Wednesday, January 22, 2014

Late EO 13650 Listening Session Updates

Today the DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate published a notice in the Federal Register (79 FR 3602) providing ‘updated’ information concerning public listening sessions for the President’s Executive Order on Improving Chemical Safety and Security. (EO 13650). This updates information provided in a November Federal Register Notice.

Unfortunately, four of the five listening sessions listed in this update have already taken place, three of them had taken place when Assistant Secretary Durkovich signed this notice on January 10th (no reason is given for the delay between her signature and today’s posting). Fortunately, readers of this blog were already updated on these listening sessions back in December.

The link to the OSHA EO 13650 web site for information about these listening sessions is also apparently out of date, as it has no information about the location and times of the sessions. I have received an email from the EO 13650 Working Group with really updated information that includes a February 5th Listening Session in Newark, NJ. It provides links for the on-line registration for either attending in person or via teleconference.


Today’s Federal Register notice is indicative of how well the Working Group is meeting their time deadlines; a day late and a dollar short.

New Chemical in Freedom Spill

Ken Ward is reporting that there is an interesting new twist in the story about the recent Crude MCHM spill in Charleston, WV. In a news report yesterday he reports that Freedom Industries is now telling State and Federal investigators that they had added another chemical to the Crude MCHM in the tank that leaked into the Elk River. The chemical is being reported as ‘PPH’ which is probably Dowanol PPh Glycol Ether. It was apparently added at a rate of about 5%.

The water treatment facility, Ken is reporting, thinks that their treatment process would have removed this chemical from the local drinking water. Additional tests are on-going to determine if that is true.

Blending of various chemicals to improve product performance is not an unusual practice in the chemical industry. Typically the blended products are given new names to help differentiate their improved performance. Current hazard communication rules do require that product material safety data sheets have to list hazardous materials when they are more than 1% of the product composition. Dow states that the PPh (which is more than 99% Propylene glycol phenyl ether) is an OSHA hazardous material, so it looks like it should have been listed on the Freedom MSDS.

It does not appear, however, from any of the news reports that I have seen, that Freedom Industries has provided their own MSDS for the Crude MCHM that they sold; they were apparently using the Eastman MSDS that would not have included references to PPh.

The Dow toxicity testing, which appears to be more extensive than the Eastman toxicity testing for MCHM, would seem to indicate that the PPh was less toxic than the Crude MCHM, but it would have slightly different medical effects. Again, PPh is a relatively non-hazardous industrial chemical that was never intended to be used in processes that would lead to human ingestion.


NOTE: There is a brief reference in Ken’s article to National Guard testing of the water. An earlier news report from WCHS-TV indicated that the 34th Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team was providing laboratory support to the water treatment facility. According to a Virginia National Guard web site, other CST’s are also involved.

Tuesday, January 21, 2014

CFATS Knowledge Center Update – 1-21-14

Today the folks at DHS ISCD have updated their CFATS Knowledge Center by revising the response to one of the frequently asked questions on the site. According to the ‘Latest News’ section of the landing page: “The answer to FAQ 1579 regarding colleges and university facilities was updated to provide greater clarity and an updated link.” Actually, there was no link on the previous version (dating to 7-1-09) of the FAQ response.

FAQ # 1579 asks:

“How does a college define itself if it has multiple facilities, yet only a few select facilities possess Chemicals of Interest (COI) that are subject to being regulated by the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS)?”

The new response explains:

“All facilities, including colleges and universities, have the flexibility to define the parameters of their facilities. CFATS requirements are facility-specific. As such, an institution of higher learning can, if appropriate, submit a Top-Screen on a facility-by-facility basis or on a campus-wide basis. However, the Department will evaluate whether or not the facility or facilities, if determined to be high-risk, have complied with CFATS and, specifically, the Risk-Based Performance Standards (RBPS). Guidance, options and exclusions are presented in Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS); Final Rule, Section III (B)(1) Colleges and Universities 6 C.F.R. pt.27 (2007), available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_appendixafinalrule.pdf.”

NOTE: Once again, sorry about the lack of a link to the FAQ or it’s response, but the FAQ listing does not use permanent links.


It would have been a tad bit more helpful if the link had been to the actual Federal Register entry and included the page number (65411) for the actual information.

EO 13650 §6(a) RFI – Other Agencies

This is another in a series of posts addressing the recent request for information (RFI) from the EO 13650 Working Group. That RFI addressed requirements in §6(a) of the Improving Chemical Safety and Security Executive Order (EO 13650) for the Working Group to “develop options for improved chemical facility safety and security that identify improvements to existing risk management practices through agency programs, private sector initiatives, Government guidance, outreach, standards, and regulations”. Earlier posts in the series include:


While EPA, OSHA and NPPD are the major players in the Working Group, two other agencies also have various roles to play in the chemical safety and security realm; the Coast Guard and the ATF. They also have areas for potential improvements identified in this RFI. In this post we will take a look at those two agencies.

Coast Guard

The Coast Guard is responsible for chemical safety and security in and around maritime shipping; this includes some port facilities. The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA, 46 USC Chapter 701) governs the security of port facilities. The major goal of the Coast Guard security activities revolves around the prevention of maritime transportation security incidents (TSI).

There is only one comment in the RFI about possible changes in the Coast Guard programs (pg 5):

• The Coast Guard is working with NPPD and other elements within the Department of Homeland Security to seek input on improving the safety and security of the nation’s maritime critical infrastructure.

MTSA covered port facilities are currently exempted from coverage under the DHS CFATS program. There had been an attempt at formulating a rule for those exempt facilities to at least submit a Top Screen under the CFATS program so that there would be a better understanding of what the potential terrorist chemical threat was at these facilities, but that has apparently been abandoned.

ATF

The ATF is responsible for the enforcement of federal explosives laws that deal with explosives in commerce. This includes licensing, storage and record keeping. That jurisdiction does not include precursors to explosives (such as ammonium nitrate, which is a precursor to the commercial explosive ANFO).

The Working Group has identified six areas of potential improvements that the ATF could make to promote the safety and security of chemicals related to commercial explosives. They are (pgs 5-6):

• Developing and encouraging best practices related to safety and security of precursor materials used in the explosives manufacturing and operational processes, to include ammonium nitrate;
• Examining potential applications of quantitative risk assessment tools to explosives-related industry operations;
• Continued partnering with industry to develop means to account for bulk materials and ammonium nitrate;
• Effective implementation of outreach programs to identify and report suspicious and unsafe behaviors associated with unregulated explosives and precursor chemical materials;
• Means for mitigating duplicative Federal qualification and inspection requirements; and
• Unsafe making of explosive materials by unregulated persons.

Agencies Absent from RFI

There are three other agencies that have important chemical security and safety regulatory roles that were not included in the RFI; DHS’s Transportation Security Agency (TSA), DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the Department of Agriculture. TSA is responsible for regulating the secure transportation of various hazardous chemicals, while PHMSA is responsible for the safe shipment. The Department of Agriculture is responsible for regulating the use of a large number of hazardous chemicals in the agricultural setting.

There is no mention of why the chemical safety and security programs of these three agencies were not included in this RFI.

Suggestions

The Coast Guard should resume their project to incorporate Top Screen data submissions in the management of their port side security program under MTSA. They should also consider using the CFATS Security Vulnerability Assessment Tool to more accurately assess the chemical security hazards at such facilities.

The ATF should also consider the use of Top Screen data for identifying facilities producing or storing explosives precursor chemicals for use in their out-reach campaign.

The biggest hole in the chemical security process is the security of chemicals in transit. While establishing effective and economically sensible security measures will be difficult, an effort needs to be made to move forward in this area. Concepts that deserve to be looked at include:

• TSA needs to complete its security training regulations for bulk chemical transportation by rail;
• Tracking of all toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) bulk chemical shipments;
• Establishing automatic notification systems for accidents involving TIH bulk chemical shipments; and
• Mandating federal reporting of transport theft/diversion of chemical precursors to chemical weapons or explosives.

Public Comments

This is a reminder that the whole purpose of this RFI is to get public feedback on these proposed ideas. The RFI requests the public to respond to these specific proposals for areas of improvement. That response should address the following (pg 9):

• Examples of where implementation of the same or similar options has been successful;
• Information or data that would characterize the positive impacts the options might have, including additional benefits;
• Potential limitations or unintended consequences of the options described;
• Methods for implementing the options, including methods for potentially increasing benefits or reducing costs; or
• Alternatives to the options that could achieve substantially the same result.


Comments need to be submitted by March 31st, 2014. They may be submitted via the Federal eRulemaking Portal (www.Regulatons.gov; Docket #OSHA-2013-0026). 

Monday, January 20, 2014

Chemical Safety and Security EO – Any Movement?

This is part of a continuing series of blog posts discussing President Obama’s executive order on “Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security” (EO 13650). The other posts in the series are:



I have been writing a series of blog posts on the request for information published last month seeking public input on areas that the organizations represented on the Working Group should be doing to improve chemical safety and security. This is all in support of §6(a) requirements from the EO. What about the other 90-day deadline requirements? What were they? Here is my list from an earlier blog:

The Attorney General, through the head of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), shall assess the feasibility of sharing data related to the storage of explosive materials with SERCs, TEPCs, and LEPCs. No Public Action.

The Secretary of Homeland Security shall assess the feasibility of sharing Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) data with SERCs, TEPCs, and LEPCs on a categorical basis. No Public Action.

The Working Group shall consult with the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) and determine what, if any, changes are required to existing memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and processes between EPA and CSB, ATF and CSB, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and CSB for timely and full disclosure of information. No Public Action.

The Working Group shall develop an analysis, including recommendations, on the potential to improve information collection by and sharing between agencies to help identify chemical facilities which may not have provided all required information or may be non-compliant with Federal requirements to ensure chemical facility safety. No Public Action.

The Working Group shall develop options for improved chemical facility safety and security that identifies improvements to existing risk management practices through agency programs, private sector initiatives, Government guidance, outreach, standards, and regulations. This is being addressed under the §6(a) RFI.

The Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary of Agriculture shall develop a list of potential regulatory and legislative proposals to improve the safe and secure storage, handling, and sale of ammonium nitrate and identify ways in which ammonium nitrate safety and security can be enhanced under existing authorities. Partially addressed by EPA guidance document.

The Administrator of EPA and the Secretary of Labor shall review the chemical hazards covered by the Risk Management Program (RMP) and the Process Safety Management Standard (PSM) and determine if the RMP or PSM can and should be expanded to address additional regulated substances and types of hazards. Partially addressed by OSHA PSM RFI and §6(a) RFI.

The EPA and the Department of Labor shall develop a plan, including a timeline and resource requirements, to expand, implement, and enforce the RMP and PSM in a manner that addresses the additional regulated substances and types of hazards. Partially waiting on public feedback from OSHA PSM RFI and §6(a) RFI.

The Secretary of Homeland Security shall identify a list of chemicals, including poisons and reactive substances, that should be considered for addition to the CFATS Chemicals of Interest list. No Public Action.

The Secretary of Labor shall identify any changes that need to be made in the retail and commercial grade exemptions in the PSM Standard. Partially addressed by OSHA PSM RFI and §6(a) RFI.

The Secretary of Labor shall issue a Request for Information designed to identify issues related to modernization of the PSM Standard and related standards necessary to meet the goal of preventing major chemical accidents. Fully covered by OSHA PSM RFI; just a month late.

Some work is obviously being done, though extremely slowly since it is over two months since the November 5th deadline and Friday it will be two months after the deadline plus a reset for the Federal funding fiasco (FFF). The reason for the delay, in most cases, is that the level of complexity for the identified problems is very high and there is need for coordinated activities across too many government agencies.

Another Deadline Missed

On December 20th (or January 8th if you accept the FFF excuse) the third deadline was missed. This one was even more obviously going to be missed because it included more agencies and organizations. I described the requirement this way:

The Working Group shall develop a plan to support and further enable efforts by State regulators, State, local, and tribal emergency responders, chemical facility owners and operators, and local and tribal communities to work together to improve chemical facility safety and security. No Public Action.

No Public Action

I have been careful to characterize the activity level on many of these objectives as “No Public Action”. Most of these activities did not specifically require public input or cooperation to meet the deadline requirements so there was no specific requirement to complete the work in public. I suspect (and more than suspect in a couple of instances) that there has been on-going work on the objectives; just no reportable results.

There was no way that the time objectives of the EO were ever going to be met, even ignoring the FFF. The topics were just too complex and there was no single person put in charge. Anyone with any organizational experience had to realize that it was going to take at least a month for the Working Group to get organized and actually start working.

It is becoming more and more obvious that this effort is bogging down because of a combination of bureaucratic infighting, a way too complex agenda, and the fact that it is going to take legislation to correct most of the problems identified. And we all know that most of these issues will not be dealt with by Congress in an election year. In fact, they probably will not be dealt with by Congress until there is a veto proof (internal and external) single party majority in both the Senate and House.


Unless, of course, someone blows up something much larger than West, Texas.

Freedom Spill - In a Perfect World What Should Have Happened, Part III

This is the third in a short series of posts about what probably should have happened in Charleston, WV a little over a week ago now when a spill of Crude MCHM shutdown the water supply of well over 100,000 people for most of a week. The earlier post (listed below) I described how the water company could have kept the water out of its system in a perfect world.


Even if the Freedom facility and the water treatment facility did not live in a perfect world, if communications had been perfect then the prolonged shutdown and the post-shutdown exposure anxiety could have been avoided in this instance. What would this perfect communication looked like.

Potential Hazards Identified

By all news reports, Freedom Industries had complied with all of its chemical notification requirements. It had filed it reports to State and local authorities about the bulk storage of Crude MCHM. As is typical for these reports, particularly for those chemicals not regulatorially (new word) identified as hazardous, the reports were briefly looked at and then filed.

If the State and local authorities had entered the chemical storage data into an appropriate georgraphical information system (GIS) application, they would have seen that there was just a short distance away a water treatment plant that could be affected in the event of a spill at the Freedom site that made it into the nearby river. While the State and local authorities can be forgiven for not knowing if this could have any specific impact to the treatment facility, they should have notified the facility of the type and quantity of any chemicals in bulk storage upstream of the facility.

If the water treatment facility had received advanced notification from State and local authorities, it could have determined in advance whether or not their routine treatment activities would remove the chemical from any water entering the facility. They also could have acquired the testing capability to detect the chemical in their inlet and output waters.

Leak Notifications

There is no CERCLA reporting requirement for Crude MCHM as it is not a hazardous chemical and thus does not have a federal ‘reportable quantity’. However, given the close proximity of the tank farm to the Elk River, as soon as the leak broached the containment wall there should have been notification to the Coast Guard’s National Response Center (NRC), the agency that is responsible for coordinating all chemical spill information.

One would like to think that the NRC had appropriate GIS programs in place to identify the location of the spill and immediately be aware of the downstream water treatment plant. Immediate notification could then have been made to the plant about the spill.

Assuming that the Elk River is flowing at a relatively gentle 3 mph and is a half-mile upstream of the water treatment plant’s intakes, it would have taken the about 20 minutes for the first traces of the Crude MCHM to reach the intakes. This makes it clear that any notifications would have to be made promptly and follow-up actions needed to be taken with dispatch to avoid contamination of the treatment facility equipment.

Community Notification

As soon as the water treatment facility became aware of an upstream spill of a chemical that they knew could not be removed by their treatment processes, plans would have been initiated for a shutdown of the water intake. These plans would have included notification to all customers (direct notification and notification via the media) that there would be an impending shortage of treated water. This would have allowed people to start taking measures to ensure that they had drinking water on hand for the time of the shutdown.

Communications According to Law

It currently appears that Freedom Industries made all of the chemical notifications, including spill notification (none), required by law. It appears that current reporting requirements (and follow-up planning requirements) do not address the special case of chemical spills upstream of the water intake of a water treatment facility.


It is readily apparent that the chemical notification and planning processes need to be revised to address this situation. In a future post in the series, I will propose what I think those changes should include.

OMB Announces Receipt of DOT Phone ANPRM

Saturday the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) announced that it had received an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) from the Department of Transportation concerning the use of mobile wireless devices for voice calls on aircraft. I have no idea what the rule making would say (allow/prohibit/restrict???) since this was not covered in the fall unified agenda. Technically that means that this cannot be significant regulation.
 
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