While the results are not technically official, the great
2020 election count is essentially over. Baring something strange (and this is
2020), 2021 will see a Biden Administration take office. The House will still
be in control of the Democrats and the Senate will (probably) remain in the nominal
control of the Republicans. So, what does this all mean for control system
security legislation and chemical security legislation in the 117th
Congress?
The Trump Effect
While Trump lost the election, one thing is clear, he has lots
of support in the hinterlands of this country. Republican politicians are going
to have to acknowledge their anti-government and anti-liberal outlook as they
look forward to the 2022 election cycle. How much those congresscritters are
going to be willing to work with the Biden Administration will depend in a large
amount on Donald Trump. If Trump continues to defy political traditions and
maintains an active commentary on political matters, then the Republicans in
Congress will have a harder time justifying to their base any cooperation on bipartisan
legislation. If Trump folds up his tent and returns to his previous business
interests, then moderate, bipartisan legislation will have some chance for
success.
Spending
Any legislation, security and otherwise, that calls for
significant new spending is going to run into strong opposition in the fiscal
conservative faction of the Republican Caucus in the Senate. McConnel had to
have their support in the 116th Congress to keep the Caucus
together. If the Trump Effect disappears, McConnel will have more leeway to
work with the Democrats. Large spending programs are still going to face
serious opposition.
Cybersecurity
With no major cybersecurity attacks on the election system
in 2020, there is going to be a lesser demand in Congress to pass major
cybersecurity legislation. Republican opposition to government mandates on
businesses will continue to insure that any cybersecurity legislation will only
call for voluntary compliance with any cybersecurity standards and processes
established by legislation. Cybersecurity in industrial control systems will
continue to be a low priority area of legislation, unless, of course, there is
a significant attack on an industrial system that leads to loss of life, major
physical destruction or the shutdown of major services. An attack of that sort
would lead to a knee jerk reaction in any Congress that could result in
significant (and probably ineffective) mandatory controls being placed on
industrial control systems.
One area that will see continued support in Congress will be
development of a ‘Cyber Sense’ program in DOE similar to that seen in this
session’s HR
360 that was passed in the House. This sort of cybersecurity certification
program for industrial control system components used in the grid
infrastructure will look like an effective way to ensure security of the grid.
What will be overlooked is that the replacement of ‘insecure’ components with cybersecurity
certified devices will take years to accomplish if it is actually attempted,
something that is far from certain without a specific (and well-funded) mandate.
Further, the unfortunate information sharing limitations are sure to have the
unintended consequence of impeding researchers from finding new vulnerabilities
in these systems.
Additional programs could be seen to be called for in
medical device security and automated transportation systems. A cyber sense
program for automated transportation systems could probably be the most
effective since there is not currently a large installed-device inventory that
would have to be replaced. Unfortunately, the most appropriate agency to be
tasked with overseeing such a program, the National Highway Transportation
Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not have a cybersecurity infrastructure to
call upon to oversee such a program. Adding that capability would call for a
significant increase in NHTSA funding.
Ransomware
Ransomware is going to continue to be a long-term, high-profile
problem going forward that may see a legislative program that actually contains
some sort of mandatory provisions. Unfortunately, the prevention of these attacks
will not be effective as long as the potential for making money in successful
attacks remains so high. Well-funded attackers are going to be able to find
ways to subvert security controls. Federal rules will be most effective in mandating
reporting requirements, though there will be increasing calls for the prohibition
of paying the ransoms. There will also be suggestions that the military,
particularly the National Guard cyber units, be given authority to take down
ransomware networks that attack State, local, Tribal and Territorial government
agencies. How far legislative provision go will depend in large part in how
effective ransomware attacks remain.
Chemical Security
When Congress extended the authorization for the Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program this year it was for three
years. That means that there will not be a major push to make changes to that
program in the 117th Congress. Even if there were a need to reauthorize
the program, it is unlikely that the 2020 election would have had any significant
change in the ability of the 117th Congress to agree to what sort of
changes are required in the program. The House Democrats could not agree on
legislative language for a reauthorization bill in the 116th
Congress, this has been a continuing problem with the differences in outlook
between the Homeland Security Committee and the Energy and Commerce Committee.
One area that may see some legislative movement is a relook
at the mandate for an Ammonium Nitrate Security Program. Congress passed a
mandate for DHS to establish a program to regulate the sale and transfer of
ammonium nitrate (a ‘popular’ precursor for large improvised explosive
devices). Unfortunately, DHS has been unable to come up with a cost-effective
method of implementing that mandate. DHS has quietly suggested that Congress
relook at the mandate, removing the costly registration requirements and
extending the coverage to other precursor chemicals. The Biden Administration
may be more vocal in supporting such a change and we could see some
congressional hearings on the topic in the 117th Congress. I would
be surprised to see any such regulation passed in this session. Unless, of course,
if there is a large IED detonated successfully in the United States, then I
would expect to see quick, over-reactive legislation calling for an expansion
of the current mandate.