Showing posts with label Luigi Auriemma. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Luigi Auriemma. Show all posts

Saturday, November 18, 2017

Public ICS Disclosure – Week of 11-12-17

Today this is not about a new disclosure but about some new information on an ICS-CERT advisory that was published this week. SEC Consult published additional information on the Siemens SICAM vulnerabilities on the FullDisclosure web site.

The ICS-CERT advisory reported that publicly available exploits were available, but did not provide a link. This report from SEC Consult provides proof of concept code for exploiting the first two vulnerabilities and a link to a very old (2003) link to an earlier report on the code injection vulnerability. That link leads to a report by Luigi Auriemma, a name that hasn’t been seen on this blog in quite some time.

The Luigi report is about the GoAhead web server that was apparently used by Siemens in the affected versions of the SICAM devices. This is not noted in either the ICS-CERT advisory or the Siemens security advisory. Luigi describes GoAhead this way:

“Goahead (sic) webserver is an embedded OpenSource server that can be build (sic) on a lot of systems (CE, Ecos, GNU/Linux, Lynx, MacOS, NW, QNX4, VXWORKS, Win32 and others).
“It is supported by a lot of companies that use it for their projects and it is also used like ‘base’ for other webservers, furthermore it has been developed for be very tiny and to run on embedded systems.”

Apparently, Siemens used an unpatched version of the webserver (Luigi reported that the vulnerability he reported was fixed in December 2003) in the affected versions of the SICAM devices. Since Siemens (and almost all other ICS vendors) did not start to take control system security seriously until after 2010 (STUXNET), it is not surprising that a newer version of the webserver was not incorporated in these devices; in fact, it is quite possible that they were not informed of the vulnerability.

This is an old, but continuing problem, with third party software used in many of the control system devices used still today. If the original vendor does not have an active method for sharing vulnerability information with all of its customers, the using vendor may not become aware of the vulnerability until some third-party researcher discovers the problem.


More disturbing in this case is the fact that neither ICS-CERT nor Siemens mentioned that the vulnerabilities (apparently all three) in the SICAM devices were based upon vulnerabilities in a GoAhead web server. If it were not for this separate SEC Consult disclosure, the community would not realize that that there was a third-party vulnerability involved that may still exist in other non-Siemens devices.

Monday, July 8, 2013

ICS-CERT Publishes Two Advisories

Our friend Luigi is back in an ICS-Advisory with an uncoordinated disclosure of multiple vulnerabilities in QNX products and Jon Christmas of Solera Networks has a coordinated disclosure for a vulnerability in a Triangle Research PLC. In an interesting twist, Luigi confirms the efficacy of the QNX patch while TRI self-validates their patch.

QNX

This advisory reports multiple vulnerabilities reported by Luigi. Luigi’s report was posted on his web site in May 2012, but it wasn’t picked up by ICS-CERT for an alert at that time. It may have been that ICS-CERT wasn’t really looking at vulnerabilities in embedded systems at that time. Or maybe they just weren’t watching Luigi because of his new business. In either case (or some other that I missed) QNX took action to address the following vulnerabilities;

• Stack-based buffer overflow, CVE-2013-2687; and
• Buffer copy overflow, CVE-2013-2688

NOTE: The CVE links are not yet live, it will be a day or two.

ICS-CERT notes that a relatively unskilled attacker using Luigi’s code could remotely exploit these vulnerabilities to execute a DoS attack or execute arbitrary code.

Triangle Research


Jon reported an improper input validation vulnerability in the Nano-10 PLC. ICS-CERT reports that this vulnerability could be remotely exploited by relatively low skilled attacker if the firewall has Port TCP/502 open. It could be used to execute a DoS attack.

Saturday, September 3, 2011

ICS-CERT Publishes BroadWin WebAccess Alert


Yesterday the DHS Industrial Control System Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) published an alert concerning two vulnerabilities that have been publicly reported for Advantech’s BroadWin WebAccess system. While ICS-CERT is not giving credit for the disclosure (they typically don’t for uncoordinated disclosures) SecurityFocus.com is providing a copy of the BugTraq notification from Luigi Auriemma that is almost certainly the ‘public disclosure’ mentioned by ICS-CERT.

The two ActiveX vulnerabilities, according to Luigi, allow for remote exploitation. The two vulnerabilities are:

• A format string vulnerability; and

• A memory corruption vulnerability.

ICS-CERT is coordinating with Advantech to evaluate these reported vulnerabilities.
 
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