Review - CSB Updated the Status of 5 Investigation Recommendations – 9-16-26

Earlier this week, the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) updated their Recent Recommendation Status Updates page, closing three recommendations with ‘acceptable action’, one with ‘acceptable alternative actions’, and one with ‘exceeds recommended action’. These actions left 129 of 1061 recommendations open. Additionally, the CSB updated the open status of three recommendations. The CSB took all of these actions on September 16th, 2026. The previous update was published on August 6th, 2026. 

Closed Recommendations  

The five recently closed recommendations are: 

• Bio-Lab Lake Charles Chemical Fire and Release - 2020-05-I-LA-3 - Bio-Lab Lake Charles,  
• Foundation Food Group Fatal Chemical Release - 2021-03-I-GA-2 - Messer LLC,  
• Foundation Food Group Fatal Chemical Release - 2021-03-I-GA-3 - Messer LLC, 
• Givaudan Sense Colour Explosion - 2024-06-I-KY-11 - International Molasses Corporation LTD, and 
• Givaudan Sense Colour Explosion - 2024-06-I-KY-12 - Corn Refiners Association. 

For more information on the investigation responses, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/csb-updated-the-status-of-5-investigation - subscription required. 

FCC Sends Mobile Ground Station Final Rule to OMB

Yesterday, the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) announced that it had received a final rule from the FCC on “Amendment of Parts 2 and 25 of the FCC Rules to Facilitate the Use of Earth Stations in Motion Communicating with Geostationary Orbit Space Stations in FSS Bands: IB Docket No. 17-95”. A notice of proposed rulemaking was published on June 16th, 2017. A further notice of proposed rulemaking was published on July 24th, 2020. Portions of the first NPRM were adopted in a Report and Order notice published on July 24th, 2020. 

According to the 2026 Unified Agenda entry for this rulemaking: 

“In June 2017, the Commission began a rulemaking to streamline, consolidate, and harmonize rules governing earth stations in motion (ESIMs) used to provide satellite-based services on ships, airplanes and vehicles communicating with geostationary-satellite orbit (GSO), fixed-satellite service (FSS) satellite systems. In September 2018, the Commission adopted rules governing communications of ESIMs with GSO satellites. These rules addressed communications in the conventional C-, Ku-, and Ka-bands, as well as portions of the extended Ku-band. At the same time, the Commission also released a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that sought comment on allowing ESIMs to operate in all of the frequency bands in which earth stations at fixed locations operating in GSO FSS satellite networks can be blanket-licensed. Specifically, comment was sought on expanding the frequencies available for communications of ESIMs with GSO FSS satellites to include the following frequency bands: 10.7-10.95 GHz, 11.2-11.45 GHz, 17.8-18.3 GHz, 18.8-19.3 GHz, 19.3-19.4 GHz, 19.6-19.7 GHz (space-to-Earth); and 28.6-29.1 GHz (Earth-to-space).” 

NOTE: The above UA agenda entry was posted in the ‘Long Term Actions’ portion of the Agenda with a note: “Next Action Undetermined”. It is unusual, but not unprecedented, for a rulemaking to so quickly change status. 

This rulemaking will only receive limited notice in this blog under my limited Space Geek coverage. 

CISA Announces VINCE-NT

Earlier this week CISA announced their upgraded coordinated vulnerability disclosure platform, VINCE-NT. This new platform will replace the VINCE CVD hosted by Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute; which was primarily focused on vulnerabilities in industrial control systems. The old VINCE site reports that “after November 17, 2026, all CISA vulnerability reports must be submitted through VINCE-NT.” 

According to CISA’s CVD landing page the new VINCE-NT program is designed to expand the CISA CVD program to include: 

• Operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS),  
• Internet of things (IoT) devices,    
• Medical devices,  
• Open source software,  
• Artificial intelligence (AI), and 
• IT systems.  

The new VINCE-NT data collection form is hosted on a CISA.gov web page. As such it is required to provide a reference to the OMB Control Number for that information collection to show that it has been appropriately reported to, and reviewed by, OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to ensure that it conforms to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). This new VINCE-NT data collection page does not provide an OMB Control Number. Back in February, OIRA did approve a new ICR for a “CISA Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) Platform” with an OMB Control Number of 1670-0058. 

Review - CSB Publishes Shell Polymers Final Report

On Tuesday, the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) announced that it had published their final report on the June 2025, process explosion at the Shell Polymers Monaca (Shell) facility in Monaca, Pennsylvania. While no deaths or injuries were caused by this explosion, it did result in $95 million in property damages and the release of an estimated 5,100 pounds of ethylene and combustion products. This currently leaves six ongoing investigations. 

According to the Executive Summary of the Report:  

“On the day of the incident, Shell was returning Furnace 5 to operation after cleaning its coke trap. During the return to operation, a process control engineer (also called a PACO engineer), who had never previously performed the task involved in this procedure, inadvertently opened a valve during the start-up sequence, leading to an unintended flow path of flammable cracked gas between the downstream quench tower and Furnace 5. Four of the other seven furnaces were actively producing cracked gas, and the flammable cracked gas backflowed from the quench tower to the furnace. Roughly just 6 minutes after the PACO engineer sent the inadvertent open command to the valve, cracked gas entered the firebox, contacted the lit pilots, and ignited.” 

Recommendations  

The Report makes two safety recommendations, both for Shell Polymers Monaca: 

2025-05-I-PA-1 – Review the Shell Polymers Monaca Ethane Cracking Unit process hazard analysis to identify process deviations that are addressed solely with administrative controls. Implement an inherently safer design or an engineered control for any scenario identified that could result in a fatality, serious injury, or substantial property damage. 

2025-05-I-PA-2 – Based on licensor input and good industry practices, such as ANSI/ISA-61511-2-2018 / IEC 61511-2:2016, Functional Safety – Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector – Part 2: Guidelines for the application of IEC 61511-1:2016 and Part 3: Guidance for the Determination of the Required Safety Integrity Levels, implement and maintain an engineered control to prevent backflow of cracked gas into a furnace during all modes of furnace operation. 

For more information on the report, including safety issues identified, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/csb-publishes-shell-polymers-final - subscription required.