OMB Approves TSA Rail Security ICR Revision

Last week the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs announced that it had approved an information collection request (ICR) from the DHS Transportation Security Agency (TSA) for their Rail Transportation Security ICR (1652-0051). The revision significantly increased the response burden estimate for the ICR and provides some broad insights into this surface transportation security program.

ICR Response Increase

This ICR covers four railroad security reporting requirements under 49 CFR 1580:

• Rail Security Coordinator (RSC) information (§1580.101);

• Location and shipping information (§1580.103);

• Significant security concerns reporting (§1580.105); and

• Chain of custody documentation (§1580.107)

The 60-day ICR Notice noted that:

“The total annual burden for this collection is approximately 112,764 hours, which is 67,320 hours higher than the current annual inventory. This change is primarily due to an increase in the number of responses of transfer of custody.”

 More detailed information is available from the Supporting Document that TSA submitted to OIRA with this ICR revision [.DOCX download] and the previous ICR update [.DOCX download]. Table 1 below shows the comparative date from the two Supporting Documents.

ICR Response Burden Information	Current ICR	Previous ICR
Rail Security Coordinator Information	475	804
Location and Shipping Information	655	330
Significant Security Concerns Reporting	4,971	5,475
Chain of Custody Documentation	107,000	78,000

Table 1: Comparative ICR Response Data

There is no information in the Supporting Documents to indicate why there is a decrease in the estimated number of RSC information submissions.

The ‘location and shipping information’ data is collected during TSA security inspections of railroads. The earlier ICR data was based upon the number of those inspections in FY 2013 (pg 7). The new ICR uses the average of the number of inspections conducted during the FY 2015 thru FY 2017 period (pg 8); that number is slightly skewed due to the high number of inspections in 2015 (876). A more appropriate number might be 544; still a significant increase (154%).

The almost 11% decrease in the estimate of ‘significant security concerns reporting’ probably does not reflect a change in the railroad security situation. The earlier ICR used an “approximately 15 reports daily” to computer the estimated number of responses. The current ICR uses the average from the last three reporting years (“reports from FY15 (4,529), FY16 (5,210), FY17 (5,145)”; pg 9) and those would average from 13 to 14 daily reports. Daily averages in that range would probably be well within the standard deviation of the data.

TSA breaks out the ‘chain of custody documentation’ down into four categories:

• Shipment originations;

• Placement at Hazmat receiver;

• Carrier Interchange inside HTUA (high-threat urban area); and

• Carrier Interchange outside HTUA w/path through HTUA

Table 2 shows the estimated reporting data for each of those categories from current and previous ICR support information submissions.

Chain of Custody Documentation	Current ICR	Previous ICR	% Increase
Shipment originations	48,000	18,000	166.7%
Placement at Hazmat receiver	12,000	10,000	20.0%
Carrier Interchange inside HTUA	18,000	6,500	176.9%
Carrier Interchange outside HTUA w/path through HTUA	29,000	4,500	544.4%

Table 2: Estimated Chain of Custody Submissions

TSA provides no data on how these estimates were prepared in either support document. Since the regulation only requires that the above listed chain-of-custody activities must be documented, but not reported to TSA, one has to assume that these estimates are taken from data obtained during TSA inspections of shippers and carriers. Shippers and carriers are only required to retain these chain-of-custody documents for 60-calendar days {§1580.107(h)}, so the TSA data upon which they base this estimate is incomplete at best and, looking at the % increase data that I calculated, statistically unlikely. What is clear, however, is that during whatever period that TSA ‘collected’ the ‘shipment origination’ data, they had stepped up their inspection activities of hazmat shippers and railroads outside of HTUA’s.

Electronic Incident Reporting

Currently ‘significant security concerns’ are required to be reported to be reported to TSA via telephone. According to the Supporting Document submitted to OIRA on the current ICR revision (pg 2): “TSA is revising the collection to include a proof of concept, to be conducted with 9 railroads, for option to submit significant security concern electronically.” No additional information about the collection format or the electronic process is provided. This electronic submission trial was not mentioned in the 60-day ICR notice, but it was briefly reported in the 30-day ICR notice.

Commentary

I have long complained about the TSA’s implementation of the ICR process. They are notorious for providing inadequate information in their ICR notices. This has made it nearly impossible for the public to reasonably comment upon revisions to the ICR. When I have formally complained about this lack of information in the past in response to TSA ICR notices I have been informed that the information would be made available when the ICR was submitted to OIRA and OIRA has accepted this explanation by approving the ICR’s in question.

This time TSA has gone one step further and failed to provide adequate information to OIRA explaining changes that have resulted in significant increases in the information collection burden. Simply reporting that increases have happened is clearly inadequate when those changes could only have happened because of the actions of the data collection agency. TSA needs to ensure that they explain why their actions have changed and whether or not that change will continue into the future.

Unfortunately, it is unlikely that anyone (any congresscritters listening?) will take TSA to task for this lack of information. The OMB certainly has demonstrated that they feel no oversight responsibility in the matter.

HTUA Maps Missing

I have had a number of folks visiting my site looking for information about the maps of the High Threat Urban Areas (HTUA) that are an integral part of the TSA Rail Transportation Security Rule (49 CFR 1580). I did a quick check and can see why; the link to the TSA HTUA maps is dead again. This is a recurring problem for TSA.

This is a regulatory issue since these maps are the only way that facilities have of checking to see if they are covered by provisions of §1580. Well, that isn’t entirely true, they can call the TSA Freedom Center (703-563-3240 or 1-877-456-8722).

FRA Emergency Order – Securing Trains

Late this afternoon the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) published an emergency order to Prevent Unintended Hazardous Materials Train Movement. This action is being taken as an interim measure while the accident investigation of the recent derailment, fire and explosions in Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, Canada determines the root cause of that fatal accident. The emergency order and a separate Joint FRA/PHMSA safety advisory were published on the FRA web site. I expect that they will be published in the Federal Register some time next week.

According to a press release about the EO all railroad operating in the United States must complete the following listed actions within the next 30 days:

• No train or vehicles transporting specified hazardous materials can be left unattended on a mainline track or side track outside a yard or terminal, unless specifically authorized.

• In order to receive authorization to leave a train unattended, railroads must develop and submit to FRA a process for securing unattended trains transporting hazardous materials, including locking the locomotive or otherwise disabling it, and reporting among employees to ensure the correct number of hand brakes are applied.

• Employees who are responsible for securing trains and vehicles transporting such specified hazardous material must communicate with the train dispatchers the number of hand brakes applied, the tonnage and length of the train or vehicle, the grade and terrain features of the track, any relevant weather conditions, and the type of equipment being secured.

• Train dispatchers must record the information provided. The dispatcher or other qualified railroad employee must verify that the securement meets the railroad’s requirements, and they must verify that the securement meets the railroad’s requirements.

• Railroads must implement rules ensuring that any employee involved in securing a train participate in daily job briefings prior to the work being performed.

• Railroads must develop procedures to ensure a qualified railroad employee inspects all equipment that an emergency responder has been on, under or between before the train can be left unattended.

• Railroads must provide this EO to all affected employees.

I’ll have additional details about the EO and Safety Advisory later this weekend.

Rail Transportation Security – Shipper Security Plan

This is another in a series of blogs that will look at the requirements of the recently released final rule on Rail Transportation Security. While the main focus of this regulation is directed at railroads, there are significant provisions (49 CFR part 1580, Subpart B) that will apply to a wide variety of chemical facilities that use railroad to ship or receive ‘specified quantities and types of hazardous materials’ {§1580.100(b)}.

This blog looks at what a security plan might look like for a covered hazmat shipper. Earlier blogs in this series were:
Rail Transportation Security – RSC Requirement
Rail Transportation Security – Reporting Security Concerns
Rail Transportation Security – Rail Car Chain of Custody
Rail Transportation Security – Inspection Authority
Rail Transportation Security – Reporting Railcar Locations

On the 26th of December the requirements for this rule will be in effect for covered freight railroads, covered hazmat shippers, and covered hazmat receivers located in HTUA’s. While the rule does not specify that a security plan is required, in practice some document is going to be required at each covered facility describing how the rule will be implemented at that facility. For discussion purposes we will call this plan the Hazmat Rail Shipper Security Plan (HRSSP).

The HRSSP will only address the requirements of 49 CFR part 1580. Since the shipper facility will have rail car quantities of a PIH chemical on hand, the facility will have been declared a high-risk chemical facility and there will be a site security plan under 6 CFR part 27 (CFATS). The HRSSP will probably become an annex to the CFATS SSP. The two will have a number of requirements that will be in common, but there will be a number of requirements that will pertain only to the HRSSP and the portion of the facility that is used to load and ship railcar quantities of the PIH chemical produced at the site.

Description of the HRSSP Area

The HRSSP will only address a limited portion of the facility. That area will extend from the railroad gate through the facility perimeter, along the railroad tracks into the facility and the rail secure area where rail cars are loaded and held until picked up by the railroad. The HRSSP will probably describe this area in words and diagrams or annotations on a facility map.

The description of the rail secure area will provide a general description of the security devices and procedures that prevent access to the area by unauthorized personnel. Specific requirements for security are not outlined in the rule. Some sort of barrier fencing with locking gates for personnel and train access will probably be necessary along with some sort of intruder detection system. Video surveillance should probably suffice.

Assigning Responsibilities 

The next section of the HRSSP will probably be the section that assigns responsibility for various functions under the HRSSP. Some of the assignments will be made by job description (shift supervisor, security guard, etc) while others will be required to be identified by name. It is almost always a good idea to assign primary responsibility and at least one back-up for required action.

The first position discussed will be the Rail Security Coordinator (§ 1580.101). If the facility is part of a company with multiple covered facilities, the RSC will be appointed on a Corporate Rail Security Plan. The HRSSP will only have to identify who the corporate RSC and alternates are and provide contact information. If the facility preparing the HRSSP is the only covered facility in the organization the RSC will probably come from the facility. In that case the RSC and at least one alternate will have to be identified. The requirements for the RSC were covered in an earlier blog.

The HRSSP will define who has responsibility for reporting security incidents to the TSA Freedom Center (§ 1580.105). This will probably be assigned to a management position. The requirements for reporting security incidents was covered in an earlier blog.

The next position discussed will be the Railcar Location Point of Contact (§ 1580.103). This may be appointed to a duty position or even contracted to an outside party. The requirements for this position were discussed in an earlier blog.

Additionally, the HRSSP will define who will provide information updates on railcars to the RLPOC. The HRSSP will also identify who is responsible for inspecting railcars before they are loaded (§ 1580.107). This will probably be identified by job description.

The final position to be discussed will be the individual responsible for turning over control of the shipping railcars to railroad personnel. This will probably be identified by a job position like shift supervisor or security guard. The requirements for this position were discussed in an earlier blog.

Describing Security Procedures 

The first security procedure to be discussed would most likely be the access procedures for the HRSSP. Entrance procedures for the railroad gate will be given by reference to the general site security plan. The access procedures for the rail security area will be more detailed. Personnel with routine unaccompanied access will be identified, probably by job descriptions. Entry procedures for personnel and rail cars will be described.

Empty rail cars will be inspected for tampering and potential IED’s before entering the rail secure area. The procedure will specify who will notify the RLPOC what railcars have entered the rail secure area and when and the spot in which they were placed in the rail secure area. The procedure will specify that the RLPOC will be notified when the railcar filling begins, the amount in the railcar at any point where the filling is temporarily stopped, and the final weight of material placed into the railcar. The procedure will require that the RLPOC is notified when the full railcar is turned over to the railroad. The procedure will also detail how the RLPOC will record and maintain the data so that a request for railcar location information can be supplied within 30 minutes of it being requested.

Incident Reporting Procedures 

The HRSSP will also describe procedures to be used to deal with unusual items found during railcar inspections, intruders in and/or around the HRSSP area of the facility and any other potential security breaches described in § 1580.105(c). The procedures will include security response as well as reporting requirements. Procedures will include how to deal with personnel who claim to be TSA/DHS inspectors. The requirement to demand identification and how to verify that identification with the TSA Freedom Center will be addressed.

Plans Will Vary

Each facility will address the details of this plan in a number of different ways. The plan outlined above provides a listing of the areas that must be addressed according to the Rail Transportation Security Rule. Covered facilities will need to start work on this plan as soon as possible. The rule does go into effect on December 26th, but there is, as of yet, no indication when TSA will begin enforcing the rule.

Rail Transportation Security – Reporting Railcar Locations

This is another in a series of blogs that will look at the requirements of the recently released final rule on Rail Transportation Security. While the main focus of this regulation is directed at railroads, there are significant provisions (49 CFR part 1580, Subpart B) that will apply to a wide variety of chemical facilities that use railroad to ship or receive ‘specified quantities and types of hazardous materials’ {§1580.100(b)}.

This blog deals with the provisions requiring facilities to be able to report locations of hazmat railcars. Earlier blogs in this series were:
Rail Transportation Security – RSC Requirement
Rail Transportation Security – Reporting Security Concerns
Rail Transportation Security – Rail Car Chain of Custody
Rail Transportation Security – Inspection Authority

Railroads, hazmat receiving facilities located in high threat urban areas (HTUA) and all hazmat shippers must be prepared to report to TSA the location and status of covered railcars in their physical possession when requested by TSA. While railroads have different time standards depending on the size of the railroad, all covered chemical facilities must be able to report this information within 30 minutes of it being requested {§ 1580.103}.

Provide TSA with 24-hour Contact Number 

To allow TSA to initiate the request for information, every covered facility is required to provide TSA with a contact telephone number that is manned 24-hours a day {§1580.103(g)}. This is a separate requirement from the RSC contact information (though the RSC might serve this purpose if they have timely access to the required information). There must be a live person answering the phone, no answering machines or beepers.

The person answering the phone must be able to act on the information request. Answering services that just notify someone to contact TSA will not fulfill the requirement {§1580.103(g)(2)}. The preamble notes that as long as “the individual who answers TSA's telephone call can provide accurate information within the specified timeframe, paragraph (f) {there is an apparent typo in the Federal Register, this should read ‘(g)’} permits the regulated party to use a designated third party or agent to meet this performance standard” (page 72155).

Information Required

Section 1580.103(c) lists the information that must be provided to TSA. The information includes:

Facility Location (City, county and state) Whether it is a shipper or receiver facility Each rail car’s initial and number A list of the total number of railcars containing covered materials broken down by proper shipping name, hazard class and UN number

Since ‘residue quantities’ of PIH materials are excluded from the covered material definition {§ 1580.100(b)(2)}, emptied railcars do not need to be reported. For shipping facilities, once any amount of the covered material has been loaded onto an empty or ‘residue’ car, it would be reportable.

Method of Transmitting Information

Section 1580.103(f) lists a number of different methods that may be used to transmit the information back to TSA. These include:

Electronic transmission in spread sheet, HTML or XML format Fax of a hard copy spread sheet Posting to a secure website approved by TSA

There is a listing for “Another format approved by TSA” {§ 1580.103(f)(6)}. The preamble makes it clear that “TSA anticipates that a railroad carrier or rail hazardous materials facility may use this provision when they receive a request for information on only one rail car and can provide the answer easily by telephone” (page 72155). In other words, for a report on one or two railcars, TSA is willing to take the information verbally over the phone.

There is an interesting omission in this section. The description of the fax format reads “a hard copy spreadsheet in tabular format” (emphasis added) {§ 1580.103(f)(4)}. None of the descriptions of electronic formats includes the phrase ‘in tabular format’. The requirement for tabular format cannot even be assumed to be required because the electronic format descriptions come before the fax description. This is an extremely odd omission.

Rail Transportation Security – Inspection Authority

This is another in a series of blogs that will look at the requirements of the recently released final rule on Rail Transportation Security. While the main focus of this regulation is directed at railroads, there are significant provisions (49 CFR part 1580, Subpart B) that will apply to a wide variety of chemical facilities that use railroad to ship or receive ‘specified quantities and types of hazardous materials’ {§1580.100(b)}. This blog deals with the provisions allowing TSA inspectors to enter facilities for purposes of inspection. Earlier blogs in this series were: Rail Transportation Security – RSC Requirement Rail Transportation Security – Reporting Security Concerns Rail Transportation Security – Rail Car Chain of Custody Inspection Authority Section 1580.5 provides TSA inspectors with inspection authority to perform inspections in support of this regulation. Specifically § 1580.5(b) requires that covered persons:

“…must allow TSA and other authorized DHS officials, at any time and in a reasonable manner, without advance notice, to enter, inspect, and test property, facilities, equipment, and operations; and to view, inspect, and copy records, as necessary to carry out TSA’s security-related statutory or regulatory authorities”.

Chemical facilities that ship covered hazardous materials and chemical facilities located in High Threat Urban Areas (HTUA) that receive the same covered materials are specifically covered under this provision. Section 1580.5(b)(5) includes the description of “transportation-related areas of rail hazardous materials shipper and receiver facilities” in the list of areas that TSA will be inspecting to oversee “the implementation, and ensure the adequacy, of security measures” required under this rule. TSA received a large number of comments about this section of the rule. Most commenters were concerned about the safety and security of unannounced inspections after hours. Concerns were expressed about the ability of inspected parties to confirm the identity and authority of inspectors. The only change made in response to these comments was that TSA included language {§ 1580.5(d)} requiring TSA and other authorized DHS personnel to present identification when requested. TSA Will Typically Provide Notice In the preamble discussion TSA acknowledged that most inspections would be conducted with advance notice. They note that this “notice gives the parties to be inspected the opportunity to gather evidence of compliance and to arrange to have the appropriate personnel available to assist TSA” (page 44). Unannounced Inspections Required Even given the fact that most inspections will include prior notification, TSA maintains that it needs to be able to respond to “to information, operations, and specific circumstances whenever they exist or develop” (page 44). This requires that inspections will be conducted at any time of the day or night and there might not be time available to provide advanced notice. There are also security provisions that can only be properly evaluated on a no-notice basis. For example this would be the only way for TSA to “test the regulated party’s ability to detect and respond to the presence of unauthorized individuals” (page 46). No announced inspection would allow for adequately determining this information. Identification of Inspectors Until an electronically verifiable Federal Identification card becomes available, TSA and DHS inspection personnel will use their agency identification cards to identify themselves. Since TSA will not make copies of those cards available in advance (to avoid potentially compromising that identification), facility personnel will likely not be familiar with that identification. TSA has provided a phone number where the identity of any TSA or associated DHS inspectors can be verified. Facility personnel can call the Freedom Center (703-563-3240 or 1-877-456-8722) at any time to verify the inspector’s identity. That phone number is not in the regulation, but it is listed in the preamble (page 50). Inspector Safety Many commenters questioned the safety of inspectors wandering unescorted around rail facilities or hazmat chemical facilities. TSA notes that during many of the inspections that they will be conducting they expect to request that escorts be provided, “but they must be able to perform unescorted inspections at times to check compliance” (page 51). With this in mind TSA has taken measures to ensure the safety of their personnel. TSA ensures that their inspectors “receive training on specific safety procedures to use while inspecting the equipment and facilities of freight and passenger railroad carriers, transit system owners and operators, and rail hazardous materials facilities” (page 48). This includes attending the Transportation Safety Institute’s Transportation of Hazardous Materials course covering 49 CFR parts 100-185. TSA realizes that this training might not cover all hazmat shipping and receiving facilities given the widely varied nature of operations occurring there. In the preamble (page 48) TSA notes that:

“If a rail hazardous materials facility requests that an inspector receive facility-specific safety briefings or training, TSA will work with the facility to accommodate those requests, provided that the timing is acceptable and that additional safety training is reasonable given the nature of the expected inspection.”

Nothing in the discussion explains how TSA expects to handle these types of safety considerations when conducting unannounced inspections, especially penetration type inspections. Covered facilities with special safety considerations around rail loading/unloading equipment need to contact TSA and express their concerns well in advance. TSA has no desire to put their personnel at risk.

Rail Transportation Security – Rail Car Chain of Custody

This is another in a series of blogs that will look at the requirements of the recently released final rule on Rail Transportation Security. While the main focus of this regulation is directed at railroads, there are significant provisions (49 CFR part 1580, Subpart B) that will apply to a wide variety of chemical facilities that use railroad to ship or receive ‘specified quantities and types of hazardous materials’ {§1580.100(b)}. This blog deals the provisions requiring covered chemical facilities to report significant security concerns to TSA. Earlier blogs in this series were: Rail Transportation Security – RSC Requirement Rail Transportation Security – Reporting Security Concerns This final rule requires that receivers of specified hazmat that are located in an HTUA and all hazmat shippers of the same materials (regardless of their location) perform certain security related duties. These duties include producing and maintaining documentation of the transfer of responsibility of the rail cars to or from the rail carrier. Hazmat Shipper Responsibilities Section 1580.107(a) requires that shippers of designated hazmat must, for each hazmat rail car:

· Physically inspect the rail car before loading · Keep the rail car in a rail secure area · Document the transfer to the rail carrier

The purpose of the physical inspection is to detect evidence of tampering or “other signs that the security of the car may have been compromised” {§ 1580.107(a)(1)}. Additionally, the inspection is looking for suspicious or out-of-place items, including IEDs. According to the preamble to this final rule (page 84) TSA is in the process of completing a DVD that may be used to train people in “identifying IEDs and signs of rail car tampering”. HTUA Hazmat Receiver Responsibilities Section 1580.107(f) requires that within HTUAs receivers of specified hazmat must, for each hazmat rail car

· Ensure that positive control of the hazmat rail is maintained during the transfer · Keep the rail car in a rail secure area until it is unloaded · Document the transfer from the rail carrier

The requirement to ensure ‘positive control’ is placed on both the facility and the delivering rail carrier. The preamble states that “TSA intends that the receiver communicate with the railroad carrier and work in close cooperation to ensure the security of the rail car during the transfer process” (page 83). Rail Secure Area TSA does not provide a great deal of guidance on ‘Rail Secure Areas’. Section 1580.107(i) simply states that “The rail hazardous materials shipper and the rail hazardous materials receiver must use physical security measures to ensure that no unauthorized person gains access to the rail secure area.” Even as an operational definition or performance measure this is an inadequate definition. I know of no security professional that would claim that any physical security measure or combination of measures can ‘ensure that no unauthorized person gains access’ to a secure area. It will be extremely interesting to see how TSA enforces this requirement. Document Hazmat Rail Car Transfer Each time a rail car containing a specified hazmat moves from control of one entity to another (shipper to carrier, carrier to carrier, or carrier to receiver in HTUA) both parties to the transfer will independently document {§ 1580.107(k)(3)} the transfer, either electronically or in writing. That documentation will include:

· Car initial and number. · Identification of individuals who attended the transfer · Location of transfer. · Date and time the transfer was completed.

Regulatory Exemptions Unlike the CFATS regulations there are no statutory exemptions to this rule. There are provisions in the rule {§ 1580.107(j)} for receivers within a HTUA to request an exemption from TSA from the change of custody requirements of this rule “if the receiver demonstrates that the potential risk from its activities is insufficient to warrant compliance”. The discussion in the preamble (pages 87-8) makes it clear that infrequent shipments are not an adequate justification for an exemption, explaining that the hazards associated with the specified “materials is significant even if a rail hazardous materials facility only receives a single carload each month”.

Rail Transportation Security – RSC Requirement

This is the first in a series of blogs that will look at the requirements of the recently released final rule on Rail Transportation Security. While the main focus of this regulation is directed at railroads, there are significant provisions (49 CFR part 1580, Subpart B) that will apply to a wide variety of chemical facilities that use railroad to ship or receive ‘specified quantities and types of hazardous materials’. 

Specified Hazardous Materials 

While the regulation includes certain explosives and radioactive materials among the specified ‘hazardous materials’, the materials that will affect chemical facilities (pages 8-9) generally are materials that are poisonous by inhalation (PIH) (49 CFR §171.8), including:

Anhydrous Ammonia Division 2.3 gasses Division 6.1 liquids in hazard zone A or B

Facilities that ship rail car quantities of these materials fall under these rules. Facilities located in a High Threat Urban Area (HTUA) (Appendix A, 49 CFR part 1580) that receive rail car quantities of these materials are also covered facilities. There are no exceptions for facilities that fall under CFATS, MTSA, nor are water treatment or waste water treatment facilities exempted. Rail cars containing ‘residual amounts’ of the specified materials are not covered under this regulation. So facilities shipping ‘empty’ railcars back to suppliers are not covered by this regulation unless they are located in an HTUA. 

Rail Security Coordinators Chemical facilities that are affected by this regulation will be required (49 CFR § 1580.101) to have a designated Rail Security Coordinator (RSC) and at least one alternate. This person will be the ‘corporate level’ point of contact for TSA. According to the final rule preamble (page 35) the RSC will “serve as the primary contact for intelligence information and security-related activities and communications with TSA, and coordinate security practices and procedures with law enforcement and emergency response agencies”. 

Contact information for the RSC and designated alternates will be provided to the TSA within seven days of their appointment or change in appointment or contact data. The contact data will include {§1580.101(d)} names, title, phone number(s) and email address(es). 

RSC Availability 

The RSC or alternate will be available to TSA on a 24-hours a day, 7 days a week basis. The use of a security center or industry call center (like CHEMTREC) will not be adequate to fulfill the contract requirements for the RSC unless the call center is “staffed 24-hours a day, 7 days a week, and must be able to immediately locate and communicate with the RSC” (page 38). Corporations that have multiple covered facilities may have a single RSC. The discussion in the preamble states that “A single RSC or alternate may have responsibility for multiple covered rail facilities that are owned and operated by one corporation, provided that the individual has the information necessary to perform the RSC’s duties” (page 41). 

RSC Training 

TSA has not provided any training requirements for the designated RSC. They have established a ‘performance standard’ (see below) for the RSC and would expect that any necessary training to perform to those standards would be provided by their employer. RSC Performance Standards (page 43)

“(A)vailable to TSA on a 24-hours a day basis, “(C)apable of serving as the primary point of contact with TSA on security matters, and “(A)ble to coordinate security practices and procedures with appropriate law enforcement and emergency response agencies.”