CSB Publishes Volume 4 of Their Incident Reports Series – 2-18-26

Yesterday the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) announced the publication of the fourth volume of their Incident Reports Series. This volume provides 13 investigation summaries of incidents reported since 2020. The investigations were not conducted by the CSB, but rather by the affected companies. Volume 1 (26 incidents) was published in January, 2025, Volume 2 (25 incidents) in March 2025, and Volume 3 (30 incidents) in July 2025.

While these investigation reports are not up to the technical standards of the CSB, they still provide valuable insights into how accidental releases occur in the chemical industry. Readers are going to have to deduce and apply the lessons learned as there are no recommendations from the Board at the end of these reports.

That these companies are willing to publicly share their accident investigation results with the public through the auspices of the CSB positively reflect on the chemical safety investigations and outreach efforts of the Board. The idea that unrelated entities can learn from the mistakes of others in the realm of chemical safety is the largest legacy of this underfunded agency. It is heartening to see that Congress remains willing and able to continue to fund the CSB even in the face of the anti-government agenda of the current administration.

Administrative Note: Volume 4 is not yet listed on the CSB’s Incident Reporting Rule Submission Information and Data page where the other three volumes are reported. I expect that this administrative oversight will be corrected in the near future.

CSB Updates Status of Four Investigation Recommendations – 4-10-23

Yesterday, without fanfare or notice, the Chemical Safety Board updated the status of four accident investigation recommendations. The change of status documents were all dated April 10^th, 2023, but the status was not updated on the CSB website until yesterday. The status updates include:

• Aghorn Operating Inc. Waterflood Station H2S Release, 2020-01-I-TX-R8, OSHA, Closed – Acceptable Action,

• Aghorn Operating Inc. Waterflood Station H2S Release, 2020-01-I-TX-R9, The Railroad Commission of Texas, Closed – Acceptable Action,

• US Ink Fire, 2013-01-I-NJ-R1, OSHA, Closed – Acceptable Action, and

• US Ink Fire, 2013-01-I-NJ-R2, OSHA, Closed – Reconsidered/Superseded

NOTE: The links above are to the closing document not the actual recommendation.

NTSB Publishes UAS Accident NPRM

 Today the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register (86 FR 27550-27551) for “Amendment to the Definition of Unmanned Aircraft Accident”. The rulemaking would remove the weight-based requirement and replacing it with an airworthiness certificate or airworthiness approval requirement. This action is being undertaken to reflect the evolving nature of UAS usage and regulation.

Current Definition

The current definition of the term ‘unmanned aircraft accident’ is found at 49 CFR 830.2. It includes in that definition a requirement that the occurrence defining the accident includes either of the two following characteristics:

• Any person suffers death or serious injury; or

• The aircraft has a maximum gross takeoff weight of 300 pounds or greater and sustains substantial damage.

Proposed Change

In this rulemaking, the NTSB is proposing to replace the second characteristic with the phrase: ““holds an airworthiness certificate or approval”. The Preamble to the NPRM notes that:

“While this definition ensured that the NTSB expended resources on UAS events involving the most significant risk to public safety, the advent of higher capability UAS applications—such as commercial drone delivery flights operating in a higher risk environment (e.g., populated areas, beyond line-of-sight operations, etc.)—has prompted the agency to propose an updated definition of “unmanned aircraft accident.”

This change will “will treat a UAS with airworthiness certification or airworthiness approval in the same manner as a manned aircraft with airworthiness certification or airworthiness approval, thereby enabling the NTSB to immediately investigate, influence corrective actions, and propose safety recommendations.”

Public Comments

The NTSB is soliciting public comments on this proposed rulemaking. Comments may be submitted via the Federal eRulemaking Portal (www.Regulations.gov; Docket # NTSB-2021-0004). Comments should be submitted by July 20^th, 2021.

DOT Takes Additional Actions on Crude Oil Trains – Accident Information

This is part of a detailed look at several actions that the Department of Transportation (DOT) took last Friday to reduce the hazards associated with the transport of crude oil and other flammable liquids by train. Earlier posts in this discussion include:

DOT Takes Additional Actions on Crude Oil Trains

DOT Takes Additional Actions on Crude Oil Trains – FRA EO 30

DOT Takes Additional Actions on Crude Oil Trains – Incident Report ICR

This post looks at a joint Safety Advisory published by the Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the Federal Railroad Administration last Friday (and it is scheduled to be published in the Federal Register tomorrow).

The SA reminds railroads that the FRA and PHMSA have authority to investigate railroad accidents, particularly those involving hazardous material. As part of that investigation process they have the legal authority to demand information from the railroad and affected shippers of hazardous materials. As a matter of advance notice, the SA provides a list of the type of information that they routinely expect to request for accidents involving crude oil train cars or other flammable liquid accidents. Those include:

∙ Information on train consist;

∙ Waybill;

∙ Safety Data Sheet;

∙ Results of product testing used to categorize flammable material;

∙ Results of product testing of railcar samples;

∙ Date of Acceptance;

∙ Company extracting crude oil;

∙ Company doing initial categorization testing;

∙ Company hauling crude oil or other flammable liquid to loading facility; and

∙ All railroads handling affected railcars;

The ‘train consist’ information would include:

∙ Train number;

∙ Locomotives;

∙ Locomotives as distributed power;

∙ End-of-train device information;

∙ Number and position of tank cars in the train;

∙ Tank car reporting marks;

∙ Tank car specification and ‘relevant attributes’

Commentary

A lot of the product related information included in the above list is going to be unique to crude oil shipments because of the increased testing in the latest version of EO 28 issued last year. Manufacturers of flammable liquids do not have to test every load to confirm the classification and packing group of the material. They can use standard information on the product. The oil industry used to be able to do this, but spot checks by PHMSA indicated that there were a number of cases where those assumptions were wrong.

At this time this information is only needed on an ‘on demand’ basis in the event of a rail accident involving crude oil or other flammable liquids (mainly targeting ethanol, but that distinction is not made in this SA). It seems likely that at some point FRA will consider a formal documentation requirement for all crude oil railcars from point of extraction to delivery to the refiner.