting on September 18^th, 2024 where HR 8610 was considered. The bill was amended and ordered reported favorably. The Committee’s Report was published on September 20^th, 2024. No further action was taken in the House.

Moving Forward

On September 3^rd, 2025, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee held a business meeting, where HR 5061 was considered. The Committee approved substitute language by a vote of 60 to 0 and ordered the bill reported favorably as amended. When the Committee’s report is published, the bill will be cleared for consideration by the full House (if the chairs of the two other committees assigned for consideration, Judiciary and Homeland Security, sign off on the consideration). I suspect that the bill would be considered under the House suspension of the rules process, where it would likely pass with strong bipartisan support.

 

For more details about the provisions of this bill, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/hr-5061-introduced-cuas-authority - subscription required.

Reader Comment – Advisory Windows

This weekend a reader over on Substack, Robots and Chips,  left three comments (here, here, and here) on two of my blog posts (here and here) about CISA vulnerability advisories. They draw some interesting conclusions about how these vulnerabilities provide a window into cybersecurity problems with the energy sector. While I generally try to avoid drawing general conclusions from isolated advisories, the insights here deserve consideration and discussion.

I would, however, like to make one observation; I have seen very few of these energy sector related vulnerabilities show up in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. That may just be a reporting anomaly (the KEV catalog is, after all, focused on problems potentially affecting federal systems), or a failure to report exploits by that sector, but I suspect that the overall cybersecurity posture of the major components of the electric grid may have something to do with that. But that is an outsider’s perspective, my knowledge of the grid does not extend much beyond being able to identify the GA Power distribution substation down at the end of my block.

Review – Bills Introduced – 10-31-25

Yesterday with the House meeting in pro forma session, and the Senate taking another long weekend, there were 46 bills introduced. One of those bills may receive additional coverage in this blog:

HR 5900 To direct the Department of Defense to establish a joint task force to investigate transnational cybercrimes, and for other purposes. Vindman, Eugene Simon [Rep.-D-VA-7]

 

For more information on these bills, including legislative history for similar bills in the 118^th Congress, as well as a mention in passing of the Warrior Road Act, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/bills-introduced-10-31-25 - subscription required.

Review – Public ICS Disclosures – Week of 10-25-25

This week we have bulk vendor disclosures from HP (6). We have 11 additional vendor disclosures from Circutor, Hitachi Energy, HPE, Moxa, Philips, QNAP, Ruckus, Sick (2), Supermicro, and WatchGuard. There are bulk updates from HP (6). We have six additional vendor updates from ABB, Hitachi Energy, and Moxa (4). Finally, we have a researcher report of a vulnerability in products from MPDV Mikrolab.

Bulk Disclosures – HP

• HP Client Management Script Library – Security Update,

• AMD Graphics August 2025 Security Update,

• HP Card Readers (B Models) – Potential Information Disclosure,

• NVIDIA GPU Display Driver October 2025 Security Update,

• Intel Xeon Processor Firmware August 2025 Security Update,

• HP ThinPro 8.1 SP8 Security Updates.

Advisories

Circutor Advisory - INCIBE-CERT published an advisory that describes 12 vulnerabilities in the Circutor SGE-PLC100 and SGE-PLC50 concentrators.

Hitachi Energy Advisory - Hitachi Energy published an advisory that discusses the BlastRadius-Fail vulnerability.

HPE Advisory - HPE published an advisory that describes seven vulnerabilities in their Private Cloud AI product.

Moxa Advisory - Moxa published an advisory that discusses an inadequate encryption strength vulnerability in multiple Moxa product lines.

Philips Advisory - Philips published an advisory that discusses a Windows remote code execution vulnerability that is listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog.

QNAP Advisory - QNAP published an advisory that discusses an HTTP request/response smuggling vulnerability (with publicly available exploit) in their NetBak PC Agent.

Ruckus Advisory - Ruckus published an advisory that describes “a number of vulnerabilities in access control and privilege escalation” in their RUCKUS Network Director.

Sick Advisory #1 - Sick published an advisory that discusses an inclusion of functionality from untrusted control sphere vulnerability (listed in CISA’s KEV and has publicly available exploit) in their SID products.

Sick Advisory #2 - Sick published an advisory that describes six vulnerabilities in their TLOC100-100 product.

Supermicro Advisory - Supermicro published an advisory that discusses an improper handling of insufficient entropy vulnerability in multiple Supermicro products.

WatchGuard Advisory - WatchGuard published an advisory that describes a command injection vulnerability in their Mobile VPN product.

Bulk Updates – HP

• Intel Rapid Storage Technology Software August 2025 Security Update,

• HP Hotkey Support – Escalation of Privilege,

• NVIDIA GPU Display Driver January 2025 Security Update,

• NVIDIA GPU Display Driver July 2025 Security Update,

• Intel System Security Report and System Resources Defense, and

• Intel Graphics Software August 2025 Security Update

Updates

ABB Update - ABB published an update for their Terra AC wallbox advisory that was originally published on September 16^th, 2025, and most recently updated on October 9^th, 2025.

Hitachi Energy Update - Hitachi Energy published an update for their Asset Suite advisory that was originally published on September 30^th, 2025.

Moxa Update #1 - Moxa published an update for their Ethernet Switch advisory that was originally published on October 23^rd, 2025.

Moxa Update #2 - Moxa published an update for their Secure Routers advisory that was originally published on April 2^nd, 2025, and most recently updated on May 5^th, 2025.

Moxa Update #3 - Moxa published an update for their Secure Routers advisory that was originally published on April 2^nd, 2025.

Moxa Update #4 - Moxa published an update for their ICMP Timestamp advisory that was originally published on October 21^st, 2025.

Researcher Reports

MPDV Mikrolab Report - SEC Consult published a report that describes a path traversal vulnerability in the MPDV MIP 2, FEDRA 2, and HYDRA X Manufacturing Execution Systems.

 

For more information on these disclosures, including links to 3^rd party advisories, researcher reports, and exploits, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/public-ics-disclosures-week-of-10-0e8 - subscription required.