FRA Sends Electric Brake Final Rule to OMB

Yesterday, the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) announced that it had received a final rule from the DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) on “Amendments to Brake System Safety Standards Governing Operations Using Electronic Air Brake Slip System”. The notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for this rulemaking was published on January 15th, 2021.  

According to the 2026 Unified Agenda entry for this rulemaking: 

“This rulemaking proposes to amend FRA's brake system safety standards to govern operations using the eABS system developed by AAR member railroads. This rulemaking would provide an alternative regulatory framework for railroads to utilize when choosing to use the eABS system. The rulemaking would extend the distance individual rail cars may be moved without stopping for brake and mechanical inspections and tests if the cars have a valid eABS system record. The rulemaking also proposes to allow railroads to add multiple cars to a train or remove multiple cars from a train without conducting additional brake tests as currently required if the train is solely made up of cars with eABS records.” 

This final rule looks to be a bit more on the technical side of railroad operations that I typically cover in this blog. I do not expect to cover this in any detail, but I do plan on at least announcing its publication in the appropriate Short Takes post. 

Review – HR 7338 Introduced – RSAC Codification

Earlier this month Rep Sykes (D,OH) introduced HR 7338, the Railroad Safety and Accountability Act. The bill would codify the establishment and operation of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) which was established by DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) in 1996. It would amend 49 USC by adding a new §20122, Railroad Safety Advisory Committee. The bill would authorize “such funds as would be necessary” from the Highway Trust Fund for the operations of the RSAC.

The RSAC was effectively terminated in August of 2025 as part of the Administration’s efforts to recraft advisory committees to reflect their policy agendas. In January 2026, the FRA announced the reestablishment of the Charter for the RSAC in the Federal Register. There are not yet any members appointed to the ‘new’ RSAC.

Moving Forward

Sykes is a member of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee to which this bill is assigned for consideration. This means that there could be sufficient influence to see this bill considered in Committee. While the provisions of this bill would appear to be relatively uncontroversial, I suspect that there may be some Administration push-back because of a perceived criticism of how they mistreated the previous RSAC. Still, I expect that this bill would receive some level of bipartisan support were it to be considered, but I am not confident that it would be sufficient to allow the bill to be considered by the full House under the suspension of the rules process.

Commentary

Advisory committees like RSAC provide regulatory agencies with an invaluable tool to help them develop workable regulatory schemes to deal with a wide variety of safety and security issues. The varied backgrounds and agendas of the members provide the parent agency with a variety of perspectives that are not available in-house. This helps those agencies avoid unanticipated problems with the publish and comment process of regulatory development.

 

For more information on the provisions of this bill, including additional commentary on Congress utilizing the expertise of advisory committees, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/hr-7338-introduced-rsac-codification - subscription required.

Review - FRA Publishes Hot Bearing Wayside Detector Safety Advisory Update

Today, the DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) published a safety advisory update in the Federal Register (89 FR 58243-58245) on “Safety Advisory 2023-01; Evaluation of Policies and Procedures Related to the Use and Maintenance of Hot Bearing Wayside Detectors (Second Supplement)”. The original advisory was published on March 3^rd, 2023 and then updated on June 14^th, 2024. This latest supplement expands on the recommendations to incorporate the findings of FRA's ongoing evaluations by emphasizing:

•The importance of trend analysis and the opportunity to integrate wayside detector data types to evaluate railcar health,

•The need to establish and follow appropriate processes in analyzing and responding to HBD data,

•The need for railroads to ensure that adequate staff are assigned to monitor and respond to wayside detector data, and

•The need for railroads to maximize the use of HBD data, including sharing wayside detector data between railroads, as a train travels from one railroad's tracks to another railroad's track.

 

For more information on today’s supplement, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/fra-publishes-hot-bearing-wayside - subscription required.

OMB Approves FRA Train Crew Staffing Final Rule

Yesterday, the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) announced that it had approved a final rule from the DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) on “Train Crew Staffing”. The rule was submitted to OIRA on January 2^nd, 2024. The notice of proposed rulemaking was published on July 28^th, 2022.

According to the Fall 2023 Unified Agenda entry for the rulemaking:

“This rulemaking would address the potential safety impact of one-person train operations, including appropriate measures to mitigate an accident's impact and severity, and the patchwork of State laws concerning minimum crew staffing requirements. This rulemaking would address the issue of minimum requirements for the size of train crews, depending on the type of operations. In an effort to encourage public participation, FRA extended the comment period from 60 to 146 days and held a public hearing on December 14, 2022.”

The final rule may be published in the Federal Register this coming week. As with the NPRM, it is not likely that I will be covering this rulemaking in any detail, but I will almost certainly announce it in my ‘Short Takes’ post on the day it is published.

Review - OMB Approves FRA Train Length ICR

Today, the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) announced that it had approved an information collection request (ICR) from the DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) on “Class I Freight-Train Length Reporting”. This ICR supports the collection of information by the FRA supporting their May 2^nd, 2023 Safety Advisory 2023-03, Accident Mitigation and Train Length.

Burden Estimate
# of Respondents	6
# of Responses	72
Burden (hrs)	576
Burden ($)	$48,496

For more information on the approved data collection, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/omb-approves-fra-train-length-icr - subscription required.

FRA Sends Train Crew Size Final Rule to OMB

Yesterday, the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) announced that it had received a final rule from DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) on “Train Crew Staffing”. The notice of proposed rulemaking for this action was published on July 28^th, 2022.

According to the Fall 2023 Unified Agenda entry for this rulemaking:

“This rulemaking would address the potential safety impact of one-person train operations, including appropriate measures to mitigate an accident's impact and severity, and the patchwork of State laws concerning minimum crew staffing requirements. This rulemaking would address the issue of minimum requirements for the size of train crews, depending on the type of operations. In an effort to encourage public participation, FRA extended the comment period from 60 to 146 days and held a public hearing on December 14, 2022.”

While this rulemaking is a little more down-in-the-weeds in railroad operations than I typically cover in this blog, the NPRM contained specific provisions (see my post) for hazmat trains that may affect loading operations at some chemical facilities. 

FRA Publishes Another Train Operations Safety Advisory – 4-27-23

Today, the DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) published on their website a new safety advisory dealing with the operation of long trains. The instructions to railroad operators will not become official until they are published in the Federal Register, probably next week but, since these are non-regulatory instructions, that delay is not material.

Reacting to three recent long-train derailments (not including the East Palestine derailment) the advisory provides eight recommendations pending completion of two formal studies about safety issues related to the operation of long-trains. None of the recommendations is going to have an immediate impact on operational safety.

I’ll have more details when the official version is published and I can provide paragraph links in the discussion.

FRA Publishes Hot Wheel Bearing Safety Advisory

Yesterday, the DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) published a notice of Safety Advisory 2023-01 in the Federal Register (88 FR 13494-13497) for “Evaluation of Policies and Procedures Related to the Use and Maintenance of Hot Bearing Wayside Detectors”. This safety advisory is at least partially in response to the recent derailment with fire and explosions near East Palestine, OH.

After reviewing background information on the use of hot bearing wayside detectors and how some recent derailments were presaged by ‘hot bearing detector’ (HBD) warnings (Warner Robins, GA, 7-12-22; Sandusky, OH, 10-8-22; and East Palestine, OH, 2-3-23), the Advisory discusses “Journal Bearings and Detecting Journal Bearing Defects”.

Based on the information discussed above, the Advisory goes on to recommend that railroads:

Review existing HBD system inspection and maintenance policies and procedures for compliance with existing industry standards and manufacturer recommendations for HBDs,

Review existing procedures to train and qualify personnel responsible for installing, inspecting, and maintaining HBDs to ensure they have the appropriate knowledge and skills,

Review current HBD detector thresholds in light of recent derailments, and all other relevant available data (including data from any close calls or near misses), to determine the adequacy of the railroad's current thresholds,

Review current procedures governing actions responding to HBD alerts to ensure required actions are commensurate with the risk of the operation involved, and

With regard to trains transporting any quantity of hazardous materials, FRA recommends railroads adopt the procedures outlined in AAR's OT-55 for key trains as an initial measure.

All of the discussions and recommendations described above were preceded by the following disclaimer:

“This Safety Advisory is considered guidance pursuant to DOT Order 2100.6A (June 7, 2021). Except when referencing laws, regulations, policies, or orders, the information in this Safety Advisory does not have the force and effect of law and is not meant to bind the public in any way. This document does not revise or replace any previously issued guidance.”

 

Perhaps it is time for Congress to specifically require FRA to establish regulations that require the use of wayside detectors and to ensure that they are tied into positive train control (PTC) systems where such systems exist.

FRA Publishes Train Crew Size NPRM

Today the DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register (87 FR 45564-45622) for “Train Crew Size Safety Requirements”. The regulation would establish safe minimum requirements for the size of train crews depending on the type of operation. It would also establish processes for requesting authority to operate or continue to operate trains with fewer crew members.

Hazmat Shipments

Section E of the preamble addresses the concerns that the FRA looked at in assessing how it should deal with the train crew issue when dealing with the rail transport of hazardous materials. At the end of that discussion the preamble states:

“Based on the known safety and security risks associated with operating trains transporting large amounts of hazardous materials and with the hazardous materials known to present the greatest safety and security risks, as discussed in more detail in the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 218.123 [link added] below, in this NPRM FRA is proposing to prohibit the operation of trains transporting hazardous materials subject to FRA's securement regulation [link added] or materials designated by TSA as RSSMs [rail-security sensitive materials] on trains with fewer than two crewmembers.”

The proposed §218.123(c) that deals with hazmat shipments reads:

“(c)Hazardous material two-person train crew mandate. For the purposes of this paragraph (c), a tank car containing residue of a hazardous material as defined in § 171.8 [link added] of this title is not considered a loaded car. None of the exceptions in §§ 218.125 through 218.133 [links added] are applicable when any train is transporting:

“(1) Twenty (20) or more loaded tank cars or loaded intermodal portable tanks of any one or any combination of hazardous materials identified in § 232.103(n)(6)(i)(B) [link added] of this chapter; or

“(2) One or more car loads of rail-security sensitive materials (RSSM) as defined in § 1580.3 [link added] of this title.

Interestingly, this specifically excludes the exemption for using a one-person crew for filling unit trains.

Public Comments

The FRA is soliciting public comments on the NPRM. Comments may be submitted via the Federal eRulemaking Portal (www.Regulations.gov; Docket # FRA-2021-0032). Comments need to be submitted by September 26^th, 2022.

OMB Approves FRA Train Crew Staffing NPRM

Last week the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) announced that it had approved a notice of proposed rulemaking from the DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) on “Train Crew Staffing”.

According to the Spring 2022 Unified Agenda entry for this rulemaking:

“This rulemaking would address the potential safety impact of one-person train operations, including appropriate measures to mitigate an accident's impact and severity, and the patchwork of State laws concerning minimum crew staffing requirements. This rulemaking would address the issue of minimum requirements for the size of different train crew staffs, depending on the type of operations.”

I do not intend to get this far down into the weeds of railroad operations in this blog, but if this rulemaking, as expected, increases train crew staffing requirements, this will have at least some adverse impact on the problems Class I railroads with service issues.

Review - FRA Publishes PTC Safety Advisory – 9-2-21

Today the DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration published a notice of safety advisory in the Federal Register (86 FR 49410-49411) for “Positive Train Control Interface Design Issue With Locomotive and Cab Car Braking Systems”. Safety Advisory 2021-01 was published due to the identification of the availability of a manual bypass of the PTC breaking controls on at least two different PTC systems.

It is easy to imagine circumstances where being able to defeat the PTC’s operation of breaking controls would be necessary. The system to defeat that system should not, however, be readily available to the train crew. Management review of the circumstances needs to be undertaken to ensure that the safety of the train, the crew and the public is protected.

For more details on the problem and FRA required actions, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/fra-publishes-ptc-safety-advisory - subscription required.

FRA Publishes New PTC Reporting NPRM

Friday the DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register (85 FR 82400-82425) outlining changes to the regulations concerning positive train control systems (PTC) reporting processes. The proposed changes include:

• Modifying the process under 49 CFR 236.1021 by which a host railroad must submit a request for amendment (RFA) to FRA before making certain changes to its PTC Safety Plan (PTCSP) and FRA-certified PTC system,

• Expanding an existing reporting requirement by increasing the frequency from annual to biannual,

• Broadening the reporting requirement to encompass positive performance-related information, not just failure-related information, and

• Requiring host railroads to utilize a new, standardized Biannual Report of PTC System Performance (Form FRA F 6180.152).

Public Comments

The FRA is soliciting public comments on this NPRM. Comments may be submitted via the Federal eRulemaking Portal (www.Regulations.gov; Docket # FRA-2019-0075). Comments should be submitted by February 16^th, 2021.

Commentary

The FRA is to be commended for recognizing that the completion of the initial implementation of the PTC program (at long last) should mark a change in the way that it oversees the program. This proposed rulemaking goes a long way to providing the FRA with the necessary information that it needs to perform its regulatory oversight function. Unfortunately, with the recent news about the SUNBURST attacks, it is clear that all federal agencies must step up their activities related to cybersecurity. The PTC safety system is one such area where the FRA must proactively address cybersecurity needs.

A comprehensive attempt to address the cybersecurity challenges related to the PTC system will probably require a stand-alone rulemaking, but this NPRM provides a good place for the FRA to make a cybersecurity down payment on the system.

The FRA already notes the importance of reporting of software defects in 49 CFR 263.1023(b). The scope of that requirement needs to be enlarged to include notifications of 3^rd party reports of software and firmware vulnerabilities, but that is outside the scope of this rulemaking. The reporting requirements of that section, however, should be included in the biannual reporting requirements being addressed in this rulemaking. This could be addressed by inserting a new subparagraph (iii):

“(iii) Any reports from hardware or software suppliers or vendors under §263.1023(b) about software failures or reported vulnerabilities.”

The FRA should also specify that changes to PTC software or firmware specifically requires approval under the proposed revised processes. This would allow the FRA to keep control of an important part of the PTC environment. It could be achieved by adding a new subparagraph (5) under §263.1021(h):

“(5) Any change in PTC component software or firmware.”

One other area that should be addressed by the FRA is adding a requirement for reporting unusual operation of the PTC systems. Such incidents can provide indications that they system has been attacked or breached. Ideally, this would include adding the phrase “or demonstrates indicators of compromise” after the word “malfunctions” in 49 USC 20157(j)(2), but that is clearly beyond the scope of rulemaking. Having said that, this could be implemented by revising the proposed definition for ‘malfunction’ at §236.1003(b) by inserting the following language after “PTCSP”:

“, or any indication of unauthorized system access or other indicators of compromise described by system suppliers or vendors.”

These changes would be a first step in increasing the efforts to be taken by the FRA to ensure that cybersecurity of PTC systems is being addressed in a proactive manner.

A copy of this post will be submitted as a comment on this NPRM.

OMB Approves FRA Automation Induced Human Error Study ICR

Yesterday the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs announced that it had approved an information collection request (ICR) from the DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration for an Experimental Investigation of Automation-induced Human Error in the Locomotive Cab. The study will be conducted by the DOT’s  Volpe Center using their Cab Technology Integration Laboratory (CTIL).

The Study

The study will look at two different types of train automation systems currently in use by railroads in the United states; the Trip Optimizer and Electronic Train Management System (ETMS) Positive Train Control (PTC). According to the final Supporting Statement [.DOXC download] provided to OIRA, the study will assess three working hypotheses:

• Automation provides specific performance benefits (e.g., TO reduces fuel usage; PTC prevents overspeeding and transgressions into workzones or past a red signal) compared with manual control;

• Automation does not reduce perceived workload in the locomotive cab compared with manual control; and

• Automation condition will show more errors in high workload situations than in low workload situations (e.g., distractions lead to failure to notice mode transitions) and the manual condition will not.

That Supporting Document provides a fairly detailed description of the proposed test. The idea behind this study is that disruptions to the engineer/conductor attention at critical junctures in train operation lead to errors. The specific disruption that will be studied will be a radio call from the dispatcher carefully timed to changes in operation of the automation system. The Supporting Document notes that an earlier study suggested that this might be a specific cause of operator error in using train automation systems.

The results of the study will be published as an FRA technical report at some future date.

Commentary

This looks like it will be an interesting study and it may have important implications for a number of other areas where automated safety critical systems require operator interactions.

The three hypotheses being tested here are an interesting look at automation systems in their own right. The first goes to the efficacy of the safety-critical automation system; if that assumption is not true, then the entire design of the system is called into question. The second hypothesis is a human factors issue, but it also is an important question of safety design. If the safety critical system requires operator action, it should not add to the operator’s workload else it increases the probability of a safety-critical human-error; that is the third hypothesis in a nutshell.

The FRA is fortunate that it has simulator capacity to evaluate these concerns. Designers of a process safety system at a chemical plant (for instance) are unlikely to have that capability.

FRA Announces RSAC Meeting – 04-07-16

Today the DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration published a meeting notice in the Federal Register (81 FR 14515-14516) for a public meeting of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee in Washington, DC on April 7^th 2016. The RSAC was formed to develop new regulatory standards, through a collaborative process, with all segments of the rail community working together to fashion mutually satisfactory solutions on safety regulatory issues.

Status reports will be presented by the following working groups (links are for the task statements for the working gourp - .PDF download):

• Remote Control Locomotive;

• Track Standards;

• Hazardous Materials Issues; and

• Rail Integrity

While this is a public meeting, there is nothing in the notice that would indicate that feedback from the public, either oral or written, will be accepted for this meeting.

FRA Publishes PTC Direct Final Rule

Today the DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) published a final rule in the Federal Register (81 FR 10126-10131) implementing changes in compliance dates for the implementation of Positive Train Control (PTC) technology in accordance with the requirements of §1302 of the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2015 (PL 114-73).

The changes being made in this new final rule include:

• Striking the deadline referenced in 49 CFR §236.1005(b)(1) and is adding a paragraph (b)(7) to address the new deadlines the recent legislation mandates;

• Amending paragraph §236.1005(b)(6) by striking “2015” and replacing it with “2020”;

• Striking the deadline in §236.1006(b)(1) and (b)(3), replacing the latter change with a cross-reference to new paragraph § 236.1005(b)(7);

• Removed paragraph §236.1006(b)(2);

• Striking the introductory phrase in §236.1006(b)(3);

• Adding three years to each date referenced in paragraph §236.1006(b)(4)(iii)(B);

• Amending paragraph §236.1009(a)(5) to reference that new progress report deadline and to avoid confusion and potential redundant submissions;

• Amending the deadline in § 236.1011 to cross-reference to the applicable deadline determined under §236.1005(b)(7); and

• Amending the deadline dates referenced in Appendix A.

This is a direct final rule implementing changes required by Congress, so the typical public comments are not being solicited by FRA. The FRA does note that petitions for reconsideration may be filed via the Federal eRulemaking Portal (www.Regulations.gov; Docket #FRA-2016-0012). Petitions should be filed before April 19^th, 2016. The effective date of this final rule is April 29^th, 2016.

FRA Publishes Bakken Notification ICR Renewal 60-day Notice

The DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) published a 60-day information collection request renewal (ICR) notice in Monday’s Federal Register (80 FR 63272-63275, available on line Saturday) to extend the current ICR (2130-0604) that requires railroads to notify State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs) about trains carrying 1 million gallons or more

of Bakken crude oil travel. The currently ICR was approved in July to continue through March 31^st, 2016.

The SERC ICR

According to the latest notice:

“FRA is now requesting to continue these information collection activities until the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) finalizes the Oil Spill Response Proposed Rule that it is currently working on and that will codify the requirements of the Secretary's Emergency Order.”

In the earlier ICR renewal FRA made a similar request for a three year extension of the emergency ICR that was approved to support the Department’s Emergency Order requiring the SERC notification. In approving the extension, the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) only approved it through March 31^st, 2016; noting that:

“Per the joint PHMSA-FRA HHFT final rule (RIN 2137-AE91), the information collection requirements in the May 7, 2014 emergency order remain in effect until March 31, 2016. OMB is therefore approving this collection until that date. FRA may submit a request to continue this collection after soliciting public comment per the PRA's requirements. PHMSA will address the information collection requirements in the HHFT final rule in a subsequent ICR(s).”

The reason that the public comments for the earlier ICR renewal did not count towards this requirement was that those public comments were requested well before the HHFT final rule was published and it was assumed that the HHFT would address the industry concerns about the information being reported to the SERCs.

Other ICRs

The Federal Register Notice also includes two other FRA ICR renewals. They are:

2130-0614 Ballast Defects and Conditions-Importance of Identification and Repair in Preventing Development of Unsafe Combinations of Track Conditions; and

2130-0529 Disqualification Proceedings

The first is a renewal request for an ICR that was approved last month as an emergency ICR supporting FRA Safety Advisory, 2015-04, Ballast Defects and Conditions. FRA is requesting a standard three year renewal of the ICR.

The second is a long standing (first approved in 1992) ICR supporting FRA actions to issue orders disqualifying railroad employees, including supervisors, managers, and other agents, from performing safety-sensitive service in the rail industry for violations of safety rules, regulations, standards, orders, or laws evidencing unfitness.

Public Comments

The FRA is soliciting public comments on these three ICR renewals. Comments may be submitted via the Federal eRulemaking Portal (www.Regulations.gov; Docket # 2015-0007-N-26). Comments should be submitted by December 18^th, 2015.

Commentary

The abstract supporting the SERC notification ICR uses almost word for word the information provided in the request for the emergency ICR in May of 2014. It does not reflect any new information since that ICR was approved or since the ICR was renewed in July.

It does not take into account the emergency notification requirements set out in the PHMSA-FRA Highly Hazardous Flammable Train final rule that was published last spring. The preamble to that rule contains a lengthy discussion about the most appropriate way for railroads to notify local emergency response planners about the HHFT routes. The conclusion in that rule was that the existing requirement in 49 CFR 172.820(g) were the most appropriate way to proceed.

The other important consideration from the HHFT rule is the change in information protection status of much of the routing information. The addition of HHFT to the other highly hazardous chemicals requiring specific route selection criteria under §172.820(c). Including HHFT trains in route selection program requires that much of the information included in that route selection process {including the final route; §172.820(e)} must be treated as Sensitive Security Information (SSI; 49 CFR 1520).

Because of the conflicts between railroads, SERCs and much of the emergency response community about the distribution of information provided by the railroads to SERCs under the emergency order, the ICR notice should have provided some mention of the SSI status of the information to be provided to the SERCs and the effect that status would have on the redistribution of that information by the SERCs.

It is true that such issues are not normally addressed in ICR notices. But it was clearly the intent of OIRA when they approved just the short extension of the ICR in July that they expected to see a full public discussion of the important issues that surround this ICR. The FRA did a disservice to the public and the regulated community when it chose to ignore these two important considerations in the preamble to the ICR.

The failure to set forth the FRA’s outlook on these two topics means that they have lost any control over that discussion. The inevitable plethora of responses will inevitably delay the preparation of the 30-day notice. The FRA responses to the comments in 30-day notice will ensure that there will be many comments made to OIRA by the industry and affected communities. Those comments will delay the OIRA consideration of the ICR renewal, probably beyond the publication of the new PHMSA emergency response rule that is supposed to ‘resolve’ the controversy around the route reporting requirements.

And that is the final problem with this ICR. The emergency response and reporting requirements are a function of hazardous material safety not railroad operation. PHMSA will be the agency that establishes the final rule for these requirements, not the FRA. That was the second point made by OIRA when they made their short approval of the ICR renewal. And FRA failed to make any arguments that countered that in this ICR notice. If FRA is working with PHMSA on this ICR then that should have been mentioned in the notice.

The FRA should withdraw this 60-day ICR notice and submit one that appropriately addresses all of the issues that affect approving the extension of this collection beyond March 31^st, 2016. Anything less makes a ludicrous joke of the ICR approval process.

NOTE: A copy of this blog post was submitted as a comment to the Docket on this ICR on 10-25-15 at 11:30 CDT.

FRA Publishes 30-day ICR for Accident Reporting Form

Today the DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration published a 30-day information collection request (ICR) notice in the Federal Register for changes that it is proposing to make to their accident and incident reporting requirements for accidents involving crude oil trains. The 60-day ICR was published in April and I submitted comment to that ICR based upon a blog post made a few days before that were based on a draft version of the ICR that was published along with the FRA’s Emergency Order 30.

I mentioned my comment submission because a large portion of today’s ICR notice is taken up with the FRA’s responses to my comments (though they did get my first name wrong – Patrick not Peter).

The FRA somewhat agreed with my suggestion that an entirely new form would be needed to collect the data needed for a complete analysis of the crude oil train accidents. They noted that that was beyond the scope of the current ICR (which legitimately was for a revision to an existing reporting requirement) and reported that they intend “to continue considering other options for gathering additional information concerning rail cars carrying crude oil (and other hazardous materials) involved in reportable accidents”.

That was the only positive response to my comments. In response to my comment about their handling of residue cars the same as filled railcars, they noted that they were already doing that for all other railcar reporting requirements on the form. And to my complaint about the lack of data collection about railcar types and failure rate analysis they responded that would be considered in future rulemaking activities as well.

The FRA is soliciting public comments upon this ICR submission. Comments should be submitted to the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) by September 11^th, 2015 and may be submitted via email (oira_submissions@omb.eop.gov).

NOTE: While my suggestions and comments were not actually adopted in this instance, at least my comments were heard and considered. I urge anyone with an interest in Federal regulatory affairs to take any opportunity that is provided to respond to the governments. You may not get to see the changes you want to be made, but it is probably the only way that an individual American is going to have a direct chance to influence Government without spending a ton of money.

FRA Publishes Train Securement Final Rule

Today the DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) published a final rule in the Federal Register (80 FR 47349-47386) to amend the brake system safety standards (49 CFR 232) for freight and other non-passenger trains and equipment to strengthen the requirements relating to the securement of unattended equipment. This is the same rule that FRA announced a week ago. The notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for this rule was published in September of last year.

Definitions

This rule makes changes to §232.5 by adding a new term, moving a definition into this section, and changing a term without changing the definition. Those three terms are respectively

∙ Mechanical securement device;

∙ Unattended equipment {from §232.103(n)};

∙ Yard {from yard limits also defined in §218.35(a) with a conflicting definition}.

Rule Coverage

A minor change in wording from the NPRM was made in the new §232.103(n)(6); the term ‘loaded tank car’ is used instead of ‘loaded freight car’. With this new wording, the new changes in securement requirements now applies to {new §232.103(n)(6)(i)}:

∙ Any loaded tank car containing PIH material, including anhydrous ammonia and ammonia solutions; or

∙ Twenty (20) or more loaded tank cars or loaded intermodal portable tanks of any one or any combination of PIH materials (including anhydrous ammonia and ammonia solutions), or any flammable gas, flammable or combustible liquid, explosives, or a hazardous substance listed at §173.31(f)(2) of this title.

For purposes of this rule rail cars containing a residue will not be considered in determining if a freight train is covered under the rule.

The Plan

The new rule includes basically the same plan requirements found in Emergency Order #28 which this rule supersedes. Railroads are still required to have the required plan in place before they can secure and leave unattended a covered train outside of a yard. There is only one change in the plan requirements:

The final rule allows a railroad to leave a train or equipment unattended on mainline track that is running through a yard or on mainline track that is adjacent to the yard without covering the location in the railroad's plan.

FRA still reserves the right to review such plans and direct changes in them when necessary. They still will not require the plans to be approved by FRA prior to their use.

Securement

There are some differences in the securement requirements in this rule and in the Emergency Order #28. The FRA has removed the specific requirement for railroads to “review, verify, and adjust, as necessary” the securement procedures to be employed in support of this rule. The FRA is also discontinuing the requirement from EO #28 of preparing a written verification of the securement procedure used on each unattended train.

A couple of changes were made from the proposed wording in the NPRM. One change is found in the revised §232.103(n)(1); The new language now makes it clear that at least one hand brake must be set on unattended trains. A change to §232.103(n)(2) removes the words ‘on a grade’ from the description of areas where air brakes cannot be relied upon to hold standing unattended equipment.

The discussion in the preamble seeks to clarify that the final rule requires all unattended covered trains to be secured in accordance with the new §232.103(n)(8). The exception for trains left unattended in yards or on mainlines adjacent to yards only applies to the plan requirements of the new §232.103(n)(7).

Effective Dates

The effective date for the requirements of this new rule is October 5^th, 2015. Emergency Order #28 is rescinded on October 5^th, 2015. Petitions for reconsideration must be received by September 25^th, 2015. 

OMB Approves Emergency FRA ICRs

Yesterday the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) reported that it had approved three emergency information collection requests (ICR) from the DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration. These ICRs support recent actions taken by the FRA to increase the safety of highly-hazardous flammable trains. These ICR’s specifically address information collection requirements for:

∙ FRA Safety Advisory 2015-01 (OMB # 2130-0607);

∙ FRA Safety Advisory 2015-02 (OMB # 2130-0608); and

∙ FRA Emergency Order No. 30 (OMB # 2130-0609).

In each case OIRA approved the emergency ICRs with an end date of October 31^st, 2015. The FRA request did note that they intended to renew the ICRs for the two safety advisories in regular order, but that the ICR for the emergency order would be superseded by the ICR for HM-251, the HHFT rulemaking expected to be published later this month.

Burden Estimates

Here are the burden estimates for these three ICRs:

	2130-0607	2130-0608	2130-0609
Annual Responses	351,000	50	25
Burden Hours	6,333	100	1,000

The burden estimate for 2130-0607 is based upon (WORD® download) an estimate of the number of automated reports from Wheel Impact Load Detectors (WILD) along routes traveled by affected trains. The subsequent information collection will be the submission of work orders to deal with the maintenance requirements specified in the safety advisory. There is no indication of the basis for this number of estimated WILD reports or if it takes into account the recommended (but unspecified number of) new WILD installations.

The burden estimate for 2130-0608 is based upon (WORD® download) the FRA estimate of the number of accidents involving HHFT trains each year; they are estimating 50 such accidents. This under-estimates the number of responses because the FRA may request information from both a railroad and multiple stakeholders for any given accident. The actual number of requests per accident would be difficult to estimate.

The burden estimate for 2130-0609 is based upon (WORD® download) the FRA estimate of the number of petitions the FRA expects to receive for the use of alternatives to the safety requirements outlined in the Emergency Order.

FRA Publishes Incident ICR Revision

Today the DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) published a 60-day information collection request (ICR) revision notice in the Federal Register (80 FR 23069-23071). This is the same incident report ICR notice that I discussed earlier in conjunction with the documents released last week by DOT concerning the additional actions that DOT is taking to reduce the risk from crude oil trains.

The FRA is soliciting public comments on this ICR notice. Comments may be submitted via the Federal eRulemaking Portal (www.Regulations.gov; Docket # FRA-2015-0007). Comments should be submitted by June 23, 2015. My comment was submitted today.