Friday, April 17, 2009

When do Mobile Hazmat Sources Become Facilities?

Because I have been recently writing articles for the Journal of Hazmat Transportation I have been paying more attention to regulations concerning hazmat transportation. Last week the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) published a new Final Rule with some changes to the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR). One change caught my interest because of potential chemical facility security implications.

Mobile Refrigeration Systems The preamble to the Final Rule (74 FR 16136) describes mobile refrigeration systems this way:
“In the NPRM, in response to Western Growers Association (WGA) petition P-1352, we proposed to revise the HMR to provide for the transportation of large, mobile refrigeration systems used by the agricultural produce industry at field sites to help preserve freshly harvested fruit and vegetables. These refrigeration systems consist of ASME non-DOT specification pressure components with a maximum total volumetric capacity per vehicle of 2,500 gallons.”
The reason these systems are covered under the HRM is that, while in transportation to and from their field locations, they contain residual amounts of Division 2.2 refrigerant gases or anhydrous ammonia, both of which are hazardous materials under DOT regulations.

Temporary Hazmat Facilities What is interesting to me is not so much the transportation aspects of this equipment, but what happens when these systems are set up and operating. With a 2,500 gallon capacity and using anhydrous ammonia, it would appear that this equipment contains a screening threshold quantity (10,000 lbs for anhydrous ammonia) of a chemical of interest as defined in 6 CFR §27.200(b)(2). The CFATS regulations do not make separate provisions for permanent or temporary facilities.

A chemical facility is defined as “any establishment that possesses or plans to possess [emphasis added], at any relevant point in time, a quantity of a chemical substance determined by the Secretary to be potentially dangerous or that meets other risk-related criteria identified by the Department” (6 CFR §27.105). Now the typical rural location where these systems would be expected to be set up would probably ensure that the submitted Top Screen would not result in a finding by DHS that they were high-risk chemical facilities.

However, with the rapid spread of suburbia into farming areas in many parts of the country, this would not always be true. And since DHS refuses to share their criteria for the ‘high-risk chemical facility’ selection, there is no practical way for the owners of these systems to determine if a particular location would make them high-risk.

 Practically speaking it would be nearly impossible for DHS to enforce CFATS rules on these facilities. A facility has 60-days from the time they have an STQ amount of a COI on site before they must complete their Top Screen. Technically, I suppose that they would have to submit a Top Screen within 60-days of when they filled a unit on site, even if the unit was drained and moved within that 60-day limit. Practically, even if the unit were set up somewhere that made it an attractive terrorist target, it would be drained and gone before the letter arrived from DHS that the ‘facility’ was initially determined to be a ‘high-risk’ facility and an SVA required.

Why Worry About This? I would assume that the operators of these systems are not complying with the reporting requirements of the CFATS regulations. I would bet that many are not even aware of the requirements. I would also bet that none of these systems has a security plan more advanced than having locks on the drain valves. Since the largest normal threat to these refrigeration systems is pilfering of anhydrous ammonia by illicit meth manufacturers, this would typically be sufficient.

But, somewhere this next harvest season one of these units will be parked just upwind of a rural school, hospital, nursing home or a spreading suburban housing development. Or perhaps one will be deployed to a major urban area hit by a flood, tornado or hurricane to support relief operations. In any of these cases the population density could be raised to the point where the temporary site fits the description for a Tier 4 CFATS designation as a high-risk chemical facility. But, no one will know because a Top Screen will not be filed because of the rules ‘don’t apply to me’ attitude associated with this ‘low risk’, temporary facility. Finally, I doubt that this is the only type of ‘temporary’ chemical facility currently in existence.

What to Do? First off, this is not an urgent issue. Let’s get the Site Security Plans for large fixed-site high-risk chemical facilities out of the way first. Then DHS can take a look at this type of issue. First, DHS will need to establish a definition of what constitutes a ‘temporary chemical facility’. That definition needs to include a minimum and maximum time that will constitute ‘temporary’.

Below the minimum time, the facility should be considered ‘in transportation’ and covered by the 49 CFR security rules. Above the maximum time limit the facility should be treated as a regular fixed site. Temporary facilities that house Theft/Diversion or Sabotage COI should be regulated regardless of their proximity to populated areas. The current rules for Top Screens, Security Vulnerability Assessments and Site Security Plans could be adapted to be equipment oriented rather than location oriented.

The security apparatus, and registration would move with the equipment from temporary location to temporary location. Temporary facilities that contained Release COI (like anhydrous ammonia) would be regulated according to their proximity to populated areas. The guiding principal would be the number of people within the affected area of a potential catastrophic release of the COI. Below a certain number of at hazard population there would be a minimal level of security required.

There would then be a threshold established for each of the four Tier levels with different security requirements for each level. Those security standards would be established in advance so that the owner could include the cost of security into his cost calculations for site selection. High-risk chemical facilities come in all sorts of types and sizes. Now we need to start considering if they can also be temporary as well as permanent.

No comments:

 
/* Use this with templates/template-twocol.html */